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Abstract
Ethicon Endo-Surgery (EES), a Johnson & Johnson company, has experienced consistent
supply problems when introducing new products. On several occasions, demand for a
new endoscopic surgical instrument has outstripped EES's ability to supply the insbllment.
(Demand in this sense refers to the volume of product ordered by distributors.) Depleted
finished goods inventories have translated into several mOliths of continuous stockouts. In
response, production has been forced to quickly ramp up its output in an effort to restore
consistent supply to distributors and, consequently, to end·cu~tomers (hospitals).
Ethicon Endo-Surgery's strategy of rapidly developing innovative products and of
servicing hospitals through new sales channels has earned it tremendous success in the
market for endoscopic surgical instruments. In keeping with EES's product development
strategy, the original research problem focused on forecasting demand for new products.
Having consistently experienced supply shortages for new products, EES felt that being
able to better predict distributor demand could help alleviate the supply problems. In
other words, EES wanted to understand the extrinsic factors associated with new product
introductions.
Interestingly, the extrinsic factors did not tum out to be nearly as important as the intrinsic
factors. Distributor demand was found to be surprisingly predictable and stable relative to
production. Variations in production rates from week to week and from month to month
often exceeded the corresponding variations in incoming demand. And despite the
relatively stable demand, finished goods inventory levels were found to be well in excess
of corporate objectives (on the order of $10 million). The real issue, therefore, was not in
predicting distributor ordering patterns, but in the way that EES convened the orders into
actual production plans and inventory policies.
In this thesis, I provide the research path that began with an extrinsic view of new product
introductions and ended with a focus on processes within EES. I will demonstrate that
distributor demand patterns are relatively predictable, even during new product
introductions. I will then show how month-to-month changes in production exceeded
month-to-month changes in demand for both new products and stable products. An
analysis of finished goods inventory levels uncovered inventory well in excess of corporate
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objectives. Why was the leverage for improving product supply initially believed [0 exist
in understanding extrinsic factors? I argue that the organizational structure, incentives,
planning processes, and infonnation systems were largely responsible for the
organization's external focus. No single group or person had the ability or the incentives
to tie together the key pieces of the puzzle. Lack of readily available infomlation made
the task even more difficult. ..
Lastly, I present a new production system that, in light of the research findings, should
help inlprove EES's internal operations. 'Ibis new system, in contrast to the current
monthly forecasting and planning system, uses simple concepts of "demand-pull" to
schedule production. Simulation modeling efforts demonstrate that, even with the most
extreme demand patterns, variation in demand can actually be reduced in production.
Reduced variation results in reduced inventory with improved delivery service. From an
organizational standpoin~ the system naturally emphasizes cycle time reduction, inventory
reduction, and increased flexibility. I will show how these benefits complement, rather
than conflict, with each other, resulting in the ability to align incentives throughout the
manufacturing function.
Thesis Advisors:
Al Drake
Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Rebecca Henderson
Associate Professor of Strategic Management
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Executive Summary
With rapid product development central to Ethicon Endo-Surgery's business
strategy, the ability to introduce new products smoothly into the market has been of
critical importance for success. Introducing products smoothly requires having finished
product consistently available to supply to distributors and hospitals. Unfonunately, the
past several years have brought new product introductions that were not always smooth.
Orders coming into Ethicon Endo-Surgery (EES) often outstripped production capacity,
depleting inventories and sending the product into back order l . This defined the basis of
the res~arch as understanding hospjtal and distributor2 ordering behavior for new
products. The intention was to develop forecasting techniques to predict the incoming
demand and to offer a strategy for planning for introductions based on those predictions.
By understanding the ordering behavior of hospitals and distributors, EES could build up
an appropriate level of finished goods inventory prior to the introduction.
The fust several months of the research were spent investigating distributor and
hospital ordering and inventory policies, panicularly in relation to new products. Three
impottant findings emerged (refer to Chapter 3 in the thesis):
1. Distributors typically build inventory during the fIrSt few weeks of an
introduction, resulting in an ordering "spike." The spike is immediately
followed by steady demand;
2. The demand "spike" can be easily predicted;
3. No evidence could be found that distributor demand increases due to
"panic orderinglt or due to increasing safety stock policies.
The initial spike in demand occurring during the fust few weeks of the introduction was
found to be largely responsible for demand outstripping supply and, consequently, for new
I "Back order" in this case refers to the condition when there are more orders for a product than can be
immediately supplied from finisheci goods inventory.
2Ethicon Endo-Surgery uses domestic dealers to dislribule prodUCl within the United States and Johnson
&. Johnson affiliates to dislribute product internationally. The term "distributor" will be used at this point
to refer to both dealers and afrdiales.
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products falling into back order. I originally held a belief that distributors would increase
their ordering in response to a product falling into back order. This has since been
disproved. The belief stemmed from various repons that distributors "panic order" (i.e.,
game with the EcS order filling policies in an effon to increase the probability of receiving
product) and, as a result of increased delivery lead times, increase safety stock levels.
Variation in PrOduction Exceeds Variation in Demand
After discovering a consistent, predictable pattern for new product demand, I investigated
how EES reacted internally to the demand (see Chapter 4 of the thesis). All examined
products revealed that the initial "spike" was under-forecast, forcing the production
processes to quickly ramp up to meet the incoming demand. The reaction from a
production standpoint was found to be rather extreme -- production output would literally
double from one month to the next. Even more surprising, the production processes,
designed largely to shield specific operations from variations in demand, were found to
vary significantly more from month to month than the incoming demand. The monthly
changes in production rate often exceeded the monthly changes in demand by a factor of
two.
Products other than new products were also found to demonstrate a similar
panern. In one panicular case, the assembly production rate nearly quadrupled within a
five week period. Changes in demand for the product were not nearly as significant.
As a side but related issue, fmished goods inventory levels were found to
significantly exceed the corporate inventory objective (see Chapter 6 of the thesis). The
current inventory policy, stated in tenns of weeks of inventory, translated into a higher
service level than the corporate selVice level objective. Alternatively, the corporate
objective translated into a significantly lower inventory level than the current policy. The
magnitude of the difference has been calculated to be on the order of $10 million.
Why Was the Leverage Believed to Exist with Extrinsic Factors?
Given that distributor demand turned out to be predictable for new pre duct introductions;
and given that the demand was relatively stable for all products (see Chapter 9 of the
thesis), the question that should immediately come to mind is, Why was the leverage for
improvement initially believed to exist with extrinsic factors? The ability to recognize the
internal factors of the analysis hinged on combining three critical pieces of data -- demand,
inventory, and production (see Chapter 8). By examining production rates relative to
demand, the fact that demand is relatively stable and that production varies considerably
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more becomes immediately evident. Bv adding inventory to the graph, the timing of back
order with production responses becomes clear. Additionally, placing inventory and
demand on the same graph helps demonstrate how high the inventory levels really are.
Finally, a graphical view of the demand data over an extended period of time demonstrates
the steady trends of most of EES's products.
The research found that no one single group or person had immediate incentives to
combine separate pieces of the puzzle. One part of the organizaticn, the central planning
group, was responsible for developing forecasts and monthly production "plans. It The
"plans" were actually the volume of product that needed to be transferred into finished
goods inventory to satisfy the forecast demand. Therefore, they did not provide insight
into the actual production schedules (see Chapter 2 of the thesis for an explanation of the
current ITlonthly planning process). Additionally, the central planning group's "view" of
demand was limited to monthly snapshots taken only over the preceding few months.
With another group, the primary responsibility was in scheduling prcxluction and ordering
component parts from suppliers. Creating the schedules based off forecasts from the
central planning group did not require significant knowledge of product demand. With yet
another group, management of inventory was the primary responsibility. This group,
however, did not have responsibility for creating the prcxluction schedules or for
interpreting demand data.
The other imponant factor to consider is that the demand, inventory, and
production data was difficult to obtain. Data concerning the assembly schedules could not
be obtained for most plants. In the case of one particular plant, it had to be pulled from a
local spreadsheet. And once obtained, the infonnation often had to be convened into
comparable units. For example, much of the monthly information was based on quanerly
financial calendar months. The financial quarter is composed of three months of four
weeks, four weeks, and five weeks in length. The five week months had to be converted
into equivalent four week months.
How Can EES's Production System Be Improved?
The fortunate pan of demand being relatively stable is that the production system can
potentially be greatly simplified. In particular, a simple Order Point / Order Quantity
(OP/OQ) "Pull" policy can be used to schedule production (see Chapter 10 of the thesis).
This policy simply states that when inventory drops below a cenain point, a new batch of
product should be initiated through the production process. No forecasting is necessary t
so inaccurate forecasts can no longer be an excuse for not providing a high level of
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customer service. Aside from the potential to reduce variation in converting demand into
production, the policy emphasizes cycle time reduction, inventory reduction, and increased
flexibility. It also very simply allows demand, inventory, and production to be controlled
within one manageable group.
Final Remarks Before Proceeding Forward
In summary, this thesis will show that in EES's case the ability to cope with external
complexity depends critically on the ability to reduce complexity internally. An important
distinction should be made between the tendency to find ways of accommodating
complexity and the need to find ways of reducing it. This idea is presented clearly in
chapter 7 of Dynamic Manufaciurin: by Hayes, Clark, and Wheelwright3, and in
ReeniineerioK the Corporation by Hammer and Champy4. (This will also be discussed
briefly in Chapter 1 of the thesis). As EES moves to improve its product supply to
hospitals, I advocate finding ways of reducing rather than accommodating complexity
throughout its produCtiOll and business processes. Anyone reading this thesis will find that
this theme consistently arises in several chapters. So that my conclusions will be best
understood, I ask that the redder keep this in mind as he or she proceeds fOlWard.
3Hay&, ~., S. Wheelwright, K. Clark, Dynamic Manufacturios: Creatins the Learning QraanizatioD,
New York: Free Press, 1988.
4Hammer, M., J. Champy, Reeoeineerins the Comoration: A Manifesto for Business Revolution, New
York: HarperCollins T'Ublishers, Inc., 1993.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Johnson & Johnson is the world's largest and most diversified health care company,
boasting revenues of $15.7 billion in 19945• Johnson & Johnson's products range from
consumer goods to professional equipment, and from BAND-AIDTM brand adhesive
bandages to surgical instruments. Baby JXlwder, Tylenol™ brand pain relief products,
sutures, contact lenses, scalpels, dialysis machines, CO2 surgical laser systems, and
phannaceuticals are just a sample of offerings. Equally as diverse are Johnson &
Johnson's customers -- an aching high-school student and a highly-specialized surgeon are
equally likely to use its products. Having such a diverse set of products and customers
places unique demands on an organization. To compensate, Johnson & Joh.lson
approaches these demands with an emphasis on decenttalization. Comprised of over 160
individual companies, Johnson & Johnson is actually an established network of
autonomous business units that each detennine their own mission and are responsible for
quarterly and annual financial reJXlning to the parent company6.
The research in this thesis focuses on a recently fonned Johnson & Johnson
company, Ethicon Endo-Surgery. Ethicon Eodo-Surgery (EES) was spun-off from its
parent, Ethicon Inc., in 1992 to address the unique needs of the endoscopic and
mechanical surgical ~nstrument businesses'. The research itself is a result of my internship
conducted under the auspices of the Leaders for Manufacturing (LFM) program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The LFM program is sponsored by Johnson &
SJohnson & Johnson 1994 Annual Repon
6Por further infonnation on Johnson & Johnson's individual companies, refer to: Aguilar, Francis J. and
Arvind Shambri. Johnson cl Johnson (A), Harvard Business School Case Services, Case SWdy #384..053,
1983.
'Endoscopic surgery is a rapidly emerging surgical technique characterized as minimally invasive. With
this technique. the surgeon ~sentially perfonns the surgery on a video screen. Surgical instruments along
with an optical device are inserted into the body through small incisions. The sur~eon then guides the
insttuments' actions by watching the screen. Once the necessuy actions have been completed, the
inS1lUmcnts and scope are removed from the body and the snaall incisions are closed. The small size of
the incisions often results in a shonened patient recovery time.
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Johnson along with twelve other industrial companies8• Through Johnson & ~rohnson's
participation in LFM and as an opponunity presented to LFM Fellows, I conducted the
research effons at Ethicon Endo-Surgery's main site in Cincinnati, Ohio. The internship
itselfran six-and-a-half months, from June through mid-December of 1994, with two
initial site visits conducted in April and May of the same year. Two company supervisors
and two M.I.T. advisors provided guidance. After returning to M.I.T. in January of the
following year (1995), I proceeded to write up my findings and conclusions in this thesis.
1.2 blttrnship Project Background
Ethicon Endo-Surgery has grown rapidly dw-ing its shon existence. Its chief competitor,
U.S. Surgical Corporation, maintained almost complete control of the minimally invasive
surgery market as recently as 1989. Now, as of late-1994, Ethicon Endo-Surgery claims
to have captured the market share lead9. This tremendous market success has reqUired a
large emphasis on marketing, sales, and rapid product de"elopment. With its main
customers being hospital materials managers and surgeons (as opposed to household
consumers), EES has had to rely on a sales force that could establish important
relationships and reliably deliver quality products. Being a relatively new company, EES
has also had to concentrate on mpidly developing products to fill out product line
offerings. A complete product line increases the company's attractiveness to potential new
hospital customers -- a direct result of hospitals that typically purchase through second-
pany vendors (specifically, group purchasing organizations or GPOSIO) and need a
sufficient volume of product to justify a re-writing of purchasing contracts.
Now that Ethicon Endo-Surgery has established itself in the market, it faces the
task of establishing solid business processes and finding ways of reducing operating costs
(i.e., inventory and cost of goods sold). Yet, the ability to rapidly develop new products
continues as pan of the company's mission, presenting challenges unique to its parent's 80-
year old suture business. One of these challenges, understanding supply chain reactions
(principally, distributor and hospital reactions) to new product introductions, forms the
BThe other sponsoring companies include Alcoa, Boeing, Chrysler, Digital Equipment Corporation
(DEC), Ford, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, Kodak, Motorola, Polaroid, and United Technologies
Corporation (UTe).
9Sman, T., "Can u.s. Surgical Make a Full Reco\Wery?:' Business Week, Dec. 5, 1994. It should also be
noted that Ethicon Endo-Surgery's market share leadership claim has been disputed by the CEO of U.S.
Surgical. The facl that a controversy even exists provides enough evidence of EES's remarkable growth.
IOpor a better understanding of group purchasing organizations (GPOs), see for example, SCOll, L.,
"Group Purchasing Evolution," Modem Healthcare, SepL 27, 1993.
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initial focus of the research. As will be described, the focus shifted slightly as the
internship progressed.
After arriving at the site last June, I worked with several people at Ethicon Endo-
Surgery to create a well-defined project proposal. The drafted proposal described the
need to "find the lever" that would improve EES's supply and distribution process.
Original discussions with EES representative~ (back in April and May) hinted at the need
to develop an improved forecasting methodology for new products. The initial direction
to understand distributor and hospital behavior outside ofEES, as will be discussed ir the
fonhcoming chapters, unexpectedly evolved into an analysis of the planning, inventory,
and forecasting processes within EES. From the research, I found that improvements to
internal processes for AU products would have a significantly greater impact than
improvements in predicting external behavior for~ products. In other words, the
"lever" turned out to exist within the company. This immediately drew into question, Why
was the problem defined throughcut the organization as a forecasting problem? With the
problem defmed as forecasting, I will argue that the organization did not recognize
substantial opportunities to improve internal operations. The internal improvements found
to be possible include reductions in finished g<X>ds inventory and reducing large
production swings. (Finished goods inventories were found to be high relative to desired
service levels11 ,12, and production rates, following a brief period of unexpectedly high
demand, would at times double or ttiple from one month to the next.)
1.3 Thesis Summary
Divided into four pans, this thesis presents the fmdings of my six-and-a-half month
internship at Ethicon Endo-Surgery, offering some explanations of what was observed and
proposing a few fixes and enhancements to the internal operations.
Pan I of the thesis provides the background necessary for understanding the
remainder of the thesis. It describes the entire supply chain from raw materials to the
hospitals'shelves. For clarity, I will refer to the portion of the supply chain that moves
finished goods onto hospital shelves as the "external supply chain." This ponion includes
11Service level here is defined as the percentage of customer orders arriving at EES that are immediately
filled from finished goods inventory. An order that cannot be immediately filled from finished goods
inventory is commmonly refered to as a "stockoUL"
12By "high inventory levels" I refer to the fact that the actual inventory levels for most products suppon a
substantially higher service level than the company's wget service level. By "substantially" I mean that
the target probability of a stockout occuring (i.e., 1 I wget service level) is two orders of magnitude
greater than the actual probability of a stockout occuring (i.e., 11 actual service level). This will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
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hospitals, domestic dealers, international Johnson & Johnson affiliate companies, and
Ethicon Endo-Surgery's distribution center. The "internal supply chain" will refer to the
portion that resides entirely within EES. Included in this portion are the main processes
that convert component pans into finished goods. The production planning processes,
inventory policies, and organizational structures also fall under the internal supply chain
topic. It may be noticed that I do not provide a particular name for the portion of the
supply chain that delivers component parts to Ethicon Endo-Surgery. Raw material
providers and component parts suppliers were not specifically investigated as part of the
internship research.
Pan II, in supponing the initial project proposal to model the external supply
chain, presents an analysis of distributor and hospital ordering patterns for new products.
I show that hospital orders to distributors build quickly to a steady level, rarely reaching a
peak level within the first few months. Distributors, on the other hand, need to build up
inventories when a product is first released. Distributor orders reach a high peak (or
"spike") during the first two weeks of the introduction as distributors build inventory; the
orders then typically drop off to a steady level. For products that faIl into back order13, I
initially hypothesized an additional event. I believed, based on discussions with EES,
dealer, and affiliate representatives, that increased ordering would result for products that
fell into back order. The increased ordering would result from larger safety stock levels
(due to longer waiting periods for delivery of the product) andlor "panic ordering." The
perceived response is similar to the "production-distribution system" model results
presented by Forrcster14 and to the "beer game" description presented by Senge1S where
an increased period of ordering within the supply chain is followed by a period of reduced
ordering. The data, however, demonstrates otherwise -- no increases in ordering are
evident even for even the most severe cases of back order. Finally, I will present a simple
technique (actually, more of a heuristic or "rule-of-thumb") for forecasting the initial
distributor ordering peak. Proper preparation for the peak in distributor demand will help
eliminate the occurrence of back order in new product introductions.
In Pan III, I will demonstrate how the organization reacts internally to back order
during new product introductions. This analysis will put together distributor demand data,
finished goods inventory, and assembly rates to show how fluctuations in demand are
13Back order here and throughout this thesis refers to a period of time when a panicular product is
"stocked out" (there is not enough product in finished goods to immediately fill all customer orders).
14Forrester, J. W., Industrial Dynamics, Cambridge: Productivity Press, 1961.
lSSenge, P. M., The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization, New York:
Doubleday/Currency, 1990.
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followed by amplified internal reactions -- i.e., the magnitude of the production reaction
exceeds the magnitude of any demand fluctuation. It will then be shown that the amplified
reactions occur with any product that falls into back order, independent of new product
introductions. Additionally, I will show that the finished goods inventory levels are
excessive when compared to desired inventory levels when examined using statistical
methods.
After demonstrating the reactions to back order and the high levels of inventory, I
will explain why these fmdings occur. In particular, the original emphasis on marketing
and sales that led to much of EES's marketplace success resulted in strong incentives to
avoid back order. The back order incentive emphasized the expense of high inventories
over benefits of maintaining low inventories, and emphasized the costs associated with
rapid reactions in production over restoring product supply gradually. Additionally, I will
show how the organizational structure, incentives, infonnation systems, and current
business processes did not allow the organization to perceive the "lever" as residing within
its own operations. The problem was originally believed to be a forecasting issue, but the
research uncovered the larger inventory and back order reaction problems. This will
address why the organization framed the problems as external rather than internal. I will
provide an explanation as to how the original business emphasis that made the
organization successful -- marketing, sales, and product development -- resulted in the
organization's own view of its problems.
In Pan IV of the thesis, I present a relatively simple production planning,
scheduling, and inventory management system that I believe will resolve many of EES's
operations problems. The system's design takes into account the product demand patterns
and the flexibility of the current production process. I will show how the ~ystem provides
the correct incentives, organizational structure, and flexibility to address EES's major
objectives (inventory reduction, cycle time reduction, and improved service levels).
Finally, I will demonstrate a simple statistical forecasting technique that improves EES's
current "annual forecast / market intelligence" methodology. Understanding the nature of
product demand was imponant in redesigning the planning and inventory management
system.
In the final concluding chapter, I discuss my final recommendations, as presented
to Ethicon Eodo-Surgery prior to leaving the internship, and offer some additional issues
not addressed in the thesis but worth pursuing.
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1.4 Literatur~ Review
Several aspects of this thesis have been discussed in other texts. The system dynamics
work of Forrester16 demonstrates the effects of delays in a simple production-distribution
model. The model considers a typical supply chain consisting of a retailer, a distributor, a
factory warehouse, and a factory. The retailer receives orders for product from, and ships
product directly to, customers; the distributor receives orders from and ships product to
the retailer; the warehouse receives orders from and ships product to the distributor; and
lastly, the factory orders from and ships to the warehouse. During relatively stable periods
of demand, the ordering and shipping delays do not have much of an influence on
production reltes and inventory levels. When the level of customer demand suddenly
increases by 10%, however, the delays have a tremendous impact throughout the chain.
The 10% increase gets amplified from retailer to factory, reaching a peak order at the
factory 51% higher than the original order level.
Although this amplifying effect was not clearly evident in comparing order levels
from hospitals to order levels at EES, it did exist with conlparisons of dealer demand
(demand into EES) to EES production levels. Much of the thesis will be devoted to
explaining this finding, both organizationally and from a systemic viewpoint. From the
systemic side, Alonso and Frasier discuss the impact of management delays on the lifetime
profitability of a product17• They found that delays in planning can have a significant
impact on how well an organization reacts to changing product demand. In particular,
they compare a lIT system (low planning delays) with an MRP-type system. The impact
of altering the planning delay for Ethicon Endo-Surgery's production system will be
discussed later in this thesis. Further discussion of what has been tenned the "Bullwhip"
effect (amplified variation in the supply chain) can be found in the paper by Lee,
Padmanabhan, and Whangl8•
From the organizational side, Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark19 discuss how an
organization's structure can influence its ability to react to change. Many typical and
successful manufacturing organizations have established incentive structures that naturally
resist change. Under steady conditions when changes are incremental, the incentive
structures can gradually give way to new policies and business processes. The structures
16Forrester, J. W., Industrial Dynamics, Cambridge: Productivity Press, 1961.
17Alonso, R. L., and C. W. Frasier, "JIT Hits Home: A Case Study in Reducing Management Delays,"
Sloan ManaGmenl Review, Summer, 1991.
18Lee. H., P. Padmanabhan, S. Whang, "Infonnation Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect:'
Working Paper, Stanford University, 1995.
19Hayes, R. H., S. C. Wheelwright, K. B. Clark, Dynamic ManufacturinK: Creating the Learning
OraaoizatioD, New York: Free Press, 1988.
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are not as forgiving when the change is dramatic, however. For example, the typical
manufacturing organization contains several product line managers, each having
responsibility for meeting a regular production schedule. The organization may also have
an inventory manager responsible for controlling inventories across the product lines.
Conflict results if an objective is set to drastically reduce inventories. The inventory
manager's job is to reduce inventory, but reducing inventory may result in a stockout of
critical component parts. Without component pans, the product line manager cannot
meet her schedule. The objective of the inventory manager therefore directly clashes with
the objective of the product line manager. A similar conflict was found to exist at Ethicon
Endo-Surgery. This may at least panially explain the difference between current inventory
policy and corporate inventory objectives. (It will be shown that Current policy, stated in
tenns of a selVice level, exceeds the equivalent corporate service level objective.) Other
conflicts will be discussed.
Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark also discuss how a factory's prvduction system can
influence its perfonnance. Two example factories are discussed. The fIrst factory's
operations are divided up by process, with each process having several specialists. A
sophisticated MRP system controls the daily flow of material. Complaints abound of too
much inventory and inaccurate sales forecasts, and operations are hectic and wrought with
complicated problems. Factory B, on the other hand, uses a simple layout with operations
divided along product lines. A simple order point / order quantity replenishing system is
used to detennine production schedules. An MRP system is used, but only to plan longer-
tenn. The amount of inventory, while considered a problem within the factory, is only a
fraction of what is found in Factory A. Complaints from workers center around the
constant change taking place. The two factories participate in similar industrial markets,
have essentially the same suppliers, and utilize the same processing equipment. So, why
do they differ? One explanation offered by Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark lies in the way
the two factories deal with complexity. In factory A, complexity is accommodated by
building more sophisticated systems and product flows. Factory B, on the other hand,
seeks to reduce complexity by simplifying systems and product flows. This concept along
with other ideas from Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark provide much of the inspiration for
the "Pull System" discussed in the second to last chapter. I will argue that this proposed
system simplifies Ethicon Endo-Surgery's production processes and will potentially
produce better operational results than their current system.
19
1.5 Thesis Organization
This section outlines the key points presented in each chapter of the thesis.
Part I •• Thesis Introduction and Background
chqpter I Introduction
Chapter 2 Overview Q/ the SUl'J'lY Chain
This chapter briefly describes the supply chain that convens raw materials into finished
goods and delivers finished goods into the hands of surgeons. The various entities
involved with the entire supply chain, including suppliers, Ethicon Endo-Surgery itself,
distributors (dealers), international affiliates, and hospitals, are discussed. Divided into
two major sections, the chapter addresses the external supply chain and the internal supply
chain separately. An explanation of the production planning processes, inventory policies,
and organizational sbUeture within Ethiean Endo-Surgery is provided. Readers already
familiar with the supply chain may skip this chapter and proceed to Chapter 3.
Part n .. The External Supply Chain
chaRter 3 SUl'J'1y Chain Demand for New Products
This chapter discusses hospital, dealer, and international affiliate ordering patterns for new
products. The initial ordering "spike" resulting from dealer/affiliate stocking is
demonstrated and contrasted with the underlying hospital demand. I demonstrate how to
predict the magnitude of the demand spike with a simple role-of-thumb. The dealer order
patterns will be overlaid with actual hospital demand. This will demonstrate that, in
contrast to dealer orders, hospital orders don't experience an initial spike. It will be
argued that this difference in ordering patterns demonstrates that the initial dealer demand
is largely a result of building up inventory. Lastly, I show that dealers and affiliates
actually do not increase ordering when a new product falls into back order. On the
contrary, there is no noticeable difference betweerl dealer orders for a new product that
falls deeply into back order and dealer orders for a product that does not.
Part In •. The Internal Supply Chain
Chapter 4 Infernal SUl'J'lY Chain Reactions
This chapter first presents how Ethicon Endo-Surgery's production system responds to the
new product "spike." The spike often forces the company into back order. The back
order condition is often met with a rapid ramp-up of production output. Once product
supply has been restored and finished goods inventory reaches its desired level, production
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levels quickly drop back to steady levels. Interestingly, the magnitude of the production
reaction often exceeds the magnitude of the spike in dealer/affiliate demand. This comes
as a surprise considering that the production system was designed to shield the assembly
process from swings in demand. Further evidence reveals that this reaction occurs not
only for new products but for many products that fall into back order.
Chapter 5 Production Planning and SuPJ?ly Chain Reactions
Having demonstrated that the production system tends \0 amplify large swings in demand,
I demonstrate in this chapter the effect of production planning intervals on the production
reactions. Previous literature has discussed the effect that production lead times have on
reactions; therefore, the advantages of shonened lead times will not be addressed here.
Instead, I will present how the reactions change when the production planning interval
decreases from monthly to weekly and from weekly to daily. The results of three
computer simulation models will demonstrate that the large swings are reduced in moving
from monthly planning to weekly, but that the smaller, weekly variations are increased.
The daily production planning system model actually simulates a "demand pull-type"
system. This latter system was found to dampen both the smaller, weekly variations and
the larger demand swings.
Chqpter 6 Inventory and cost ofReacrioDS
The next pan of the chapter demonstrates that, based on the organization's customer
service objective, actual finished goods inventory levels far exceed desired levels. The
analysis utilizes both statistics and a simple, graphical argument. The calculated difference
between objective and actual levels is of the magnitude of $10 million20, resulting in
additional inventory carrying costs on the order of over $1 million. Discrepancies between
the statistical models and actual operations are discussed. It will be argued that the
discrepancies do not change the analysis significantly.
The final pan of this chapter presents a framework to understand the costs
associated with quick production reactions. The organization has a choice in how to react
to the sudden increases in demand. The framework presented will outline the costlbenefit
tradeoffs associated with the decision.
2ONote dial I present only the malojtude of the value of Ihe inventory. Precise dollar values are
proprieaary in nature and are therefore not presented.
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Chapt':r 7 The Emphasis on Back Order Protection and Reaction
In this chapter, I present some rationale behind the back order reactions and the high
levels of inventory (protection from back order). I argue that both the reactions to back
order and the protection from back order are a direct result from EES's original successful
market growth strategy -- a stnl.tegy that emphasized always having product available for
sale at all times. Now that the organization has established itself in the marketplace and is
turning its focus on reducing costs, it must consider the tradeoffs between the benefits and
the costs of reacting quickly versus reacting gradually, and between the benefits and costs
of maintaining high levels of inventory versus maintaining low levels.
chapter 8 Identifying and Addressing Back Qrder Reactions and Inventory Levels
In this chapter, I discuss why the organization defined its problems as external rather than
internal, failing to fully recognize the back order reactions and the cost of high inventory
levels. Clearly, no one person within the organization is exposed to the same data in the
same fonnat as presented throughout this thesis. Putting the infonnation together and
analyzing it required substantial effort on my pan. The key to the entire analysis came
from tying together demand, production, and inventory da!a. I argue that, due to the
existing organizational structure, incentives, infonnation systems, and business processes,
no pan of the organization (1) could readily obtain the necessary infonnation; (2) had
incentives to pursue obtaining the infonnation; and (3) could recognize the issues without
having the same time and resources as available to an M.I.T. intern.
In the final pan of the chapter, I propose that the existing organizational structure,
incentives, infonnation systems, and business processes are a direct result of four key
influences:
1. Market growth emphasis
2. Rapid product development
3. The need for consistent supply of product
4. Parent business processes
The discussion centers around tl"ie ways in which these influence manifest themselves.
Part IV •• Improving the Production System
chapter 9 Improvin, Monthly Forecastin6
This chapter demonstrates a new monthly forecasting methodology. I show that this
methodology, based only on historical data, produces more accurate forecasts on average
than the current market intelligence-based procedure. The procedure demonstrates that
dealer/afftliate demand generally follows a linear trend that slopes moderately upward.
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This infonnation will prove imponant in deterntining the new planning and inventory
management system described in Chapter 10.
Chqpter 10 An Alternative Production System -- the "Pull" System
This chapter presents an alternative to the current monthly planning process used by
Ethicon Endo-Surgery to plan production, forecast demand, and manage inventories. The
"Pull" system utilizes a simple order point / order quantity (OP/OQ) methodology to tie
together the production stages. I present the advantages of this system over the current
monthly planning system with respect to EES's key operations objectives (inventory
reduction, cycle time reduction, and delivery service level). The factors that make this
system ideal-- low demand variability and high process flexibility -- are discussed. Finally,
a detenninistic model is presented that helps substantiate the claim that the system
functions well. To account for the limits of using a detenninistic model, the analysis
utilizes demand data from dozens of different products and tests for parameter sensitivity
(i.e., a sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the results Me independent of constant lead
time assumptions).
chqprer 11 conclusion
In this chapter, I discuss my fmal recommendations presented to Ethicon Endo-Surgery
prior to my departure in mid-December. I additionally discuss some additional areas of
interest not pursued within the thesis. Lastlyt I present a summary of the key points
presented throughout the thesis.
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Chapter 2 The Supply and Distribution Chain
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I describe the entire supply and distribution chain21 for endoscopic surgical
instruments -- from raw materials to finished instruments (supply chain) and from fmished
instruments into the hands of surgeons (distribution chain). The infonnation presented
here provides the base for the rest of the thesis. Readers already familiar with the supply
chain, the distribution chain, the monthly production planning process, and the Operations
organization may choose to skip this chapter and proceed on to Chapter 3.
The chapter rust presents the supply and distribution chain in total. All distribution
chain entities relevant to this thesis are presented -- Ethicon Endo Surgery, domestic
dealers, international Johnson & Johnson affiliates, and hospitals. Secondly, I describe the
"internal supply chain" (i.e., the movement of material within EES beginning with the
assembly of comJX'nents into instruments and ending with finished goods inventory). As
opposed to treating EES essentially as a "black box" entity as in the preceding section, the
second section describes the process steps and the in-process inventory locations involved
in manufacturing a medical instrument. In the last pan of the chapter, I describe how the
supply chain is actually ron. The key business processes of planning, production
scheduling, and forecasting are presented, and a brief explanation of the various
organizational roles carried out within the Operations Division is provided.
2.2 The Complete Supply and Distribution Chain
Figure 2.1 displays a simplified version of Ethicon Endo-Surgery1s supply and distribution
chain. Beginning with raw material suppliers and ending with the hospital, each entity
receives orders from and delivers product to the "downstream" entity that it immediately
precedes. Raw material suppliers deliver raw materials to, and receive orders from,
21Throughout this thesis and contrary to some other definitions, the term "supply chain" here refers to
~s of supplying fmishcd goods inventory with product. In other words. it is the entities and policies
involved in convening raw materials into finished insttuments. The term "distribution chain't refers to the
entities and policies involved in moving instruments from finished goods inventory and into the final
customer's hands.
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component pans suppliers; component pans suppliers deliver pans to, and receive orders
from, EES; and so on down the chain.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates two types of flows: material flow and order flow.
Material flows move in one direction from raw materials to the surgeon -- raw materials
are shipped to component suppliers; component parts are shipped to EES; and so on until
a completed instrument arrives in a surgeons hands. Orders flow in the exact opposite
direction; hospitals order from dealers; dealers order from EES; and so on down the
line. This section discusses both the material and the order flows as they relate to the
remainder of the thesis. Of particular importance is how orders and delivery of material
are tied together. This involves an understanding of the inventory policies of the various
entities involved with the supply and distribution chain and will be discussed in greater
detail below.
The Material Flow
The fonnation of the surgical instruments begins with raw materials such as plastics and
metals. These materials are convened into component parts by suppliers, which are in
turn assembled into surgical instruments by EES. EES packages the instruments, sterilizes
them, and stores them in finished goods inventory at a Johnson & Johnson Hospital
Services (lJHS) distribution center. This ponioD of the supply chain, the "internal supply
chain,It will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. For now, details of the
processes within Ethicon Endo-Surgery will be withheld.
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Raw Mat. Orders
Orders
O~der Flow
Instruments Orders
Supplies
Hospitals
Orders
Figure 2.1 A simplified version of Ethicon Endo-Surgery's entire Supply and
Distribution Chain demonstrating the direction of material flow versus order flow.
The completed insttuments at Ethicon Eodo-Surgery can move in one of several
directions depending on whether the product'S destination is domestic (within the United
States) or international. Domestically, the products typically ship to dealers (Figure 2.2a)
which then supply product to hospitals. Dealers typically reside a close distance from the
hospitals that they service, allowing them to quickly deliver product when needed. Being
able to dcli'''er product quickly consequently requires i.naintaining a certain level of
inventory. Therefore, dealers stock the product received from EES before passing it on to
hospitals.
Internationally, the products are fIrSt shipped to a Johnson & Johnson international
affiliate company (Figures 2.2b and 2.2c). The affiliates act as dealers to international
customers, supplying products either to hospitals widlin their own country, to hospitals in
neighboring countries) or to local dealers. As with domestic dealers, international affiliates
maitltain inventories to ensure consistent supply to customers. Product is therefore
stocked at an affiliate before being passed on to either an international hospital or a local
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dealer. Local dealers act similarly to domestic dealers. They exist to provide quick,
reliable service to their local hospitals and therefore maintain a stock of the product.
Ethicon
Endo-Surgery
Domestic
Dealer Hospital
(a) Delivery of product to a domestic customer.
Hospital
,,----~
Ethicon h.tarnational
Endo-Surgery -----.... Affiliate t----...
(b) Delivery of product to an international customer.
l Ethicon Interr18tiona~ndo.sUrgery Affiliate..---. Local Dealer -......-H_O_SP_i_ta_'--'
(c) Delivery of product to an international customer through a local dealel.
Figure 2.2 (8), (b), and (c) Flow of product from Ethicon Endo-Surgery to
dor.lcstic and international hospitals.
When examining the entire supply and distrib'Jtion chain diagrams, it is important
to remember, f1l"51, that the view is taken from the perspective of Ethicon Endo-Surgery as
the primary manufacturer and, secondly, that it does not demonstrnte the many raw
material suppliers, component suppliers, dealers. affiliates, and hospitals that exist in the
actual chain. Raw material suppliers typically ship to many customers, some of which may
be EES r.:omponent suppliers. EES conlponent suppliers may clso supply components to
several manufacturers. Equally as impoJUnt is the understanding of the distribution chain.
Numerous dealers and international affiliates order product from Ethicoo Enda.·Surgery
and dealers, and international affiliates may service many hospitals. Altematively,
hospitals·typically purchase products from at least two separate dealers; dealers carry
products from several differeD'&: m8Jlufacturers; EES purchases components from several
different suppliers; and so 00. The understanding that this mar.y-to-many relationship
exists throughout the chain contrasts with the one-to-one relationships assumed in the
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models described by Forrester22 and in the "beer game" described by Senge23• This issue
will be addressed further in Chapter 3.
2.3 The Internal Supply Chain
In this section, we open the "black box" around Ethicon Endo Surgery and describe the
flow of material and orders within the organization. The Internal Supply Chain that will
be discussed throughout this chapter consists of the ponion of the chain that resides within
BES -- namely, the bulk insttument assembly process, packaging/sterilization, and
warehousing of finished goods to JJHS. The internal supply chain and its relationship to
the overall chain is depicted in Figure 2.3.
Hospitals
Total
Supply
Chain
Assembly
Packaging I
Sterilization
''Internal''
Supply
Chain
Figure 2.3 The Internal Supply Chain and its relationship to the entire Supply and
Distribution Chain.
22Porrester, J. W., Industrial Dynamics, Cambridge: Productivity Press, 1961.
23Senge, P. M., The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Leamioa Qrlanization, New York:
Doubleday/Currency, 1990. .
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Inventory Positioning
In order to isolate the two main functions of the chain (instrument assembly and
packaging/sterilization) from differing levels of flexibility and from varying mixtures of
inputs and outputs, three main inventory stocking locations are maintained strategically
within the internal supply chain (see Figure 2.3). The function of each inventory location
is described below:
Finished Goods Inventory at J.JUS - isolates shipment of product from the lead
time of the packaging/sterilization operation and allows fulfillment of customer
orders directly from stock.
Bulk Instrument Inventory - isolates the daily "pull" operation of packaging and
sterilization from the less-flexible "push" operation of assembly. Additionally,
assembled bulk instruments may be packaged into one of several configurations.
The bulk inventory allows the flexibility to determine which packaging
configuration the instnlment is packaged into immediately before the configumtion
is actually packaged and sterilized.
Parts Inventory - isolates the assembly process from the long lead times of pans
suppliers. Additionally, a single pan may be assembled into one of several
instruments. The pans inventory allows the flexibility to detennine which
instnlment a particular pan is assembled into immediately before the instrument is
actually assembled.
Finished goods at Johnson & Johnson Hospital Services (JJHS)
Finished goods are held, along with products from other J&1 companies, at JJHS. They
are responsible for receiving orders, picking the appropriate products from the shelves,
packing the products together, and shipping to either domestic dealers, hospitals, or
international affiliates. All systems that track finished goods inventory levels, incoming
orders, and tracking the fulfillment of the orders are handled by JJHS, as are billing
operations.
The Packaging and Sterilization "Demand-Pull" Operation
The packaging / sterilization operation draws assembled instruments from bulk inventory,
configures the instruments into the required package type, sterilizes the configuration, and
delivers the finished product to the JJHS warehouse. Although both the packaging and
sterilization steps require capital-intensive equipment that are inherently subject to
capacity constraints, the entire operation has remained highly flexible with the ability to
react to large daily fluctuations in demands. Even the degree of flexibility between the
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packaging and the sterilization steps remains great enough that batches are considered to
"flow through" without significant in-process stocking.
Batch sizes are predominately detennined on a product-by-product basis through
EOQ-type calculations24 and remain relatively small due to the high degree of flexibility
within the operation (low changeover costs result in small batch sizes). Packaging /
Sterilization orders are initiated based on a "pull"-type system -- when finished goods
inventory for a particular product at JJHS drops below a predetennined order point, a new
batch of that product is initiated through the process. Schedules are determined on a daily
basis, and finished goods inventory levels are monitored with the same high frequency.
The Assembly "Forecast-Push" Operation
Contrary to the capital-intensive operation of packaging/sterilization, the process of
assembling pans into bulk instruments is predominately labor-intensive. Capacities are
limited to the speed at which the workers operate and to the availability of parts. The time
required for scheduling the work force and the supply of incoming pans are the greatest
limiting factors in ter~ns of flexibility. Additionally, several different instruments within a
product family may be assembled on a single production line. This further complicates the
assembly scheduling process due to the need to incorporate line changeovers.
To accommodate the previously mentioned difficulties, weekly assembly schedules
and orders for pans are planned on a monthly basis using monthly forecasts. The
forecasts, which stretch out several periods into the future, are broken down by an MRP-
type system2S into weekly assembly and pans requirements, resulting in a "push" of
product through assembly. The break down of requirements takes into account parts,
bulk, and finished goods inventory levels as well as assembly and pans-ordering lead
times.
Parts Supply
As discussed in the preceding paragraph, orders for pans are detennined based on the
monthly planning process and, consequently, on the monthly forecasts. Lead times are
typically on the order of 4-6 weeks, but lead times longer than 10 weeks are not
uncommon. In general, the order size for major pans equals 3-4 weeks worth of demand.
24(or an explanation of basic EOQ models, refer to Chapter 4 of: Nahmias. S., Production and Operations
Analysis, Second Edition, Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1993.
15Cor a del8iled explanation of MRP techniques for production scheduling, refer to Chapter 6 of:
Nahmias, 5., Production and Operations Analysis, Second Edition, Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1993.
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2.4 Running the Internal Supply Chain
This section shifts the focus away from the structure of the internal supply chain to
concentrate on how the chain actually operates. The ordering of component pans from
suppliers, the scheduling of assembly, and the scheduling of the packaging/sterilization
operation must somehow be coordinated with each other as well as with demands from
the market. In EES's case, this process takes place once each month for the ordering of
parts and the scheduling of assembly. I have tenned this entire process as the "monthly
planning process." The packaging/sterilization operation operates somewhat differently,
monitoring finished goods inventory on a daily basis and initiating batches of product as
needed. Both of these scheduling processes are discussed below.
In this section, I will also present the market forecasting methodology used to
predict demand for each product. The forecasts from this process are utilized by the
monthly planning process to detennine assembly requirements and supplier orders. Lastly,
I conclude with a brief discussion on the organization and the various roles within the
organization responsible for running the supply chain.
The Monthly Planning Process
This section describes the monthly planning process used to conven market forecasts into
weekly production requirements. At the beginning of each month, information is gathered
for each individual product. This infonnation includes the number of orders that were
received in the previous month, inventorJ levels in finished goods, monthly forecasts, and
desired fmished goods safety stock. By combining this infonnation, the monthly planning
process generates two outputs -- the aggregate production requirement for the entire
month and revised extended forecasts (Figure 2.4). This infonnation is funher broken
down into orders for parts and weekly assembly schedules, with weekly assembly
schedules being broken down still funher into daily assembly schedules.
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Orders Forecasts FG Inventory Levels Target Safety Stock
Extended Forecasts Production Requirements
Supplier Orders Weekly Assembly
Schedule
Figure 2.4 The monthly process of converting market forecasts into weekly
production schedules and orders for pans from suppliers.
Central to the monthly planning process is the use of a planning tool called the
"Demand Analysis (DA) sheet." Containing all data necessary to detennine production
requirements, the DA sheets (one sheet is generated for each finished product code)
effectively facilitate information exchange between Marketing, the central planning group,
and the production areas. The DA Sheet and the DA Sheet planning process are discussed
in detail below.
Tbe Demand Analysis (DA) Sheets
The DA Sheets are generated as pan of the central planning process each month, with one
DA sheet being generated for each product code. They contain infonnation concerning
the aggregate production plan -- extended forecasts, the quantity of fmished goods
required to be transferred into the JJHS warehouse to meet the forecast demand, and the
target safety stock in fmished goods (detennined as a function of the extended forecasts).
They additionally contain results from the past several planning months -- infonnation
such as demand over the previous several months, forecasts for the current month (i.e. the
forecast given for November in November, the forecast given for October in October,
etc.), fmished goods inventory at each month's end, and variances from forecast and target
finished goods inventory.
The Demand Analysis (DA) Sheets serve three main functions within the
organization: to communicate, for approval purposes, the extended monthly forecasts to
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the functions with market knowledge (marketing and customer service), to alen plant
management of the production requirements for the month, and to pa£s forecasts down to
the Buyers/Planners. As discussed previously, the Buyers/Planners use monthly forecasts,
as found on the DA Sheets, to detennine pans ordering and assembly schedules. It is
imponant to note that the DA Sheets are only panially used by Packaging / Sterilization
for which they are only used to ensure that sufficient equipment capacity and packaging
materials are in place. In general, Marketing, Customer Service, Plant Managers, and
BuyersIPlanners are the principal areas concerned with DA Sheet infonnation.
The DA Sheet Planning Process
At the beginning of each month, the resulting previous month's demand (Net Orders),
finished goods inventory, and actual finished goods transfers from the previous month Je
input into the appropriate location of each product's DA Sheet. Once the DA Sheets have
been updated, the Master Planners, in conjunction with Marketing, detennine whether
modifications need to be made to the next periods' forecasts, inputting any changes
directly onto the sheet26• Based on target finished goods inventory levels, actual inventory
levels, and the current month's forecast, the quantity of finished goods required (Planned
Transfers) to meet the forecast are calculated and entered into the sheet. A simplified
sample DA Sheet as viewed from the stan of the month of October is provided in Figure
2.5. The same DA Sheet as viewed after the forecasts have been modified and the new
Planned Transfers have been recorded is shown in Figure 2.6.
Once completed for a panicular month, all of the DA Sheets are routed through
the organization for signatures. Marketing, Master Planning Management, and Customer
Service must all examine the infonnation to ensure validity and recommend modifications
if necessary. Plant Management examines the infonnation to ensure that the assembly
operation can produce enough instruments to meet the DA Sheet's Planned Transfers
number. When all functions are in agreement that the DA Sheet seems reasonable and its
proposed plan (as detennined through Planned Transfers) can be met, each area signs-off
and the sheet moves on to the Buying/Planning functioD, for use in detennining assembly
26Note that when forecast changes are input into the DA Sheet, all infonnation concerning the prior
month's forecasts beyond the current-month forecast is lost. As explained earlier in the chapter, the
current-month forecast is simply the forecast provided in the month that the DA Sheet is being evaluated.
In other words, August's current-month forecast is determined in August, September's current-month
forecast is delennined in September, elC. In September, any forecast changes on the DA Sheet oVMWrite
August's forecasts for September, October, November, and December. Only August's forecast for August
is rtt3ined. This issue will be addressed again in Chapter 5.
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schedules and pans ordering, and to the Packaging/Sterilization function for detennining
capacity requirements.
Product: ABC 10
TOIaI July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Total
1993 1994
Forecast 2200 100 120 130 130 140 130 1500
Actual Orders 2300 110 iOO 135·
Received
V.,MIICC 100 10 -20 je
Planned 2200 120 140 90
Translen
Actual 2400 110 160 90·
Transfers
Va,iallCe 200 -10 20 O·
TargetFG 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Inventory
ActualFG 180 180 240 195*
InvenlOry
Va,iallCc -20 -20 40 -5-
-
Figure 2.5 Sample DA Sheet for October after the results from September have been
entered but prior to any modifications to the forecast or to Planned Transfers. (* =
infonnation on September's results updated the first day of October).
Product: ABC10
Total July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Tolal
1993 1994
Forecast 2200 100 120 130 120· 130· 120· 1470·
Actual Orders 2300 110 100 135
Received
Va,iance 100 10 ·20 .5
Planned 2200 120 140 90 125·
Transfers
Actual 2400 110 160 90
Transfers
Va,iance 200 -10 20 0
TargetFG 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Inventory
Actual FG 180 180 240 195
Inventory
V...,iallCe -20 -20 40 -5
Figure 2.6 Sample DA Sheet for October after modifications to the forecasts and with
the new Planned Transfers already entered. (* =infonnation updated during the fIrst or
second week of October.)
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The completion of the DA Sheets, including approval by management in all
required areas, usually occurs for all products at the end of the second week of the month.
It is not until after this point that the Buyers/Planners receive the infonnation, update the
MRP system, and detennine assembly schedules and supplier orders for the following
month. Occasionally changes will be made after the hand-off to the Buyers/Planners, but
flexibility at this point is limited to pans availability and capacity constraints. Figure 2.7
demonstrates the typical timeline of the DA Sheet process.
Previous
Month Current Month
Following
Month
2). Forecasts detennined
for current month and
for several months inLO
the future
S). Nwnbers from DA
Sheets passed down
to BuyerslPlanners
~__W_e_e_k_l W_e_e_k_2_---I __W_e_e_k_3_......_W_ee_k_4__~
1). Results from
Pr · M th 1 d 4). Approval ProcesseVlOUS on 08-
ed into DA Sheets 3). Planned transfers
into FO Inventory and
Safety Stock detennined
Figure 2.7 Timeline of events required for the DA Sheet Process
Converting the Monthly PrOduction Requirements into a Daily Production Schedule
After the second week of the month, the completed and signed DA Sheet is passed down
to the production area. For each product, a production planner takes the forecast for the
current month, as well as for several months into the future (far enough to cover
procurement of long lead-time parts), and enters them into their systems. Although
several systems are used by planners to detennine their weekly production requirements
and parts orders, the process in general breaks down the DA Sheet's monthly forecasts
into weekly forecasts and, consequently, into weekly demands. From these demands, the
number of instruments to assemble each week and when to order new batches of parts are
detennined. The exact details of the systems are purposefully omitted here since they vary
somewhat from planner to planner, but it is impottant to note that the planners do have
considerable flexibility in selecting the methods and systems to use.
To detennine the weekly demands from the monthly forecasts, the planner simply
divides each month's forecast by the number of weeks in the month. Weekly production
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schedules are then detennined, regardless of the actual system used, based on lead time
offsets from each week's projected demand. The production numbers then typically do not
change until the planning process is completed again for the following month. The long
lead times that are required to procure pans and to assemble inS'nIment5 disallow much
flexibility for changes27•
Packaging and Sterilization
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Packaging I Sterilization process operates
essentially on a pure demand-pull type system that does not rely on forecasts to detennine
packaging / sterilization schedules, effectively eliminating the need for DA Sheet
infonnation for daily and weekly scheduling. The results of the DA Sheets are, however,
passed through the Packaging / Sterilization organization for the purposes of recognizing
potential equipment capacity constraints or packaging material procurement constraints.
In the typical case, neither capacity nor packaging materials are an issue.
The Operations Division
The Operations Division contains the principal planning and production functions as
required to manufacture finished products and deliver those products to customers. All
high-level planning, parts procurement, production planning, assembly, packaging, and
sterilization operations, and customer service functions report under the Operations
Division. The particular depattments involved include Master Planning, Buying/Planning,
Business Units, Packaging / Sterilization, and Customer Service and Distribution. Along
the process pipeline of turning forecasts into the actual production of instruments, Master
Planning resides on the front-end, generating the monthly forecasts and detennining
production plans in aggregate. They are closely linked to the marketing area of the
business and act as the connection between market knowledge and production. Business
Units and Packaging I Sterilization reside on the opposite end of the pipeline converting
raw components into fmished goods inventory. A single business unit controls all
activities associated with the assembly process for a particular product line. Packaging /
Sterilization has responsibility for maintaining adequate finished goods inventory for Dll
products. Fitting somewhere in the middle are Buyers I Planners who detennine weekly
assembly plans and generate orders to suppliers for pans. The Customer Service and
27The actual flexibility of the assembly and the pans procurement processes will be challenged later in the
thesis as this issue is imponanllo the detennination of alternate, potentially more robust planning
processes.
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Distribution area is concerned primarily with movement of finished goods to domestic
dealers, hospitals, and international affiliates.
The corresponding responsibilities of all areas in the Operations Division are
outlined and summarized in Table 2.1. Their roles in the planning/production pipeline are
diagrammed in Figure 2.8.
Functional Area Primary Responsibilities to the Supply Chain
Master Planning - Link between Marketing and Production
- Monthly requirements for Finished Goods
- Monthly forecasts for each product
BuyingIPlanning - Orders to suppliers for parts
- Weekly production schedule
Business Units - Assembly of instruments for a single product line
- Daily production schedule
Packaging I Sterilization - Packaging and sterilization of instruments
- Initiation of Packaging I Sterilization batches
Customer Setvice and - Product supply-related relationships with hospitals,
Distribution domestic dealers, and international affiliates
- Handling of special instances of supply problems
Table 2.1 Summary and outline of functional areas involved with the
planning/production pipeline.
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Master Planningc
--------------
Market Knowledge
Production
Raw Parts ----------) Finished Goods
Figure 2.8 The roles involved with the planning/production pipeline and
their relationships to the internal supply chain.
The Importance of Forecasts
Forecasting plays a critical role in the monthly planning process. Forecasts are produced
each month for anticipated demand one month, two months, three months, and four
months into the future. All assembly scheduling and parts procurement are based on the
forecasts that extend several months into the future. Due to long lead times for procuring
parts, typically on the order of 4-16 weeks, the accuracy of extended forecasts beyond one
month becomes critical. Additionally, the monthly planning process requires time to
complete due to the large number of product codes (over 200 in total). As a result,
functioning forecasts are not delivered to the production area until two weeks into the
current month. The first month's forecast, already two weeks old, is only valid for the last
two weeks of the month. This places further imponance on the forecasts beyond a one
month horizon.
The process involved in generating forecasts deserves some mentioning here;
although, the detailed process will not be presented until Chapter 9. The monthly
forecasts are derived from an annual fmancial forecast, where the annual financial forecast
is determined at the beginning of each year. As the year progresses, monthly forecasts
may be adjusted up or down as dictated by market intelligence. In general, the monthly
forecasts should be thought of as a combination of the annual financial forecasting and
market intelligence.
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2.5 Conclusion
The entire supply and distribution chain for Ethicon Endo-Surgery was discussed in this
chapter. In review, the distribution chain refers to the portion of the overall chain that
moves product from finished goods inventory into a hospital. Domestically, product
passes through a local before being passed on to the hospital. The dealer maintains a
cenain level of inventory to ensure consistent supply to its customers, the hospitals.
International Johnson & Johnson affiliates operate in much the same way, but instead of
delivering product to domestic customers, they deli\'er to intemationallocations.
The "internal" supply chain refers to the portion of the overall chain that resides
entirely within RES. It consists of two major processing steps -- assembly and packaging /
sterilization -- and three major inventory positions -- component pans, bulk instruments,
and finished goods. Scheduling of the packaging / sterilization process is done on a
"poll"-type basis, and scheduling of the assembly process and of component parts orders is
done MRP-style, based on extended monthly forecasts. The generation of the monthly
forecasts and the monthly production plan revolve around the Demand Analysis (D.A.)
sheet analysis. D.A. sheets are completed by the Master Planners for all products 1-2
weeks after the beginning of each month. From the forecasts on the D.A. sheets, Buyers /
Planners detennine weekly and daily assembly schedules and component pans orders.
Now that the basic aspects of the supply and distribution chain have been
discussed, we are ready to move on to Chapter 3 to discuss demand for new products.
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Chapter 3 Supply Chain Demand for New Products
3.1 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates how dealers, international affiliates, and hospitals react to the
introduction of a new product. In panicular, it examines dealer and affiliate order patterns
to determine the volume of orders that Ethicon Endo-Surgery should expect to see
immediately following the introduction. The research demonstrated that a consistent
pattern emerged with the introductions -- an initial demand "spike" occurring within the
first few weeks. The analysis will demonstrate that the spike is relatively predictable, and
a "role of thumb" is provided for building inventory in preparation for the spike. By
comparing domestic hospital sales infonnation with domestic dealer orders, I will
demonstrate that this "spike" is attributable to dealers and affiliates building up inventory.
The final pan of the chapter will discuss the issue of "panic ordering" on the P81t of
dealers and affJ.1iates. Strong evidence will be provided that panic Ol·dering does not
actually occur, emphasizing the fact that dealers and affiliates behave in rational,
predictable ways.
3.2 The Recurring Demand Pattern
As mentioned in the introduction, the research uncovered a consistent dealer and affiliate
demand pattern associated with new product introductions. Throughout this chapter, new
product introductions refer to the introduction of a new product into the market where the
product is a replacement for a preceding product. In ether words, the market for the
product hac; already been established and a relatively reliable customer base already exists.
The new product itself replaces an older, potentially outdated product. The denland
pattern that recurs is shown in Figure 3.1 for one sample product. A demand "spike" at
the outset of the introduction is followed by a relatively stable level ofdemand. The spike
occurs within the fIrSt few weeks of the introduction.
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W••k.
!-o-T018. Net Order.I
Figure 3.1 Total dealer and affiliate weekly orders for a new product
introduction. The demand spike occurs in Week 5 and Week 6.
Predicting the Demand Peak
We will now at~mpt to characterize the initial demand peak in a way useful for
forecasting. The measurement that will be I!Sed is "weeks of additional demand" -- in
other words, the number of weeks wonh of denland in excess of average demand,
detennined during the first few weeks of the introduction. The equation for this
measurement is:
Additional Demand During Peak I Average Weekly Demand
This equation may seem somewhat vague. The definition of Additional Demand During
Peak has been purposely left unclear. The demand ~aks occur for differing lengths of
time depending on each prod\lct's particular situation. The detennination of when the
peak actually occurs for the purpose of this study is therefore left to the discretion of the
author. Typically, the peak will be the first two weeks of demand immediately following
the introduction. Additional Demand During Peak is detennined by taking the total
demand during the peak period and subtracting off the average weekly demand over an
equivalent length of time. If the peak period lasl~ for 3 weeks, the demand during that
period is 1500 units and the average weekly demand is 250 units, Additional Demand
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During Peak is 1500 - (3 x 250) =750 units. Weeks ofAdditional Demand is then
calculated by dividing Additional Demand During Peak by the average demand, 750/250
= 3 weeks.
Average weekly demand for the product in steady state can be readily forecast
with reasonable accuracy. Being predominantly single-use disposable, Ethicon Endo-
Surgery's products do not exhibit life cycle effects (i.e., rapid initial growth, market
saturation, and replacement-only sales). Additionally, changes in market share are
gradual28• As a result, demand is relatively stable, and demand for the preceding product
can be used to predict steady state demand for the replacement product. It will be
assumed that this prediction is accurate enough that 'l;e can simply use the actual average
steady state demand and still obtain useful results.
Table 3.1 displays the infonnation and results for the products used in the analysis.
Eight products in all were used,; consisting only of eligible products with significant sales
volume. To detennine eligible prociucts with significant sales volume, all product codes
released over a ont: year time period (the time period over which data was available) were
gathered. Only products with a significant percentage of Ethicon Endo-Surgery's total
sales volume29 were considered funher. Of the products with significant sales volume,
fourteen in total, six outliers were identified and removed. A product would be
considered an outlier if any unique forces were found to influence the demand from
dealers. For example, one particular outlier ~vas pan of a family of recently introduced
products that all had problems with back order. The outlier was introduced after the other
products had gone into back order and was therefore well controlled in its release. The
demand from dealers and affiliates, therefore, was influenced heavily by the controls
placed on the release. In another case, significant market depelldencies unexpectedly
developed between two products in the sample. One of the products was therefore
declared as an outlier &Ild removed from the analysis.
28More infoimation on the characteristics of the products and the effects that the characteristics have on
demand pauems will be discussed in Chapter 9.
29nJe cut-off point for considering a product as having significant sales volume has been purposely
omitted due to propricWy concerns.
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Product Number of Total Average Additional Weeks of
Weeks of Demand Demand Demand Additional
Peak Period During Peak During Peak Demand
Period
1 2 522 84 354 4.2
2 1 735 181 554 3.1
3 1 511 134 377 2.8
4 2 814 182 450 2.5
5 1 374 IM7 187 1.0
6 3 4366 705 2251 3.2
7 7 19,198 1831 6381 3.5
8 2 5163 1269 2271 2.1
Table 3.1 Determining the magnitude in tenns of weeks of demand for the initial
demand peak. (Actual values for Total Demand During Peak Period and Average
Demand have been disguised.)
From the organization's standpoint, just knowing how much additional demand to
expect during the first few weeks of introduction will allow it to prepare accordingly by
building up finished goods inventory beforehand. When the product is introduced and the
demand peak hits, Ethicon Endo-Surgery will then be able to avoid back order. To
determine how much additional finished goods inventory to have in place, we can use the
data in Table 3.1 to calculate an average of Weeks of Additional Demand. The calculated
average, with some slight aojustments, may serve as a policy for the additional finished
goods inventory. If we were to just use the average alone as the inventory policy,
approximately one half of future introductions would experience demand peaks above the
average, and one half will experience peaks below. We therefore provide 95% confidence
intervals30 around the average. (For the upper bounds using 90% and other confidence
intervals, see Table 3.2.) By stocking at the upper bound of the 90% confidence interval,
Ethicon Eodo-Surgery would expect that in 90% of all introductions, they will have
enough additional inventory to cover the additional dernand during the peak.
3Opor a description of calculating confidence intervals for means using a Student's t-distribution, see for
example: Hogg, R. V., J. Ledolter, &mUed Statistics for EnKineers and Physical Scientists. New York:
Macmillan Publishing CompanyI 1992, chapter 4.
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Average 90% 95% 97.5%
(0=8 Samples) Confidence Confidence Confidence
2.8 weeks 3.3 weeks 6.0 weeks 8.3 weeks
Table 3.2 Upper confidence intervals for Weeks ofAdditional Demand data.
Of course, the preceding calculations assume that the sample data in Table 3.1 is
representative of the Weeks ofAdditional Demand that would be det~nnined for all
products. Given the small sample size, this probably is not the case. Therefore, a word of
caution is provided. The numbers in their current state provide a reasonable "rule of
thumb" for detennining the quantity of inventory needed to have in place prior to the
introduction. For a more rigorous calculation, more samples would need to be examined.
On the other hand, the 2.8 weeks of inventory required on average and the 90%
confidence value of 3.3 weeks exceeds all other previous forecasts researched. This alone
should provide substantial guidance for future product releases.
3.3 Dealer and Affiliate Stocking in New Product Introductions
This section will compare domestic sales infonnation with domestic dealer orders to show
that the irtitial spikes in demand are indeed a result of jealer and afflliate stocking. Figure
3.2 shows monthly domestic dealer orders for two products. The first product is the same
product displayed in Figure 3.1. The second product is the "extreme back order" case that
will be discussed in Section 3.4. In addition to the dealer orders, domestic hospital orders
are plotted on both graphs. For both products, the introduction occurred during Month 1;
and for both products a demand spike occurred at that time. (Since Product B was
introduced near the middle of Month 1, the peak for Product B does not appear nearly as
significant as for Product A.)
As shown in the figure, the hospital orders do not exhibit a demand spike. Instead,
the hospital orders either start at a level close to the eventual steady state level, as with
Product A, or increase gradually over several months, as with Product B. Additionally,
the area between the dealer and hospital orders represents the approximate volume of
product deliveled to dealers that has not yet been ordered by hospitals. In other words,
this volume ("lust reside at the dealer. To detennine the total dealer inventory, we only
need to find the area. Since finding the area gives the number of sales units stocked at the
dealer at the end of the period, we must conven sales units 0/inventory into weeks of
inventory, where one week of inventory represents the volume of product inventory
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expected to be sold each week. To do this, we divide the area between the curves by the
average weekly demand. As a result, the dealer stocking levels turn out to be 4.2 weeks
for Product A and 4.5 weeks for Product B. In conversation with several dealers, these
numbers are indeed consistent with most dealers' policies.
Product A
Month
~1
Month
o
Month
1
Month
2
Month
3
Month Month Month
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Month
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-o-Dom••tlc D••••r Order. (Converted)
Product B
-X-Ho.p"•• Ord....
Month
..1
Month
o
Month
1
Month
2
Month
3
Month
4
Month
5
Month
6
Month
7
-o-Oom••tlc D••••r Order. (Conver"d) -Z-Ho.plta. Order.
Figure 3.2 Hospital orders domestic dealer orders for two new product
introductions.
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3.4 Misperceptions About Panic Ordering
In this section, I will refute many of the perceptions throughout the supply chain
concerning "panic ordering" with dealers and affiliates. Panic ordering as used throughout
this section is defmed as ordering by dealers and affiliates in excess of what is actually
needed. Dealers and affiliates may panic order when they believe that the products they
need will soon be in shon supply. When demand outstrips supply, the manufacturer must
use an allocation system to detennine who will receive the product and how much will be
received. The dealers or affiliates may believe that increasing orders influences the
allocation system to send them a greater ponion of the availabl~ product. Another
perceived cause of panic order is based on dealer and affiliate inventory systems. Safety
stock at dealers and affiliates is typically based on lead time for delivery of a product.
When product falls into back order and delivery time for the product shoots up from 3
days to 3 weeks, the safety stock levels also shoot up. This further increases the orders as
incoming product must be used to increase safety stocks as well as meet hospital demand.
Several people within Ethicon Endo-Surgery had revealed concerns that panic
ordering was artificially driving up demand for back ordered products. This concern had
been made with regard to a few recently introduced products. Surveys and discussions
with several representatives from domestic dealers and international affIliates revealed a
belief that both sources of "panic ordering" could be evident. Several dealers described
their ordering systems as using lead times to determine safety stocks. In many cases the
calculations were completed automatically. Both dealers and affiliates indicated that
increased orders to "game" with Ethicon Endo-Surgery's allocation system were plausible.
No explicit dPta, however, were provided to validate these statements.
Refuting the" Panic Ordering" Perceptions
To determine the extent of panic ordering, I took three new products from the same
product family that were introduced within a few weeks of each other. One of the
products fell into deep back order, outstanding orders equaling three weeks wonh of
demand at the lowest point. Another of the products fell into a moderate back order of
about one week's wonh of demand. The final product did not fall into back order at all.
These three products, coming from the same product family and providing similar
functionality, should experience similar patterns of demand throughout the year. By
comparing the dealer and affiliate orders between the products, any pattern of panic
ordering should be evident. If panic ordering is present, we will expect to see that the
product that went into severe back order receives a greater ponion of orders while in back
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order. Once out of back order, the product'S demand should drop off as dealers and
affl1iates receive all of their excess panic-ordered product. Ordering should remain at the
lower state until dealers and affiliates sell all of their excess inventory. In contrast, the
product that did not fall into back order should not experience the same fluctuations in
demand. Supply in that case was never in jeopardy, so dealers and affl1iates would not
have a reason to panic order. Somewhere in the middle we would expect to find the
moderate back ordered product.
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Figure 3.3 Dealer and affiliate weekly orders for two products introduced at
about the same time. One product fell into back order, and the other did not.
Order quantities have been nonnalized based on average demand to facilitate the
comparison. Interestingly, the patterns look almost indistinguishable.
To compare the ordering patterns, we can flfSt examine weekly ordering data
between the No Back Order and the Extreme Back Order cases. This comparison is made
in Figure 3.3. Note that aside from the demand during the introduction of each product,
the patterns look almost identical. The product was in back order between Week 10 and
Week 19. During this time, there appears to be a light increase in demand for the Extreme
Back Order product; however, in the weeks following Week 19, there is no evidence of
demand dropping off relative to the No Back Order product. Instead hQ1h seem to drop
slightly, indicating a market-dependent rather than a product-dependent trend.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the same concepts, adding a third product and using
monthly instead of weekly data. The third product was introduced a few weeks after the
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previous two, explaining the delayed demand peak during Month 2. Back order for both
products began in Month 2 and continued through Month 3. Once again, a slight positive
difference in ordering for the back ordere~ products is evident at the time of the back
order. After Month 3, the three products follow in lock-step. This seems to negate the
panic order theory, since panic ordering should lead to a decrease in orders after the
products come out of back order. Additionally, aside from differences during the
introduction months, the back ordered products' demands almost exactly match beginning
with Month 3. This occurred irrespective of the differences in the severity of the back
order.
On a final note and as a point of interest, the cumulative monthly demand for the
three products have been plotted in Figure 3.5. Amazingly, the cumulative results follow
closely for all three. Except at the beginning, the total volumes of the products are almost
identical. This seems to indicate that the slight increase in demand for the back ordered
products is actually a continuation of the peak period described in the previous section.
Instead of ordering all at once in the flfSt few weeks, some dealers may hold off for several
weeks. Consequently, the orders are eventually placed.
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Figure 3.4 Dealer and affiliate monthly orders for three products introduced
within a few weeks of each other. Two of the products, No Back Order and
Extreme Back Order, are also shown with weekly orders in Figure 3.2. The two
back-ordered products fell into back order during Month 2 and Month 3.
Although ordering increased in Month 3, the expected drop-off in ordering with
respect to the No Back Order product did not occur.
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Figure 3.5 Cumulative dealer and affiliate monthly orders. This graph
demonstrates that the total volume ordered for each product moves in lock-step.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, demand for new products was shown to be relatively predictable. In the
first few weeks of the introduction, dealers and afrdiates increase ordering in order to
build inventory. The additional demand during that period should be expected to equal
approximately 3 weeks wonh of expected average demand. Immediately following the
peak ordering, demand can be expected to follow a relatively stable pattern. This pattern,
as will be shown in Chapter 9, tends to follow a steady trend line. By comparing two
recently introduced products, one that fell deeply into back order and one that did not, I
demonstrated that dealers and affiliates do not increase orders for new products dIal fall
into back order. This refuted my early research assumptions that dealer and affiliate
demand increases due to panic ordering and increased levels of safety stock.
The next chapter will discuss how EES reacted to the new product demand
patterns.
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Chapter 4 Internal Supply Chain Reactions
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified a consistent demand pattern unique to new product
introductions. The initial surge (or "spikett) in orders occurring in the rust few weeks of
the introduction often forces Ethicon Bndo-Surgery into back order. As discussed in the
preceding chapter, the spike is attributable to dealer and affiliates "stocking up" on new
products to both ftII their inventories ADd meet the incoming hospital demand. But
understanding the cause and the extent of the demand spike is only one part of the puzzle.
The other pan is understanding how Ethicon Endo-Surgery, in its efforts to maintain a
consistent supply of product, prepares fOf, and reacts to, the spike.
In this chapter, I demonstrate the "internal" reactions to new product
introductions. By "internal,tt I refer to the production system within Ethicon Endo-
Surgery that allows it to deliver product to dealers, international affiliates, and, ultimately,
to hospitals. I will show that the initial demand spike results in smprisingly dramatic
reactions in production -- smprisingly dramatic in that the production system was
designed largely to "shield" the assembly process from variation in demand; however, the
data will show that demand variation is actually amplified in the assembly process. In one
particular case presented below, production output doubled from one month to the next;
yet, the only large preceding increase in demand occurred during the product's
introduction four months earlier. I continue this chapter by demonstrating that the new-
product-introduction-type reactions occur anytime a product falls into back order. This
finding altered my initial interpretations that new product introductions alone were at the
center of Ethicon Endo-Surgery's supply problems. Instead, it shifted the focus toward
back order as a root cause, with new product introductions being a subset of that root
cause.
This chapter will present the internal reactions to new product introductions and,
more generally, the reactions to products that fall into back order. I will demonstrate that,
in many cases, any sudden increases in demand are met with at least equally dramatic
reactions from production, suggesting that demand variation is actually amplified by the
production system. The following chapter, Chapter 5, will demonstrate some reasons why
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the reactions occur as a result of the current monthly planning process, and Chapter 7 will
describe how the organizational incentives contribute to the reactions.
4.2 Reactions to New Product Introductions
In many of the new product introductions examined, a consistent reaction was found. The
sequence of events that occur are as follows (see Figure 4.1)31:
1. Increased demand causes back order - the unexpectedly high level of demand
depletes inventory, often sending the organization into back order.
2. Production increases outPut - the production process must increase its output
to match both the increased orders and the depletion of inventory. This
increase oftentimes is delayed one or more mor.ths due to difficulties in
obtaining adequate parts supply.
3. FG Inventory levels shoot up - the increase in production output continues to
drive FG inventory levels up above Donnal stocking levels.
4. Production decreases outPut - the increased levels of inventory result in a
reduced need to produce; therefore, production decreases temporarily.
5. Production outPut and FG inventory le,'els settle at a steady state - the system
finally reaches a steady state several months after the unexpected occurrence.
3IThroughout this chapter, all monthly production, demand, and forecast dara has been convened from a
single monthly number into a 4-weck monthly rate. In other words, the number of units produced in one
panicolar month has been converted into an equivalent number units produced had the month been a 4-
week month. This conversion was necessary to maintain consistent comparisons from one month to the
next in light of the company's varying duration of amonth.
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Figure 4.1 Sample Reaction. A reaction to a new product introduction
demonstrating how production (planned transfers) responds to the initial drop in
FG inventory. This follows the standard sequence of steps outlined in the text: (1)
Increased demand causes back order; (2) Production increases its output; (3)
FG inventory levels shoot up; (4) Production decreases output; and (5)
Production output and inventory levels reach steady state. In this panicular case,
the steady state has just been reached in Month 6.
The following section examines two panicular examples of the reaction sequence
-- one involved with a new product introduction and the other with an unexpected supply
interruption.
4.3 New Product Introduction Example
This first example demonstrates the supply chain reactions in a new product introduction
as derived from the infonnation on DA Sheets. The key components of understanding the
reactions are examined -- forecast (Current-month Forecast) versus demand (Net Orders),
production (planned Transfers) versus demand (Net Orders), and production (Planned
Transfers) versus finished goods inventory (FG Inventory). If the meanings of any of
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these components is unclear, it is recommended that the reader briefly read back through
Chapter 2. An imponant point unique to the new product introduction demonstrated
below is worth mentioning here. Actual assembly data, either daily, weekly, or monthly,
was not available. Instead, a different representation, Planned Transfers ffC\m the DA
Sheets, had to be used. Although Planned Transfers does not actually represent the
production rates for a particular month, it offers a reasonable approximation in the case of
the following product introduction. This issue is explained further in the following
section. In a later section of this chapter, the example back-ordered product utilizes actual
assembly data. In that case, the use of Planned Transfers therefore will not be an issue.
Importance of Using "Planned Transfers" in Place of Actual Assembly Rates
Although it can be argued that Planned Transfers does not necessarily represent what was
either assembled or packaged /sterilized, it does represent what was believed to be
required in fmished goods to meet the mOllth's forecast demand. In the case of this
particular new product introduction, it represents what the plants believed they could
produce given consttaints on capacity and pans supply. This number is of value in a
slightly different way. Actual assembly or packaging/sterilization volume represents the
results after the month has ended. These actual volume numbers are subject to pans
availability, quality problems, and other unforeseen issues that were not known at the
beginning of the month when the plan was approved. They therefore represent the actual
outcome rather than what was intended. By providing a number, Planned Transfers, that
is directly calculated from available inventory and forecast demand, the intentions of the
organization are captured.
Bear in mind, though, that this analysis does not apply in the same way with
situations other than the new product introduction presented below. Only in this new
product introduction, and other more recent introductions, is availability of parts closely
examined prior to determining Planned Transfers. As a result, only in this introduction,
and other more recerlt introductions, does the Planned Transfers number represent the true
intentions of the organization.
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Figure 4.2 Actual new product introduction. (Actual sales unit values for net
orders, planned transfers, and FG inventory disguised)
Figure 4.2 demonstrates three of four key variables for understanding the internal
reactions -- demand, inventory, and production. The graphs in Figure 4.3 include the
additional variable, current-month forecast32, and demonstrate the relationships of the four
key variables (demand, inventory, production, and forecast) presented two-at-a-time. The
forecasts provided for the fIrSt several months of the introduction (Month 0 and Month 1)
were well below the actual product demand. Note that the dealer and affiliate inventory
stocking was not adequately accounted for in the forecast. More imponant, however, is
the reaction to the missed forecast. As expected, the high levels of ordering immediately
pUl finished goods inventory into back order. We would expect production to increase
substantially in Month 1 to make up for the back order from the previous month, as well
32Note that this "forecast" represents the forecast produced for the current month. As stated in Chapter 2,
the current month forecast is not dclivC2"Cd to the production area until two weeks into the month. As a
result, forecasts for one month, two months, and Ihree months into the future are of more imponance for
assembly and pans orders. The current month forecast is therefore an approximate representation of the
extended forecasts.
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as make up for Month 1's forecast demand, but instead, due to capacity constraints at the
suppliers, the assembly process could not procure sufficient pans to assemble a large
enough quantity of instrurrJents. Since this parts sho'l1age problem 'Nas known ahead of
time, a lower quantity of insuuments were planned for transfer into finished goods, and
production (Planned Transfers) fell well below the level of demand.
The demand far exceeded the forecast for a second month (Month 1), and the
company plunged further into baclr:)rder. When parts supply increased around Month 3,
production consequently increased to levels well above demand, and inventory levels
began to rise. Right about the time that demand started to drop off in Month 4, the
planned production (TOnl prior months began to arrive into finished goods inventory
pushing finished goods inventory up to a full months' worth of demand (double the target
inventory level of 1/2 month of demand). Lastly, this jump in inventory triggered a drop
in production during Month 6.
55
Net Orders and Forecast
Month
6
Month
5
Month
4
-o-Net Orders
-X-Forecast
Month
3
Month
2
Month
1
Month
o
Month
-1
16000
14000
12000
10000
J9
C 8000
~6000
4000
2000 x:....,~-..-­
O~~--+----+----+----6--~I--~==:a=====~-~
Month
-2
Net Orders and Planned Transfers
Month
6
Month
5
Month
4
-o-Net Orders
~PlaMed JJHS Transfers
Month
3
Month
2
Month
1
Month
o
Month
-1
16000
14000
12000
10000
J!J
C 8000
:J 6000
4000
2000
0 ...---+----+---.......---.....---+---......----+----1
Month
-2
Plamed Transfers and FG Inventory
Marth
6
Marth
5
Marth
4
~Planned JJHS Transfers
-Z-FG Irwentory
Marth
o
Marth
-1
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
:16000
::>
4000
2000
O....--......---'!'i....~.....---I---...... .---.....---+-----I
Figure 4.3 New Product Introduction example outcome showing Net Orders
(demand), Forecast (current-month), Planned Transfers, and Finished Goods
Inventory. This product was released to the open market in Month O. (Actual
sales unit values for net orders, planned transfers, and FG inventory disguised.)
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Changes in Demand versus Changes in Production
One method to better understand how the variation in demand translates into variation in
production levels is to take a look at how much demand and production change from
month-ta-month. If the average change in demand from month-to-month exceeds the
average change in production, it is reasonable to conclude that monthly production varies
more than monthly demand. Table 4.1 presents the average demand and production
changes for the four most recently products that were studied. The results presented in
the table are intended to augment the graphical analysis just presented. The changes in
demand and production \\'ere taken for the first six months of the respective introduction.
Five observations, one observation for each change from one month to the next, were
considered in the averages.
Average A in Average Ii in
Product Monthly Demand Monthly Production
(std. dev.) (std. dev.)
1 920 (566) 2150 (679)
2 447 (445) 966 (1058)
3 1164 (838) 2395 (1204)
4 977 (1010) 716 (467)
Average of all 4 products 877 (714) 1556 (852)
(Ave. standard dev.)
Table 4.1 Av~rage change in demand and production for four recently introduced
products. Data was taken for the six months following the introduction for a total
of five observations (five "changes" occur between the six months). (Actual
demand and production values are disguised.)
The table demonstrates that for three of the fOUf products studied, the average change in
monthly production exceeded the average change in monthly demand by approximately
100%. In the case that did not experience a greater average change in production, a single
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significant drop in demand drove up the average change in demand. Since the change was
a drop in demand, production was able to maintain a relatively stable level of output and
still meet the demand.
4.4 Back-Ordered Product Example
In this next section, I show that the typical sequence of events found with new product
introductions also occurs for other products that fall into back order. The example below
demonstrates a product that fell into back order due, in pan, to a shonage of component
pans and, in part, to an unexpectedly high level of demand (Figure 4.4). In this case, the
unexpected demand was a result of a functionally similar product being tempomrily pulled
from the market. Since customers could not order that functionally similar instrumen~
they instead ordered the example product Other sources of unexpected demand might
include short-tenn incentives provided to the sales force and periodic price increases
announced a short time prior to the date of the increase.
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Figure 4.4 Product that fell into back order due to unexpected increase in
demand. (Actual sales unit values for net orders, planned transfers, and FG
inventory are disguised.)
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Once again taking infonnation directly from the DA Sheets, this next example looks at a
product that fIrSt had problems with supply of component parts in Month 1. It was then
under-forecast for three consecutive months -- Month 3, Month 4, and Month 5 -- due to
an unanticipated temporary change in the marketplace. The under-prr,dicted demand
during those months resulted in immediate back order in Month 3. Shortly afterward, in
Month 6, the monthly production rate33 was increased to fOUf times the steady level of
demand. In Months 7, 8, and 9, finished goods inventory rose significantly, almost double
the original steady state level, to around one month's worth of demand. The reaction was
just starting to settle down in Month 12.
33As opposed to the new product inttoduction example, actual daily, weekly, and monthly assembly
volumes were available for this product. Therefore, Actual Assembly will be used in place of Planned
Transfers.
59
Net Orders and Forecast
-o-Net Orders
-X-Forecast
Month 9 Month 11Month 7Month 5Month 3
8000
7000
6000
5000
~4000
J
3000
2000 VI.. -~~-]IC..-
1~ t--I---+--......--I----.....--......-~....-.----Io-- ........----.......-.----.I
Month 1
Net Orders and Actual Assembly
Month 11Month 9
-o-Net Orders
--t-Actual Assembtl
Month 7Month 5Month 3
8000
7000
6000
5000
Ii
C 4000'
J
3000
2000
1000
0+--.....---1--......- .....---+---1---.....---1---1--......- ......
Month 1
Actual Assembly and FG Inventory
Month 11Month 9
--t-Actual Assembt,t
-.-FG Inventory
Month 7
O....- .......----t--.....- .....-.-...-~t--- .....- .....---Ip.--.....--I
-4000
Figure 4.5 Back-Ordered Product example outcome showing Net Orders
(demand), Forecast (current-month), Actual Assembly (production), and Finished
Goods Inventory. The interruption, a sudden increase in dealer demand, occurred
in Month 3, Month 4 and Month 5. (Actual sales unit values for net orders,
planned transfers, and FG inventory disguised.)
60
While the preceding example presents the internal reactions to back order for a
cenain product under fairly unusual circumstances (a shonage in component pans mId an
unexpectedly high level of demand), I want to stress that similar reactions occur for most
products examined that fall into back order for significant periods of time. The level of
back order in this case was severe, three weeks wonh of demand at its peak, as was the
three-month duration of the back order. But as a result of the severity, the example
clearly demonstrates the reactions that take place.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated the internal reactions to new product introductions and
unexpectedly high levels of demand. In both cases presented, high levels of demand sent
the product into back order, forcing production to ramp up and restore product supply.
The reactions show how sudden changes in demand are amplified by the production
system. In the next chapter, I will show how one panicular attribute, the production
planning interval, influences the timing and extent of the production response. By moving
from a monthly planning system to a daily, demand-pull system, the magnitude of the
reaction can be reduced. Future chapters will discuss why EES failed to recognize the
extent of the reactions and the potential for improvement.
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Chapter 5 Production Planning and Internal Supply Chain
Reactions
5.1 Introduction
In the upcoming chapters, I will argue that two main categories of factors contribute to
the internal reactions demonstrated in Chapter 4. The two categories are systemic (e.g.,
lead times, inventory policies, planning processes, etc.) and organizational (e.g.,
organizational structure, incentives, infonnation systems, etc.) In this chapter, I will
demonstrate some of the systemic driving forces. Other litemture has addressed the effect
that lead time has on supply chain reactions. This topic, therefore, will not be re-
addressed. Rather, I will show that one force, the time interval between each production
planning period, plays a significant role in detennining the extent and the timing of the
reactions. The planning time interval for Ethicon Endo-Surgery is essentially one month.
By decreasing the planning interval from one month to one week to one dayt the extent of
the production reactions will also be shown to decrease. As a consequence of the
decreased planning intervals, I will show that production must react faster to, and to
smaller changes in, demand.
Three simulation models will be presented in this chapter. The first one will
demonstrate the production system's reaction to monthly planning. In this case, monthly
forecasts are broken down into a monthly assembly schedule. The monthly assembly
schedule is further broken down into a weekly production schedule, such that a constant
volume of product will be scheduled for assembly each week. The second model, planning
on a weekly basis, breaks monthly forecasts into weekly forecasts, and then each week the
model detennines a new schedule. As opposed to the fll"St model where production
schedules may not reflect changes in demand or pans supply shonages until the following
month, the second model will adjust its schedules within one week. The final model
presented goes one step further to daily planning. In this case, the model of using
forecasts to dctennine production schedules will change; the assembly process will be
scheduled only as needed to replenish Bulk Instruments inventory. The scheduling
algorithm that will be used is a simple Order Point / Order Quantity, resulting in a hasic
"demand pull-type" system. This daily planning system will be discussed in funher detail
in Chapter 10 (An Alternative Production System).
62
5.2 The Spreadsheet Simulation Models
The reactions to forecast error presented in the previous section are attributable to two
broad main causes -- systemic reasons (lead times and intervals between successive
production plans) and organizational reasons (incentives to alleviate to back order as
quickly as possible). The systemic reasons stem from the long lead times associated with
acquiring pans, planning lead times (the delay in getting the plan down to the production
areas), and the planning interval (either monthly, weekly, or daily). Both the effects of
long material lead times and effects of planning/management delays on supply chains are
well documented in the literature34•
The putpOse for the three models presented below is to capture the effects of
planning in monthly intervals versus weekly or daily intervals. Through the models it will
be shown that the planning interval has a significant effect on the reactions to back order.
It is important to realize that the interval between planning periods in particular will be
analyzed. Other delays in the production system, such as supplier lead times, assembly
lead times, packaging / sterilization lead times, and planning lead times, will only be
discussed. The reason is that the effects of reducing planning intervals are almost
immediately realizable. As will be shown with the "demand-pull system" used in the final
model and as will be discussed in Chapter 10, the planning interval can be reduced from
one month to one day without increasing planning effon. While continuous improvements
in production and planning lead times were clearly evident, significant improvements
require a detailed understanding of the underlying processes. This detailed understanding
would have to cut across all of Ethicon Endo-Surgery's product lines to be realized on a
broad scale. Changing the planning process would not require the same detailed
understanding. Changes to planning could therefore be implemented across dozens of
product lines. Benefits could be realized with minimal effon3S• Additionally, the benefits
of reducing the lead times were fairly well understood within the organization. At the time
of this writing, several groups were addressing the issue of lead time reduction.
Decreasing the planning intelVal, however, was not an evident emphasis, most likely
reflecting the fact that the benefits were not well understood.
34Refer to the lilerature review section of Chapter 1 for further details.
35A word of caution: Ignorance of the underlying production processes when implementing a change in
the planning process could lead to disaster. As will be shown with the simul"tion models, changing the
planning interval also changes the flexibility required of the production processes. If the planning process
is altered and the production processes are not flexible enough to SUppoR the change, the benefits of the
new planning process will not be realized.
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The Monthly, Weekly, and Daily Planning Models
To understand the effects of reducing the time intelVal between planning periods, three
models were created -- one model that simulates a monthJy planning process, another that
simulates a weekly planning process, and another that simulates a daily planning process.
The fust two models attempt to simulate the same supply chain as described in Chapter 2
(see Figure 5.1 for a diagram of Ethicon Endo-Surgery's internal supply chain).
Component parts and assembly are detennined based on future forecasts. Orders for
packaging/sterilization are initiated as needed to replenish finished goods. In other words,
the models simulate a supply chain with component pans "forecast-pushed" into assembly,
instillments "forecast-pushed" through assembly into bulk inventory, and bulk instruments
"demand-pulled" through packaging/sterilization into finished goods inventory. The key
difference between the two is in the way in which the monthly forecasts are used to plan
assembly and order parts. This difference is outlined below and is presented in Table 5.1.
1__ Packaging I "'-'-_'-
Sterilization
~Monthly Forecast
<=Weekly Forecast
<:=Daily Demand-Pull
Monthly Forecast
Weekly Forecast
Daily Demand-Pull
Daily Demand-Pull
Daily Demand-Pull
Daily Demand-Pull
Figure 5.1. The internal supply C'lain, showing how each process -- parts
ordering, assembly, and packagin,ysterilization -- are scheduled for the Monthly
Planning, Weekly Planning, and Daily Planning models.
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Process Model Scheduling Basis Description
Packaging/ Monthly - Daily Order point / Demand-Pull - Order Point
Sterilization Order quantity determined for FG inventory. When
FO inventory drops below the order
point, a new balCh of insb'Uments are
initiated through packaging I
sterilization.
Weekly -Same Demand-Pull - (same as Monthly
Planning).
Daily -Same Demand-Pull - (same as Monthly
Planning).
Assembly Monthly - Monthly forecast Forecast-Push - Monthly forecast and
derenrnrlnes~ondlly inventory levels derennine the
assembly plan number of instruments required to be
assembled for the month. l t he
monthly assembly requirements are
divided evenly across each week of
the month.
Weekly - Weekly forecasts, Forecast...Push - Weekly forecast is
detennined from the del~rmined from the Monthly
Monthly forecast, forecast. Weekly forecast andinventory levels determine the
detennines Weekly number of insttuments required to be
assembly plan. assembled for the week.
Daily - Daily Order point / Demand·PuIl - Order Point
Order quantity determined for Bulk inventory.
When Bulk inventory drops below
the order point, a new batch of
instruments are initiated through
assembly.
Component Monthly - Ordered to arrive Forecast-Push - Monthly forecast,
Pans Orders when needed. Order Pans inventory levels, and weekly
schedule updated each assembly plans are used to project
when the Pans inventory level will
month. drop below the safely slOCk level.
One lead time prior to that projected
point an order is seDtlO the sUDPlier.
Weekly - Ordered to arrive Forecast-Push - Weekly forecasts,
when needed. Order Pans inventory levels, and weekly
schedule updated each assembly plans are used to project
when the Pans invenlOry level will
week. drop below the safely stock level.
One lead time prior to dlat projected
pOint an order is sent to the supolier.
Daily - Daily Order point / Demand-Pull - Order Point
Order quantity delermined for Pans inventory.
When Pans inventory drops below
the order point, an replenishment
order is sent to the sUDolier.
Table 5.1. Scheduling Summary. Summary of how Packaging / Sterilization,
Assembly, and Component Pans Orders are scheduled for each model.
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The Monthlv PlanninR Model: In the monthly planning model, the weekly production
plans and component pans orders are detennined at the beginning of the month and do not
change until the stan of the following month. Data concerning actual orders and final
inventory levels are gathered on the fIrst day, Monday, of the new month. By the
following Monday, exactly one week later, the new monthly forecasts have been generated
and a new monthly production plan has been detennined. This monthly production plan is
broken down evenly into the weekly assembly plan. The resulting assembly plan schedules
the same volume of instruments to be assembled each week during the month. The
weekly plan does not change until a new monthly plan is generated the following month.
Immediately after the weekly assembly plan is detennined, the component pans
orders are detennined. Based on the weekly assembly plans and the inventory level of
component pans at the beginning of the month, the model detennines when the
component pans inventory will drop below a predetennined safety stock level. Exactly
one delivery lead time prior to that point, the model initiates a new order for component
pans. The parts are then expected to arrive exactly in time to prevent the inventory from
dipping below the safety stock level.
The WeekLY Plannin, Model: In the weekly planning model, the weekly production plans
and component pans orders are determined each week. On Monday morning, infonnation
concerning Friday's inventory levels in conjunction ~,ith the monthly forecasts detennines
that week's plan. As with the monthly planning model, forecasts are generated monthly
and are not available for planning purposes until the second Monday of each month.
Unlike the monthly planning model, the monthly forecasts are broken down into weekly
forecasts rather than into a monthly production schedule. The weekly forecasts are
detennined by dividing the monthly forecast by the number of weeks in the month. The
weekly forecasts are then used each week to detennine a new assembly schedule.
Component pans orders are determined using the same method as used in the
monthly planning model -- the cunent component parts inventory level in conjunction with
the weekly assembly plan detennines when a new order should be initiated. The weekly
model, however, detennines each week whether or not it needs to initiate a new order for
component pans.
The DaiLY Planninl Model: As opposed to the monthly planning and weekly planning
models, the daily planning model utilizes a "demand-pull" policy for scheduling assembly
and for detennining orders for pans. An order point / order quantity system is used to
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create a "build-to-stock" system through assembly. In other words, when the Bulk
Instrument inventory level drops below the predetennined order point, the assembly
process initiates assembly of a new batch, or order quantity, of instruments. As for
component parts, when the inventory level for a particular part drops below the
predetennined order point, an order for more component parts is sent to the supplier.
Order points are detennined from a combination of replenishment lead times and
variability in demand36• Order quantities depend on the flexibility of either the assembly
process or the supplier's production process. The more flexibility in the process, the
smaller the order quantity. The reader should observe that the order point / order quantity
system is already in place for scheduling packaging / sterilization.
The reason for switching to a demand-pull system for the daily planning model is
that it provides a simple process for scheduling on a daily basis. It is relatively easy to
understand, relying only on replenishing the appropriate inventory position as necessary.
It is also simple to implement in a simulation model since decisions at each point in time
depend only on the current state of the system; it doe., not detennine current actions by
predicting what the future will look like and men planning according to that prediction.
As mentioned previously, the models assume a d~tenninistic world with no
deviation from the set planning process, no uncenainty in lead times or parts deliveries,
and perfectly flexible resources. They use actual weekly order data and actual monthly
forecasts from prior D.A. sheets as inputs. Outputs from the models include graphs of
pans, bulk, and finished goods inventory, assembly and packaging/sterilization rates, daily
service levels, and inventory investments. The objective of these simulations was not so
much to detennine how the system would behave differently had uncertainties not existed,
but to understand how the system would behave differently under a different planning
scenario -- specifically weekly adjusnnents to production plans instead of monthly.
For the models, three basic assumptions govern the simulations:
Q>nstant lead times - lead times are constant for pans orders, assembly, 1L,d
packaging/sterilization. This assumption holds regardless of the order size and
batch sizes.
Infinite capacity - no capacity restrictions exist within the supply chain including
within suppliers.
36Por detailed information on detennining order points and order quantities, see for example: Nahmia3,
S., Production and OPerations Analysis, Second Edition., Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1993.
67
Infinite flexibility - all parts of the supply chain can change their :Jroduction rates
from week to week to whatever rate is necessary uphold the constant le;td time
assumption.
The assumption of infinite capacity .deserves further attention. The models will
demonstrate that despite the more favorable assumption that capacity restrictions do not
exis t t the amplified reactions still occur. Without the assumption, we would expel;t the
reaction~ to be even funher amplified. Interestingly, the models will «ihow that the daily
planning system requires the least production capacity (& factor of two less than the
monthly planning model) to keep up with incoming demanG.
5.3 The Simulation Spreadsheet
This section describes the details of the simulation models. The method used to create the
simulation model on spreadsheet software is discussed briefly. The bulk of the section
presents a rrA>re detailed discussion of the variables used by the model. Readers not
interested in the technical details should skip this section, as the details are not necessary
for understanding the findings from the models.
Spreadsheet Simulation ModelirJi;. The simulation mo{~els were irnplcrnented on a
Microsoft Excel37 spreadsheet on an IBM PS/238 personal computer. Implementation of a
simulation model on a spreadsheet deserves some more discussion. Each row of the
spreadsheet represents one day of the simulation. The values of the model variables are
held in the spreadsheet columns (see Table 5.2). For each day in the simulation, the
column variables are recalculated based on data from the previous day or row. The values
of i\ll variables for a pa.tUcular day are represented by a single row in the spreadsheet. The
values of a single variable for all days of the simulation are presented by a single column in
the spreadsheet. As L'1 example, detennining what the Bulle Inventory level was on July 7
requires finding the row that represents July 7 and then crossing it with the column that
represents Bulk Inventory. To detennine the Bulk Inventory level for July 8, SImply look
one row down but in the same Bulk Inventory column. An additional section of the
~preadsheet maintains the MRP-style calculations use.1 for breaking the forecasts down
into pans and assembly requirements for each month/week. The monthly forecasts are
convened into weekly forecasts and used to detennine finished goods requirements for
37Excel is a registered lrademark of Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA.
38PSIl is a registered ttademark of IBM Corporation, Annonk, NY.
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each week. Lead time offsets for packaging/sterilization, assembly, and parts orders in
conjunction WIth current inventory levels detennine production plans a~d orders for parts.
In tile monthly planning modeJ, dAis procedure is completed once per month on the second
Monday of the month. The weekly planning model completes the procedure on Monday
of every week.
..
Date Bulk Inventory Pack,'Ster Pack/Ster WIP FG Inventory
Order
- -- -
3n/94 1200 0 500 1()()()
3/8/94 1200 0 500 800
'-3/9/94 1200 0 500 600
3/10/94 1100 100 500 400
3/11/94 1100 l 200 700
.-
3/14/94 1COO 100 200 550
Table 5.2 ~fample section from a simulatioil spreadsheet. Variables are
represented in ..:ol'Jmns. Dates are represented by rows. The value of any
particular variable at any given time can be detennined by aligning the appropriate
variable column with the appropriate date fO\\'. In the sample, Bulk In\entory,
Pack/Stet WIP, and FG Inventory are state varia.bles. Pack/Ster Order is an event
variarle indiceting th~ moment that the model initiates a new batch of instrume(j~
through packaging / sterilization.
Slate V.'riables versus Event Variablu; There are two basic kinds of variables in the
model -- state variables and event variables. State variables track levels of parts,
insttuments, and finished product at each pt:'tot in the system. These variables include
Pans Inventory, Outstanding pan, Orders, Outstanding Assembly Orders, Assembly WIP,
Bulk Inver,tory, Outstanding Pack/Ster Orders, Pack/Ster WIP, and Finished Goods
In\:entory. Event variables represent the orders throughout th", system that cause state
varitble~ to change. Event variables include Parts Order, Assembly Order, Pack/~ter
Order, and Distributor Order. All quantities for the variables are normalized to represent
one sales unit where one sales unit may consist of several instru&lents of a given product
code and one instrument may be composed of several different pans. For a discussion of
the variable:; and how they are detennined, the interested reader should refer to Appendix
A at the end of the thesis.
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5.4 Results of the Simulations
In this section, I present results of the simulation of one particular product. This product
happens to be the same product demonstrated in Chapter 4. It was chosen for the
simulations because of its unexpectedly high demand during three consecutive months (see
Figure 5.2). The system's reactions to the three consecutive months of high demand
provide an excellent demonstration of the effects of changing planning inteIVals.
The results from the models are presented in Figures 5.3a-c and Figures 5.4a-c.
Figures present the resulting finished gcxxls and bulk instrureent inventory levels.
The monthly planning model demonstrated the greatest swing in production rate
following the unexpected demand peaks; but it also demonstrated relatively steady
production during the remainder of the simulation. The weekly planning model also
demonstrated a large swing in production, !Jut the swing was not as large as that found
'_'lith monthly planning (Iemember that the production rates are approximate and would be
smoothed out in a real sense). In contrast, the daily planning model exhibited a relatively
small swing in production in order to meet the increased demand. It additionally
demonstrated a relatively stable production rate t~roughout the simulation.
Looking at FG inventory levels, the monthl)" planning model exhibits considerable
variation while the daily planning model's inventory remains remarkably stable. The
weekly planning model falls somewhere in the middle.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented the effect of changing the planning interval on the production
system. In panicular, in moving from a monthly planning model to daily. pull-type
planning model, unexpectedly high demand is dampened rather than amplified.
Additionally, inventory levels tended to flatten out as the planning interval got ~maller.
This has major implications concerning the ability to reduce inventory and still maintain a
high level of delivery ~ervice.
The daily, pull-type system will be revisited in Chapter 10 as a potential alternative
to Ethicon Endo-Surgery's existing planning and production process. As will be discussed
in that chapter, the daily system has many organizational advantages in addition to being
able to r~uce variation in production and stabilize in\'entory u;vels.
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Chapter 6 Inventory and Cost of Reactions
6.1 Introduction
Up to this point in the thesis, inventory has remained on the sidelines. Production rates
and demand levels were used to demonstrate how the production system amplifies
unexpected jumps in demand. Inventory levels were only presented to add perspective to
the reactions -- to show when the product fell into back order, when it came out of back
order, and how much time was required to bring inventory levels back to their Donnal
levels. In this chapter, I tum attention to the levels of inventory throughout the internal
supply chain. As a natural extension of my research on demand and production, I
analyzed the current inventory levels and the current inventory policy. I found that the
current policy, stated as weeks of inventory and relatively consistent across all products,
does not match the corporate servict\ objective. I will show that the inventory levels
dictated by the current policy greatly exceed the inventory levels di~tated by the corporate
service objective. In other words, the current inventory level can be reduced without
jeopardizing the ability to meet the corporate objective. This potential for inventory
reduction has been valued at millions of dollars.
The first part of this chapter is devoted to the inventory analysis, demonstrating
statistically and conceptually why the inventory levels exceed corporate objectives. The
remainder of the chapter will concentrate 011 costs of the supply chain. In particular, it will
demonstrate the difference in inventory value between the current policy and the corporate
objective. It will also return back to internal supply chain reactions. A model will be
pre~nted for analyzing the costs associated with the reactions.
6.2 Inventory Analysis
In this section, I will demonstrate why the fmished goods inventory levels are high in terms
of the corporate service level objectives. The current "inventory policy" for finished goods
is stated in tenns of demand-weeks of inventory, where one demand-week of inventory
represents the volume of product expected to be sold in one week. (The reorder point
used to replenish fmished goods is the same as the "inventory policy" referred to
throughout this thesis. This definition is used to remain consistent with EES.) On the
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other hand, the corporate objective is stated as a line service leve139. The line selVice level
represents the number of times a product was available in finished goods when an order
arrived divided by the number of orders for a given product:
L · S · Le I # of Order Lines Filled from FG Inventoryme ervlce ve = ----------------.;-
Total # of Order Lines
If, for example, Ethicon Endo-Surgery's corporate service level objective is 95%40, then
95 out of every 100 orders for a particular product should be filled completely from
fmished goods inventory.
Given the current policy and the corporate objective, the inventory levels will be
examined in three different ways. The flfSt analysis examines inventory levels graphically
compared to actual demand data. Using conservative assumptions, this simple, graphical
analysis should demonstrate clearly the potential for inventory reduction. The other two,
more rigorous analyses lJtilize standard service level models to, first, translate the
corporate service level objective into a weeks of inventory objective and, secondly,
translate the current weeks of inventory policy into a corresponding service level policy.
These translations will allow direct comparison of the demand-weeks policy and the
corporate service level objective.
A Graphical Approach to Understanding the FG Inventory Level
The simple approach demonstrates graphically the relationship between demand and FG
inventory levels. Figure 6.1 shows a product that has a fairly representative variation in
demand (standard deviation equals 25% of average demand) and a fairly representative
inventory policy (3 weeks of demand). III the graph. the jagged line shows the incoming
demand for the product over a fOUf month period. The dashed line drawn through the
middle of the demand line is the average demand for the period. Note that the tlighest
peak in demand occurs on July 2 with a demand of about 1750 sales units. Immediately
above the average demand, a line has been constructed to pass just above that demand
39The term "line" refers to the line on an order sheet. Customers IDay specify several differe"t products
on a single order sheet, and each distinct product receives its own line on the sheet. For a discussion on
service level concc'ots, see for example: Nahmias, S., froduction ~D~ Operations Analysis, Second
&lilian, Homewood, IL: IrvJin, 1993.
40'Jbe actual line service level objective is witheld as proprietary infonnation. The upcoming inventory
level calculations that compare the corporate objective to current policy will utilize the actual service level
objective, but will not disclose the panicular number.
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peak. This line, by passing through the peak demand of 1750 sales units, represents the
inventory required to avoid falling into back order. In other words, since demand never
exceeded 1750 sales units, as long as just over 1750 sales units (1 1/3 demand-weeks) of
inventory are present in finished goods at the beginning of each week, the product would
not fall into back order.
Current Inventory Policy (Reorder Point)
" .3 Dem.nd........4000~ .-....i _
500 W.kly Demand
3500
3000
1000
I
Need thl. much Inventory (-1750 Sa•• Unlta.
11/3 demand.......) It the beginning of MCh
week to remain out of beck order
0 ...........-..-...--.......-..-..-....---......--.,...-......-.........--.-...-......-....-...-...
4-Jun 18-J.... 2-JuI 16-Jul 3O-Ju 13-Aug 27-Aug 10-sep 24-Sep
Date
Figure 6.1 Weekly demand relative to the finished goods inventory
policy for a representative product As show in the graph, peak
demand over the four month period occurs on July 2 with a demand
of 1750 sales units. As long as 1750 sales units (about 1 1/3
demand-weeks) of product are present in fmished goods inventory
at the beginning of each week, the product would not fall into back
order.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the packaging / sterilization proce:· s replenishes FG
inventory on an Order Point / Order Quantity basis. We can assume conservatively that
the packaging / sterilization process examines the FO inventory leve'l once per week with a
replenishment lead time of one week. (In actuality, FG inventory is examined every day.)
In this case and under the assumption that FG inventory can be replenished to 1750 sales
units (1 1/3 demand-weeks) each week41.42, the absolute maximum inventory level would
41 As discussed in Chapter 2, the packaging I sterilization process is highly flexible. Packaging I
sterilization of 1/3 higher volume for one panicular product that represents less than 5% of the total
volume should conservatively not pose a problem
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be 1750 sales units. This maximum would be present at the beginning of the week and
would be depleted to a lower level by the end of the week. This maximum should be
contrasted with the current inventory policy of 3 demand-weeks. In figure 6.1, this policy
is represented by the highest horizontal line drawn through 3900 sales units.
As a final point, it should be noted how the line selVice level would change had
there been slightly less than 1750 sales units of inventory availabJe for shipment each
week. The graph is composed of one data point for each week of the four-month period.
This results in a :otal of 18 data points. For discussion's sake, suppose that FG inventory
can only be replenished to 1500 sales units. As a result, for every week with a demand
greater than 1500 sales units, some orders will not be filled from FG inventory. During
those weeks, the number of orders filled from FG will simply be 1500. Taking this into
account, we can determine the total number of orders that would be filled from FG
inventory and consequently detennine the line service level. The resulting service level,
calculated separately from this discussion, would be 97.4%. III other words, if the
packaging I sterilization operation can only replenish FG inventory up to 1500 sales units
each week, the resulting selVice level would still be 97.4%.
Detailed Analysis of the Inventory Policy
The service level concept found at EES exactl~' matches the Type 2 Service model of a (Q,
R) system described in serveral operations management texts43• For details of the
calculations, I refer the reader to those other texts. The reorder point and the
replenishment batch size found in the model deserve some further discussion. The reorder
point represents the point at which a new replenishment batch is initiated. When the
finished goods inventory level drops below the reorder point, a new batch of product is
initiated through the packaging and sterilization process. The size of this batch will always
be the order quantity. With this in mind, the reorder point is equivalent to EES's concept
of fmished goods safety !.tock. When finished goods inventory drops below the safety
42The inventory replenishment policy may not actually be clear here. In order to reple~i~h up to 1 1/3
weeks physically residing in fmished goods at the beginning of each week, the policy would be to order up
to 1 (to account for cycle stock)~ 1 1/3 weeks. This will result in an average inventory level on the
fust day of the week of 1 1/3 weeks. .\150 note that this policy will fail with two or more consecutive
weeks of hiCh demand. To be thorough, we would need to replenish up to 2 x 1 1/3 =2 2/3 weeks. This
will result in an average weekly inventory level of 2 2/3 - 1=1 2/3 weeks. 1 2/3 weeks is still far shan of
the current 3-week policy.
43See for example: Nahmias. S., Production and Operations Analysis, Second Edition, Homewood, 1L:
Irwin, 1993.
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stock level, a new batch is initiated through packaging / sterilization. Additionally, the
replenishment batch size is equivalent to EES's packaging / sterilization batch size.
This analysis will involve two calctlicttions -- one that convens the current
inventory policy into an expected selVice level and one that convert's the sezvice level
objective into a demand-weeks inventory policy.
CQnvert;IJi the Current Inventory Policy into all Expected Service Level
I will first demonstrate the mechanics of the calculation with a sample product. The
product selected is one of EES's high volume Instruments, representing approximately 5%
of the total EES sales volume. The policy for this product is to carry three weeks of
safety stock. The average weekly demand over the past six months has been 1450 sales
units ~~ith a standard deviation of 346 sales units. Since the replenishment lead time is
approximately one week, the average demand over the replenishment lead time is simply
the average weekly demand. Using the same logic, the standprd deviation of demand over
the replenishment lead time is simply the weekly standard deviation. The three week
inventory policy translates into a reorder point of 1450·3 == 435G sales units. As for the
final piece of infonnation, the batch replenishment size is one week's worth of ,1emand, or
1450 sales units44•
Given the infonnation for this product, the expected service level comes out to be
&Teater than 99.9%. This suggests that a significant investment has ~~n made in
inventory to ensure that all but 0.1% of the incoming orders are filled directly from
finished goods inventory.
44A batch size of 1450 sales units is actually luger than the balCh size actually used. The actual number
is not used hem for two reasons. First, the batch size was still being debated 3a. tile time of this writing.
Enough flexibility existed if' the process that the E()Q (Economic Order QU8L1tity) was smaller than one
typical week's wonh of demand. The question of batch size therefore' rested more with what quanitily was
reasonable for operators to handle. Secondly, the calcuialions h3ve been completed with batch sizes
ranging from 145 sales units to 2900 sales units. Even with a batch size of 145 sales units, the resulting
service level was stiD above 99.98%.
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-Service Level
Prod~CL Average Weekly Standard Deviation (with Current Inventory
Demand of Demand Policy of 3 Demand·
Weeks)
A 1749 541 99.9%
n 1503 264 99.9%
C 440 141 99.90/0
D 1275 304 99.9%
E 1600 422 99.9%
F 646 110 99.9%
G 861 141 100.0%
H 615 145 99.9%
I 13~ 55 99.9%
J 598 105 99.9%
K 598 185 l00.~)%
-
L 536 110 99.9%
M 1011 207 100.0%
Table 6.1. Converting the Current Inventory Policy into Expected Service
Level. Expect~: Service levels for the top thirteen selling product codes (top 50%
of sales dollar volume) based on the current inventory polic~1 of 3 demand-weeks.
All thineen codes have expected service levels greater than 99.9%. When this
analysis is expanded to the top 80% of sales dollar volume, 43 of the 45 prodt:~t
codes should expect a service lev~l greater than 99.~%.
Was this chosen product code simply a random exception? Going through the same
calculations with the top thineen sell :I.ng product codes, all thineen ~odes should expect a
99.9% service level under the \. Jirent inventory policy (see 'fable 6.1). Expanding this
analysis funher to the top 45 prodJ!~t codes, '13 of tht: 45 shc,LJld expect a service level of
99.9% or better4s.
4SOnce again, the f-enicc Icv:1s were calculated 2Ssuming a balCh size CJf one rweek's wonh of demand. In
ch~ging the batch size from one week to a lJ~f day t 40 of lhe 45 "roduct codes have a sekvice of 99.90/0
or greater.
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Coovertini the CorpQrate Service Level oQjective inTo an Inventory Policy:
For the second calculation, detennining the expected inventory level, the process just
described will be reversed. In this case, the service level is already knflwn, so we work
backward to detennine the corresponding reorder point. The calculated reorder point will
be compared to the current inventory policy. Once again, the corporate service level
objective will be kept proprietary.
Results: Considering the first code examined (average demand and standard deviation are
1450 and 346 sales units respectively and the batch size is one week's wonh of demand,
or1450 sales units) and reversing the calculations, the corporate service level results in a
reorder point of 1790 sales units or 1.2 weeks. This is less than half the current policy of
4350 sales units and 3 weeks46•
Problems With the Inventory Analysis:
Two major issues may be brought up in examining the presented analysis. First of all, the
calculations did not take into account variability in supply. Having an unsteady supply of
assembled compon~nts into the packaging I sterilization process would necessitate
additional inventory. Several times in the past, supplier disruptions have resulted in
extended periods of back order. When a supply disruption occurs at a stage upstreanl
fro~!l packaging / sterilization, the additional inventory allows a certain amount of time to
pass before the fmished goods inventory drops to dangerously low levels. The supply
disruption, it would be hoped, could be reso!ved within the given time. However, in
defense of the analysis, supply disruptions are cenainly not a consistent occurance across
any ?anicular product line. So the question is, why should high levels of inventory be
maintained with .all products when a problem is not likely to occur with anyone product in
· I ?p2rtICU ar.
The other major issue iravo}vcs variation in lead times. In this case, the assumed
lead time was one week. Du~ to competitive reasons, the accuracy of this lead time
cannot be divulged. But this number errs on the conservative side (i.e., less than the lead
time used by the calculatic.ls); and the lead time used by the calculations accounts for a
significant ponion of ~he actual lead time range. Variabilllj in l~ad time, therefore, should
not change the results of the analysis significantly.
460nce again, the balCh sizes were varir.d to delennine the influence on the calculated reorder point.
Reducing dle batch size to 1(2 day's worth of demand, the reorder point only increases from 1.2 weeks to
1.4 weeks. Therefore, Lhe conclusions presented con~ming the reorder point are nearly independent of
the batch size.
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6.3 Inventory Valuation
Now that we have detennined a sig,nificant difference exists between current inventory
policy and the corporate service level objective, we can detennine the value of the excess
inventory. After calculating that value, we can detennine the additional annual costs
incurred based on Ethicon Endo-Surgery's carrying cost of inventory. The calculated
dollar value will represent the annual additional costs incurred for maintaining excess FG
inventory.
As a word of caution before proceeding forward, the previous section mentioned
that there may be many reasons for the organization to hold onto the excess inventory.
Problems such as uncertain supply or uncenain production processes may necessitate
holding the excess inventory. With this view, however, the annual costs that will be
calculated no longer simply represent the cost associated with holding excess inventory.
Instead, they represent the cost associated with having uncertain supply and uncertain
production processes. After all I without the problems that necessitate the excess
inventory, the excess inventory is no longer needed. The costs associated with ~lolding
that excess inventory are no longer incurred.
Cm:.1J';n~ Cost qflnventory
Carrying inventory incurs cenain costs to the organization. Inventory takes up floor space
for storage, requires labor and equipment for handling, and ties up working capital. The
cost of holding inventory can be broken down into three major categories: carrying cost,
cost of capital, and efficiency costs. Carrying cost refers to the cost of physically storing
and moving the inventory. For example, floor space, material handling equipment and
labor, and infonnation systems for tracking inventory are all examples of carrying costs.
The cost of capital refers to the opporttlnity cost associated with investing working capital
in inventory. In other words, the money that an organization invests in inventory could
instead be invested somewhere else, such as in a mutual fund or a bond ponfolio, that
produces some rate of return on the investment. Finally, the efficiency cost of inventory
refers to the often qualitative impact that inventory has on a production process. The
common analogy used to express this cost is the proverbial "rocks in the stream47."
47The "rocks in the stteam" analogy goes something like this: The level of water in the stream represenlS
the level of inve.ntory; rocks represent quality problems, poor process capability, variability in lead times,
or anything else that can negatively impact a production process. When the water level is high, the rocks
are unexposed. Any floating object can move with the current uninhibited by the obstructions below the
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Quantifying these costs can become difficult and cumbersome, particularly when
accounting for all of the carrying costs and quantifying some of the efficiency costs. To
compensat~,Ethicon Endo-Surgery and many other organizations approximate all of the
costs into one straight percentage of the inventory's value. Knowing this percentage and
the value of the inventory leads to a close approximation of the cost of holding the
inventory. Both of these numbers are readily available within EES.
Rough cut calculations for Inventory Savinis.·
In this section, I provide a rough-cut method for calculating the inventory savings. To
perfonn this rough-cut calculation, we return to the product used in the previous section.
In that section we specified andlor detennined the following information:
• the average weekly demand for the product is iliQ sales units;
• the current inventory policy (reorder point) is 4350 sales units (3 demand-
weeks);
• the inventory policy (reorder point) using the objective servir;e level is .ll2Q
sales units.
water's surface. But as the water level begins to drop, rocks become exposed and must be removed. If the
water level in the stream is kept at a high level, the rocks are never exposed and removed. If Oil the other
hand the water level is low, the rocks are not only visible but mJW be remove to avoid obstructing flow.
To complete the analog, production processes that maintain high le'lels of inventory are uninhibited by the
underlying production problems. Since the problems do not inhibit the process, they are allowed to persist
unresolved and often undetected.
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Each sales unit of inventory for this product is valued at, say for example, $150. The total
value of the reorder point inventory under the current policy is $652,500 (4350 x $150);
the total value under the corporate service level policy is $268,500 (1790 x $150)48. The
difference between the two is $384,000. We can now get a very rough estimate of the
total potential inventory difference. By using the following equation, we can linearly
extrapolate the savings of S384,OOO, representing 5% of the sales volume, to the total
savings across all products.
x/ _ $384,000/
7100% - /5%
The total value of the inventory difference comes out to $7.68 million:
x = $7 .68million
With a cost of carrying inventory at 15%, the annual cost of the inventory is:
$7.68million x 15% =$1.15million
How accurate is this rough-cut approach? As part of the research, total potential
inventory savings were calculated using a more exhaustive approach. The exhaustive
approach considered current inventory levels for all products (some products had higher
inventory policies than others). It additionallJ used a new policy for all products that
could still be considered as conservative. The calculated savings in FG inventory value
was on the same ordel of magnitude of the above calculations.
6.4 Cost of Reactions
Continuing along the lirles of detennining costs in the internal supply chain, 1 now
present the costs associated witn reactions to back order. The reactions presented in
Chapter 4 demonstrate that, in response to back order, the organization rapidly ramps up
48The reader may question determining the difference in inventory value by ta:<ing the difference in the
reorder points. The (approximate) average inventory in either case is Qa + R .. Ii, where Q is the balCh
size, R is die reorder point and JJ. is the average demand over the lead-time. The two policies have the
same values for Q and for Ii. Therefore, laking the difference between the two policies results in an
inventory level of (Q/2 + R1 - J..l) - (Q(l + R2 - J.I.) =R1 .. R1 •
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production to quickly restore finished goods inventory levels. Alternatively, the
organization could choose to react in a different way -- it could raise its production level
slightly and restore finished goods inventory gradually over time. By restoring inventory
gradually over time, the manufacturing organization may take advantage of any existing
excess capacity. This latter approach represents the lowest-cost alternative. Using
already available excess capa<;ity incurs no additional labor overtime. There is also no
need to incur the cost of expediting orders from suppliers to haste,n the delivery of
incoming components. Using overnight and two-day delivery to customers would not be
necessary. On the other hand, the current demonstrated approach, reacting quickly (0
restore finished goods inventory levels, may incur significant costs. These costs are in the
fonn of labor overtime, expediting supplier orders, and using expensive overnight and
two-day delivery.
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Example Reaction #1*
-O--Weekly Prc..ductlon
-if-FG Inventory
• • • • • • Non-overtlme C8p-=lty
......................_ .......,.... ...... ---.--..................,.,,-...............~116 17 18 18 20
*Not based on actual data.
Figure 6.1(a). Rapid ramp-up of production in response to back order, restoring
fmished goods inventory levels as quickly as possible.
Example Reaction #2*
-O--Weekly Production
M FG Inventory
• • • • • • Non-overtlme
c.paclty
......_-
*Not based on adual data.
Figure 6.1(b). Gradual reaction to back order that uses readily available excess
capacity to restore fmished goods inventory.
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The purpose of the model is not to specifically detennine the optimal way for the
organization to react to back order. Instead, the model should provide a framework for
examining the costlbenefit tradeoffs as demanded by each specific case. For products that
have fallen dt.:eply into back order to the point where surgeons may not be receiving
needed product, the decision is m0st likely c~ear without the aid of the model. The
organization \\'ill need to ramp up production as quickly as possible regardless of
expediting and shipping costs. For products that have only slightly fallen behind the
market demand, the slow approach might be best. Again, this decision may not require
use of the model. Use of the model is most appropriate with inbetween cases where the
decision is not clear-cut.
As a final note before continuing, the costs specified by the model have riot
actually been evaluated for any sample products. The numbers were difficult to obtain
postfac~o and were therefore not pursued. I present this model as a piece of the research
that is complete enough to offer insight. It is open for future refinement, panicularly by
thos~ who might need to understand the reaction decision further.
Quick versus Slow Ramp-Up -- Cost Model
Table 6.1 (a). presents the costs associated with a fast reaction that are not incuned with a
slow, steady reaction. Table ".I(b). presents the benefits versus the drawbacks of each
approach. Note that the biggest drawback of the fast approach is cost wt. ile the primary
be:tefit is a better service level (restoring finished goods inventory as quickly as possible
minimizes impact on service level). Another imponant consideration is the strain on
suppliers versus the strain on dealers and affiliates. Restoring fi~ished goods inv\.~ntory as
quickly as possible will Dlinimize impact on dealers and affiliates but strain suppliers.
After all, the suppliers will have to produce the components to correspond with the
increase in production. With a gradual response, the reverse is true -- dealers and affiliates
will be strained wh.ile impact on suppliers will be nrlnllnized. The delivery deiCtys resulting
from back order potentially result in ill will on the pan of dealers and affiliates.
Additionally, the increases in lead times force dealers and affiliates to carry higher levels of
safety stock. (Safety stock is function of demand variation over lead time. An increase in
delivery lead times requires a corresponding increase in dealer safet)' stock.)
QO
Major Costs Incurred with a Quick Reaction
• Labor Overtime
• Expediting Components from Suppliers
• Overnight and Two-Day Shipments to
Customers
• Excess Inventory
Table 6.1(a). The major cost drivers associated with rapidly increasing production
outpUt in response to a product going into back order.
Increase Production Rapidly via Increase Production via SLowly
Overtime and Expediting Ramping Up Capacity
Supplier Orders
Benefits • Maximize service level • Low cost
• 100% product supply ~ Minimize strain on suppliers
restored as quickly as
possible
• Minimize strain on~wm
and affiliates
Drawbacks • High cost • Poor service level
• StrcJned reiationships with • 100% product supply may not be
suVpliers restored for several months
• Potentially strained relationships
with dealers and affiliates
Unknown • Number and percentage of orders that are deliv~red after expected
delivery dates
• Dealers' and affl1iates' inventory
Table 6. 1(b). Tradeoffs of increasing production quickly through overtime and
expediting supplier orders versus increasing production only through excess
capacity.
Also, note that the impact on other customer-driven measures of delivery service
can not adequately be detennined -- for example, delivery within an expected delivery
time. Even though a particular product is in back order, delivery of product to customers
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may still occur within the desired timeframe. To see this, consider twenty customers who
order product on Day One and eXlJect that their orders be delivered within seven days.
Also assume that the manufacturer does not have the product in stock on warehouse
shelves. When the orders arrive at the manufacturer's warehouse, they cannot be
immediately fl1loo; the manufacturer falls into back order. If on the following day, Day
Two, twenty units of the product arrive at the warehouse, the orders from Day One are
immediately fuled and delivered within the desired timeframe. Assuming that twenty new
customers order on Day Two, the manufacturer is still in back order. But these new
orders may be met with product arriving at the warehouse on Day Three. Customer
expectations of delivery in seven days are still met, and may continue to be met, even
though the manufacturer remains in back order and the service level is a lousy 0%.
Additionally, no measures are provided of dealer and affiliate inventories. When Ethicon
Endo-Surgery does not have product immediately available for dealers and affiliates, this
does not indicate that dealers and affiliates have no product available for hospitals. After
all, dealers and affiliates also maintain safety stock to avoid going into back order. Only
when their safety stocks are depleted is there a danger that hospitals don't get the product
they need right away. Needless to say, hospital~ also carry safety stocks that must be
depleted before the surgeon is actually impacted49•
One particular case exanlined during the internship demonstrated this effect. The
particular product had been in back order for several week~, accumulating a total
outstanding demand of over $250,000. Domestic dealers and major international affiliates
were surveyed to detennine their inventory positions. The survey revealed that dealers
had, on average, 30 days worth of inventory. International affiliates were even better off,
maintaining between 4-16 weeks of inventory. The resulting conc!usion 'h'a~ that the back
order posed little threat to hospitals' orders.
6.5 Conclusion
In this cha,ter, I showed that the finished goods inventory levels were significantly
higher than the intended level as detennined by the corporate seJVice level objective.
Proof was provided in three ways. First, I demonstrated the level of inventory graphically
49TIlis discussion in no way advocates getting rid of service level as a measure of performance to customer
needs. Nor does it advocate only being concerned about supply of product when dealers and affiliates are
in danger of falling into back order. If it is falsely aEsumed that dealer inventories will always cover
~honages al the manufacturer and the manufacwrer chooses not 10 be concerned about back order, the
dealer will run out of inventory at some point Nld service to hospitals will be impacted. The important
point is that several faclors should be considered oofore incurring the costs of rapidly ramping up
production.
92
with respect to weekly demand. Assuming weekly replenishment, an appropriate level of
inventory could be detennined by constructing a line the peak demand. As long as
finished goods inventory could be replenished each week up to the level of the line, the
product would remain out of back order. This line was found to be substantially lower
than the existing inventory policy. Another of the methods took current infonnation and
convened it into comparable values. The existing inventory policy of three weeks was
convened into a service level number. For most of the products examined, this seIVice
level turned out tc be greater than 99.9%.
In the last pan of the chapter, the costs associated with a quick reaction to back
order were examined. This discussion established that reacting as quickly as possible to a
back order situation does indeed incur costs and that an alternative, slower reaction may
be considered.
The next chapter will discuss why the organization has implicitly chosen to react
quickly and to maintain high levels of inventory.
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Chapter 7 The Emphasis on Back Order Reaction and Protection
7.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have demonstrated both the organIzation's reactions when a product
goes into back order and the organization's high levels of inventory. The reaction consists
of production quickly ramping up its output and producing at an increased rate for a
period of several weeks. Once finished goods inventory has been restored, production
slows down to stearly levels and resumes nonnal operations. With each back order
reaction, the organization makes an implicit decision to ramp production up quickly. A
quick l-esponse in production incurs additional costs not found with a gradual response.
Due to dealer and affiliate stocking, a gradual response docs not necessarily impact
delivery to end-customers. In such an instance, there would be no need to ramp
production up quickly to alleviate the back order.
As opposed to tt.e reaction to back order, the high levels of inventory can be
considered as protection from going into back order in the frrst place. As inventory levels
il1=rease, the likelihood of depleting the inventory and going into back order diminishes. It
was shown in the preceding chapter that FG inventory levels exceed the corporate
inventory objectives. In other words, the organization has made an implicit decision to
incur the costs of additional protection from back order.
This chapter presents some rationale behind these implicit decisions. Given the
original emphasis on market growth, an emphasis that contributed greatly to the
company's overwhelming success, I will argue that the resulting incentives naturally
suppon the decisions.
7.2 Marketing Focus and Delivery Reliability
Ethicon Endo-Surgery was spun off from its parent company in the suture business,
Ethicon, Inc., to address the specific needs of its own young markets. At the time, few
competitors existed in the market, and one company, U.S. Surgical Corporation, owned
the majority of l11..arket share. Ethieon Endo-Surgery surpassed its chief competitor in
1994 to capture a greater ponion of the U.S. marketSo• But this rapid growth did not
SOJohnson & Johnson 1994 annual report.
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come without a carefully orchestrated strategy_ The successful strategy involved emphasis
on market growth and product development and required that a consistent supply of
product be available to the sales force. The three key components, market growth,
product development, and consistent supply, are discussed further below. Of the three,
product development :ieemed to have only minor impact on the researched portion of the
manufactufdlg organization (Le., o~ganizational structure, incentives, and infonnation
systems); therefore product development is not considered beyond this section. Market
growth and consistent product supply, on the other hand, were instrumental in establishing
the imponance of back order.
Mu.:rket Growth and Product Development Emphasis
To save on costs, hospitals typically purchase through contracts with purchasing
organizations. Purchcising organizations typically represent several hospitals in a given
area and therefore have greater purchasing power than a single hospital. Greater
purchasing power translates into lower prices for products. The pur~hasing organizations,
in turn, develop contracts with dealers to supply the product. Dealers, of course, order
and receive product from manufacturers.
lois arrangement of contracts and relationships makes life difficult for a new
manufacturer trying to ent~r the market. When a hospital wants to start purchasing
products from a new manufacturer, it must fIrst assen that it will purchase enough volume
from the manufacturer to warrant supply from the purchasing organization. If the
purchasing organization does not supply the manufacturer's product, the volunle must be
significant enough to pursue updating the contract with the corresponding dealer. If the
purchasing organization already supplies the product, the contract with the hospital must
be updated.
Although this process may seem complex, the critical point is that a hospital
typically cannot 10Cik on a dealer's shelves and purchase any product from any
manufacturer. Instead, the hospital must detennine that it has significant n~..d for a
product and then work with the purchasing organization to supply it. Convincing a
hospital that it should purchase a new manufacturer's product requires significant sales
effon. A salesperson mu~t first convince the surgeons in the hospital that they should start
using their company's products; he or she must also convince the hospital materials
manager that there is some advantage or need to bring the product in. To EES sales
people, this process is referred to as "convening" a hospital. Therefore, to get its
instruments into hospitals and accepted by surgeons, Ethicon Endo-Surgery had to
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concentrate heavily on its sales force. Tremendous marketing effon also was required to
direct the sales force and determine the sales strategies.
In order to develop products that surgeons would want to use, Ethicon Endo-
Surgery 3lso concentrated heavilj on product development. Upon being spun off from
Ethicon, Inc. in J&nuary, 1992, EES was far behind its ,J,ief competitor, U.S. Surgical
Corporation, in product offerings. In addition to having great products, having a broad
range of products was critical for convening a hospital; therefore EES had to expand its
existing surgical instrument line rapidly without compromising quality. The success of this
efron can be gauged by the number of new product offerings inttOti ~ced to the market in
each of the following years.
The rapid growth, largely at the expense of the principal competitor, exceeded
expectations within the company itself as well as within the parent corporation. By year-
end, 1994, Ethicon Endo-Surgery became the dominant player in the U.S. endOStlrgical
instrument market.
Ensurin2 consistent Supply
Having product available at all times is critical to growing market share in the surgical
instrument business. The reason for this goes beyond simply satisfying customers
(hospitals and surgeons) by delivering products when they're expected. Having product
ready to deliver at all times to an ongoing account is cenainly a selling point; but having
product ready to sell immediately to a brand new account is critical. Product must be
available, or new potential custom~rs can not even be approached. As one salesp~rson put
it, "we can't even walk in the door unless we have product to sell." Additionally, the
process of convening a ho~pital is a lengthy process, but the conversion is unlikely to take
place if no product is available for the new customer. Otherwise, why would they
conven?
Having the products available to sell when a new customer wanted to purchase
them was critical to winning the customer over. This emphasis further increased the
already high costs associated with stocking out of a surgical product. The resulting risk
associated with introducing innovations into the production process was weighted toward
the high costs associated with failure (not being able to deliver product and convert the;
hospital) rather than the less significant rewards for success (reductions in variable and
fixed costs).
The ability to market and sell products was obviously a tremendous asset in
Ethicon Endo-Surgery's drive to grab market share. This effon required rapid expansion
of the product line and a consistent supply of product to (fIr sales force. The requirement
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of having consistent supply emphasized the fact that back order could not be tolerated.
Given the already high cost associated with stocking out (Le., that a surgeon may not get
an instrument when needed for surgery), the need for consistent supply further increased
the costs.
This emphasis helps explain the quick reactions in response to a product in back
order and the willingness to tolerate high inventory levels. The original need -- always
have product available -- was translated into a slightly different operational need -- always
have product available to fill orders from finished goods inventory. If product is not
available in fmished goods inventory, the customer and sale are potentially impacted.
Under this view, the organization must fill depleted inventories as quickly as possible. The
sooner inventory is restored to its desired level, the fewer the number of customers that
are potentially impacted. When inventories are not at their desired levels, a danger exists
of not filling an order from finished goods, i.e., going into back order.
At present, the initial market share expansion has largely slowed down and the
product line is essentially complete; the company can now focus its efforts more on
improving operations and reducing costs. Manufacturing process capabilities and
customer behavior are now better knowkl, helping to reduce uncertainty and risks
associated with production process innovations. As mentioned previously, there's much
evidence that the original emphasis on providing product at all times still exists. This is
clearly evident in the reactions associated with back order and with the high levels of
inventory, particularly finished goods inventory.
Additionally, it is important to consider the impact that the strategic emphasis on
market growth and having product available at all times has had on the manufacturing
organization, its incentives, the existing information systems, and important business
processes. While the influences on the overall organization are difficult to discern, many
may be readily implied. Figure 7.1 s~ows some of the connections that can be implied.
The impact of the original strategic emphases will be addressed further in Chapter 8. At
that point, an additional influence, parent business (Ethicon, Inc.) processes and structure,
will be introduced and explained further.
97
Figure 7.1. The influences exerted on the development of key pieces of the business --
the monthly planning process, organizational structure, fonnal and infonnal information
systems, and high level incentives (back order / inventory tradeoffs
7.3 Conclusion
Ethicon Endo-Surgery's original successful emphasis on growth has naturally led to two
key implicit decisions -- reacting quickly rather than gradually and adding additional back
order protection thr~ugh inventory The sales force had to have a study supply of product
in order to "convert" hospitals. This funher increased the already high stockout costs
associated with surgical instruments in general. The high costs of stockout resulted in an
emphasis on back order throughout the organization. The impact that the back order
emphasis has had manifests itself in two ways -- through ~ctions to being in back order
and through protection from back order using high levels of inventory. The decision to
react quickly to get out of back order does not come without costs, however. Realizing
that there are costlbenefit tradeoffs involved identifies that back order reactions as a
decision that can and should be analyzed. The decision to hold high levels of inventory
incurs reasonably quantifiable costs. The next question, which will be addressed in
Chapter 8, is, why has the organization largely failed to identify the reaction tradeoffs and
the high levels of inventory?
98
Chapter 8 Identifying and Addressing Back Order Reactions and
Inventory Levels
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter described how the emphasis on back order developed -- through the
high cost associated with stocking out and a need to constantly have product available in
order to grow market share. The costs of rapidly increasing production output and
maintaining high levels of inventory were implicitly overshadowed by the benefits of
restoring product supply as quickly as possible and of emphasizing protection against back
order.
Now that the business has reached a maturing stage in its development, pressures
to reduce costs have increased. As a result, the cost/benefit tradeoffs of inventory and
rapid reactions gain added importance. Given that production can ramp up gradually
(rather than rapidly) without impacting end-customer service, and given the magnitude of
potential inventory savings, the organization would undoubtedly benefit from examining
the tradeoffs. On the contrary, no analysis was ever completed to determine the best
approach to recovering from back order. At the time of this writing, a determination had
been made of the appropriate inventory levels, but the determination failed to incorporate
the costlbenefit tradeoffs of holding inventory. Of more importance, evidence suggests
that the organization did not fully recogniz~ the magnitude of the reactions or of the
inventory levels. Two considerations arise from this last statement:
1. Conducting a costlbenefit analysis each time a product falls into back order
would certainly be unnecessary, but the fact that the extent of the reactions
went largely unrecognized is in itself revealing.
2. There seemed to be some internal strife over whether or not the inventory
levels were appropriate at their current state. While several individuals
recognized that inventory levels were high, the organization as a whole had
not come to the same conclusion.
This chapter addresses the issue of why the organization did not fully recognize the extent
of the reactions and the potential for inventory reduction.. As an outsider looking in, the
extent of the back order reactions and the high levels of inventory may seem clear,
particularly when presented in the context of this thesis. But an individual working in the
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company is subject to the existing organizational environment and therefore witnesses the
issues in a different light than presented here. Understanding the influence of
organizational structure, incentives, infonnation systems, and business processes within
the company is necessary for understanding how the organization identifies and defines its
problems. A discussion on how these existing influences failed to lead to identification
and defmition of the problems is presented in this chapter. Also presented are some
observations on how the organizational structure, incentives, information systems, and
business process might have developed.
8.2 Recognizing the Back Order Reactions and Inventory
Understanding why the organization did not recognize the magnitude of the back order
reactions and the high levels of inventory requires a look inside the organization. In this
particular case, the organizational structure, the incentives, the monthly planning and
forecasting process, and the infonnation systems were found to be predominately
responsible for the view of the organization's problems from within.
Recognizing the extent of the reactions requires three key pieces of infonnation to
come together -- demand, production, and inventory. The previous chapters
demonstrated the reactions clearly by combining all three pieces into one single graph.
When the pieces are viewed in isolation, little infonnation is conveyed; but by placing
even two of the pieces together, the picture becomes clearer. Production output coupled
with demand demonstrates how much the level of production exceeds the level of demand.
Place inventory on the same graph, and the timing of the reaction with the back order
becomes instantly visible. But this infonnation -- demand, production, and inventory --
resides panially with the master planners and partially with the buyer/planners.
Organizational separation, lack of overlapping incentives, and lack of supporting
infonnation systems do not allow the critical information to readily come together. A
major connection between master planners and buyer/planners does exist in the monthly
planning process. But this process, as will be explained shortly, still falls shon for putting
together the key pieces of the demand-production-inventory puzzle.
The problem of recognizing the high levels of inventory revolves around the same
situation. Demand coupled with inventory demonstrates the level of inventory versus the
variation in the incoming demand -- a critical connection for determining appropriate
inventory leveissi . But as recently stated, the organizational structure, incentives,
SIAs demonsttated in Chapter 6 and in: Nahmias, S., Production and Operations Analysis, Second
Edition, Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1993.
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infonnation systems, and monthly planning process do not support the connection well.
The problem, therefore, remains relatively unnoticed to the organization as a whole.
More detail on how the organizational structure, incentives, infonnation systems,
and business processes hinder identification of the problems is presented below. An
additional factor, growing pains, is first considered. This factor validly states that the
organization has been concentrating heavily, and appropriately, on growth. The
organization consequently has not had the opportunity or the resources to address some
important issues that might otherwise have been addressed.
Growing Pains
A valid argument to why the organization has not fully addressed the problems is that it
has only been in existence for a few years, concentrating almost exclusively on growth
during that time. Therefore, it h~s not yet had the opportunity to identify and resolve
many problems; reactions to back order and high levels of inventory may arguably be such
problems. Under this perception, given enough time and resources, the organization
would have put someone in charge of investigating and resolving the problems; but since
everyone already has their hands full, this has not been practical.
While this view has much validity, it misses tlle fact that the organization in general
had not clearly understood the reaction problems. It must be said that a group did exist in
part to address the problems -- a group was charged with redeveloping the monthly
planning process and incentives to improve operating efficiencyS2. Clearly one of the
problems this group has had has been getting the rest of the organization to understand
clearly why a redevelopment need even occur. Much of the research presented here was
utilized by the group in :heir efforts. Interestingly, the charts presented in Chapter 4 --
demonstrating overreactions to back order and tying together demand, production, and
inventory data -- represented, to the best of anyone's knowledge in the group, the frrst
analysis clearly tying together all three variables.
In the case of inventory, demands to reduce inventory were clearly mandated.
Approximately one year prior to the time of this writing, two people were positioned
within the central planning group to address inventory reduction full time. Considerable
progress had been made, particularly with the process of getting rid of obsolete inventory.
The general sense of the organization, however, was mixed. Some groups did not
recognize the need to reduce inventory at all. Others felt that inventory was too high, but
S2The work of this group coincided closely with my research and was ongoing at the time of this writing,
Much of their effort contributed to the development of the thoughts presented throughout the thesis; and
my resea."Ch often provided the hard data required for their analysis.
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had no feel for how high. This uncertainty is surprisin& considering the data presented in
Chapter 6. For the particular product investigated, finished goods inventory could be cut
in half and still support the objective corporate service level. Additionally, the high levels
of inventory are consistent with the current inventory policy. The problem therefore is not
in bringing inventory levels down to their intended level but in recognizing that the
intended level itself is high. With the magnitude of reductions possible, it seems unlikely
that the youth of the company alone would drive the confusion. It is equally unlikely that
maturity alone would lead to the potential inventory reductions.
Organizational Structure
It was explained earlier that the master planners and the buyer/planners have visibility into
separate pieces of the demand-production-inventory puzzle. The particular viewpoints of
each function can be largely attributed to the location of the function within the
organizational structure. Their actions are then directed by fonnal and infonnal incentive
structures. Figure 8.1 shows the organization chart of the operations organization. This
particular discussion will focus on the master planning group and the buyers/planners since
their responsibilities have the greatest overlap between market demand, production, and
inventory.
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Figure 8.1. Operations organization chart showing orientation of buyer/planners
versus master planners.
The master planners reside in the central operations group and are chiefly
responsible for interpreting the market demands into monthly production plans. They
must work closely with marketing to produce monthly demand forecasts and ~.,slate the
forecasts into finished goods requirements. (A finished goods requirement refers to the
volume of finished goods that must be transferred into finished goods inventory each
month. The volume must meet the forecast demand mJ.d maintain a set level of safety
stock. For more detail on this process, refer to the descriptions provided in Chapter 2.)
Once the forecasts have been detennined, the finished goods requirements are essentially
locked in as a function of the following equation:
Finished Goods Requirementt
= Forecastt + Target Safety Stockt - FO Inventoryt_l (Eqn.8.1)
In other words, since Target Safety Stock and FO Inventory are already detennined, the
month's finished goods requirement depends only on the month's forecast. Producing the
monthly forecasts and the plan, therefore, requires a strong understanding of the market.
The finished goods requirement is only changed if review by the plant manager detennines
that the plan cannot be met, a fairly rare occurrence.
It should also be noted that the master planners do not deal with the~
production requirements for the month. The finished goods requirement only loosely
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translates into the month's production leveL Since the overall production process consists
of two main steps, assembly and packaging/sterilization, substantial inventory may reside
between the two steps. If enough inventory exists in-between, for example, no assembly
may be necessary. Packaging/sterilization will simply utilize the in-between inventory to
meet the finished goods requirement. If no inventory exists in-between assembly and
packaging/sterilization, assembly needs to build inventory between the two steps and
supply enough product to meet the finished goods requirement. The assembly output
would therefore be greater than the finished goods requirement.
The use of a finished goods requirement therefore clouds the picture even further
for the master planners. It's possible that the master planners provide a steady finished
goods requirement each month, but assembly rates vary substantially. Alternatively, the
master planners may provide highly variable finished goods requirements each month, but
assembly rates remain steady.
On the opposite side of the organization chart, the buyers/planners must
concentrate on the production process. Their principal responsibilities are to take the
monthly production plans, produce weekly and daily production plans, and schedule
component orders for suppliers. When breaking down the monthly plan, an attempt is
made to smooth (maintain a steady level of) production. In contrast to the market and
finished goods focus required of the master planners, buyer/planners must understand the
production process and the suppliers. Rate (of production) becomes more of an issue than
level (of finished goods inventory). In tenns of the reactions to back order,
buyers/planners are impacted directly when the production process must schedule
overtime and orders to suppliers must be expedited. In tenns of finished goods inventory,
the level is not of direct concern to the buyer/planner until the product falls into back
order. In this event, the production process must step up production to restore product
flow.
Incentives
Understanding the incentives of the master planners and the buyer/planners also helps
demonstrate why the organization did not identify the tradeoffs. Interestingly, neither
group has a direct incentive to reduce inventory. While arguably both have an interest in
reducing inventory due to the overall operations objectives, only the inventory
management group is directly evaluated on inventory reduction. This will be discussed
further below.
The master planners must produce forecasts and detennine monthly plans. Their
incentives are for generating plans that marketing, customer service, and plant
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management agree to. As argued in the previous discussion, this activity naturally tends to
fall toward understanding the market. It should also be noted that the master planners
have incentives to stay out of back orders3, extending from their planning responsibilities
and visibility to finished goods inventory.
The buyer/planners have a slightly different focus. They must ensure consistent
supply of components to the assembly line and schedule production to avoid back order
further downstream in finished goods. The emphasis on their part is heavily weighted
toward keeping the line running and staying out of back order downstream.
The incentives for both groups coincide with their positions within the
organizational structure. Master planners must understand the market and finished goods
inventory levels. Buyer/planners must keep the line going and ensure that production
plans are met. Both are responsible for ensuring a continuous flow of product, and both
are responsible for back order. Lowering inventory levels, however, decreases any
protection from back order. Any reductions in inventory result in an increased probability
of going into back order. The master planners and buyer/planners therefore actually have
underlying disincentives to reduce inventory.
Farmal and Informal Information Systems
The infonnation that people use and make decisions with depends on the availability of the
infonnation. In this case, the pieces of infonnation were difficult to put together,
requiring considerable effort in the forms of data entry, fmding the right person to talk to,
and translating from one data fonnat to another. The customer demand infonnation
required the least effort to obtain. A customer ordering system kept track of all orders on
a centralized database over the last several years. Obtaining aggregate weekly order
quantities required logging into the mainframe system, running the right database query,
and uploading the information from the mainframe to the desktop computer. Since several
people throughout the organization frequently requested this infonnation, one person took
on the responsibility for running the query and uploading the data each week. Obtaining
the infonnation required a phone call to that person. The data could be translated into
almost any fannat u_ spreadsheet, local database, etc.
Finished goods inventory proved a particularly difficult task. No finished goods
inventory tracking systems were in place. The only method of obtaining the infonnation
S3Not mentioned previously is the fact that the master planning group was responsible for weekly back
order repons. These reports served to infonn the entire organization, including senior level management,
of the products tJ1~t were in back order. This tended to put the master planners near the center of back
order problems.
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was to either pull the data from a Data Analysis (D.A.) sheet (the sheet used for planning
each month -- see Chapter 2) or to pull the infonnation from the weekly backup files of
the customer order database. The first method required obtaining the appropriate D.A.
sheet electronically from the appropriate master planner and refonnatting the infonnation
as required. The problem with this method was that only the inventory level at the
beginning of each month was available. Tracking in time increments of one week or
smaller was not possible. The second method, pulling infonnation from backed up
database files, required pulling one file for each week needed. For example, to track
inventory over the course of the past year, data would have to be manually extracted from
fifty-two separate files. Additionally, the database backups were not always completed on
the same day of each week. Data points might be five days apart or eight days apart,
depending on when the database was backed up. Once again, tracking in small time
increments of less than one week was not possible.
As for inventory of components, the difficulty was in separating inventory by final
proouct code. EES maintained supply of hundreds of different components. Some
components were unique to a specific fmal product code and others were used by several
different final product codes. The data itself, however, was not available throughout the
organization; it resided on an EES local database requiring specific access. More
importantly, this database is separate from the customer order database. Manual
intervention was required to combine infonnation from the two sources.
The final piece of the p.uzzle, production, was also elusive. Actual daily assembly
volume was summed by product code on one single spreadsheet. This spreadsheet,
generated each new business month, contained infonnation for all product codes produced
in a given plant. The daily infonnation was summed into weekly totals, and the weekly
totals were summed into monthly. Once again, this infonnation resided in a fonnat that
was difficult to manipulate. Getting the data into another spreadsheet or into a database
required significant manual intervention.
The Monthly Planning and Forecasting Process
The monthly planning process is the one business process that ties together marketing,
production, customer service, and master planning. Through one single planning sheet
(Demand Analysis sheet) fllr each product, demand, finished goods inventory, monthly
forecasts, and production (Of, at least, transfers to finished goods) are represented and
visible to all groups. The question is then, why didn't this allow the reactions and
inventory levels to be identified?
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The monthly planning process did shed some light on the reactions, but allowed
limited visibility to whether or not the inventory levels were appropriate. Through the
Demand Analysis (D.A.) sheets and through communication with the buyer/planner,
master planners could determine when production levels were high. Additionally, the
master planners generally know production capacity limits for their products and therefore
know when assembly will be strained. Therefore, the extent of the reactions could be at
least partially understood. However, if master planners only base their perceptions from
the numbers on the D.A. sheets, the picture is not so clear. The limited connection
between Finished Goods Transfers on the D.A. sheets and actual assembly was discussed
earlier in this section. It is conceivable that assembly would be strained for capacity
without the master planners knowing the extent of the strain.
It is also important to remember that the D.A. sheets provide only a monthly
snapshot of the production process; but the ordering of parts, assembly of instruments,
and packaging/sterilization occur on a daily basis. The monthly snapshot, while sufficient
for monthly planning activities, does not provide an accurate view of daily activity. This is
particularly relevant regarding inventory. This can be seen through the following example.
A monthly view of the inventory level for one product may look like the following:
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Month
In this case, it appears that the inventory level has been cut in half in months 3 and 4.
Depending on how the situation's viewed, either tile operation is nearing danger of going
into back order and inventory therefore needs to be raised, or the operation is OK and the
inventory can be kept safely at the low level. When the inventory is examined on a daily
basis mther than a monthly basis, it might look like the following:
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Looking at the daily view would indicate that inventory is not too low at all. As a matter
of fact, it may be reduced from its current average of about 1500 units to about 750 units -
- a reduction of 50%:
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By viewing the inventory on a monthly basis, this reduction in inventory would not have
been as easily recognized. Of course, it may also be the case that inventory is in fact too
low and needs to be raised. Once again, the monthly picture would not provide enough
infonnation to discern this fact.
To understand these effects further, we can examine actual monthly in,'entory
levels taken from the DA Sheets. Figure 8.2(a) shows sample data extracted from a DA
Sheet. By only examining the data in the figure, we cannot detennine whether the
inventory level should be increased or reduced. Even by looking at a plot of the data
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Figure 8.2(b). Monthly Demand and FO Inventory plot from the data
presented in Figure 8.2(a).
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Figure 8.2(a). Sample information from DA Sheet. The product had just
gotten out of back order in June. Judging from the July, August, and September
FG inventory results, the appropriate inventory levels are difficult to discern.
(Figure 8.2(b», the solution is not obvious. Knowing that the replenishment lead time is
approximately one week and that the batch size is approximately 200 sales units helps
interpret the picture. But once again, a clear detennination cannot be made.
As far as the reactions to back order go, the montl.1,y snapshots may also obscure
weekly production levels. In the one case from Chapter 4, assembly output nearly
quadrupled within a five week time frame. The monthly infonnation presented in the
chapter demonstrated a tripling of output. While the ttipl~g in monthly output is
undoubtedly quite dramatic, it does not convey the severity that quadrupling weekly
output within a five week time frame conveys.
August September October November
Demand 2049 2497 2489 1298
FG Inventory 1569 2081 2409 1792
As a final note, the forecasting process may also contribute to the high levels of
inventory. Chapter 9 will demonstrate that the forecasting process currently in place is not
as accurate as using a linear regression model based on past data. The inaccuracies of the
current process may even make demand seem quite erratic in some casesS4 • In such
instances, the greater uncertainty would help justify the higher levels of finished goods
inventory (i.e. more uncertainty translates into a need for more inventory). A more
accurnte forecast could then expose the need for lower inventory levels.
8.3 Development of the Organization
The previous section demonstrated many of the ways that the current organizational
structure, incentives, information systems, and key business processes inhibited the
identification and resolution of the back order reactions and the high levels of inventory.
In particular, the key pieces of infonnation -- demand, production, and inventory -- were
not readily available for any single group to tie together, nor were there incentives for any
group to seek all of the infonnation. This next section presents some ideas on how the
sbllcture, incentives, infonnation systems and business processes themselves developed.
While exact origins are difficult to discern, a look at the early business influences (i.e. how
the business developed and the key strategic emphases in that development) reveals some
insight into the origins (see Figure 8.3).
The dominant early influences -- market growth, product availability, product
development, and parent business structures -- manifest themselves in many ways. For
example, Ethicon Endo-Surgery's manufacturing organization sbllcture seems to follow
closely with what Clark, Hayes, and Wheelwright refer to as a "representative plant
organizationss.II This sbllcture, the authors argIle, works well with a stable business that
follows a path of incremental, as opposed to radical, improvements. This coincides with
many aspects of Ethicon Endo-Surgery's parent suture business -- a business that has been
in existence for over 100 yearsS6• Alternatively, BESts modifications to the Clark, Hayes,
S4For one particular product, the average monthly forecast error under the current process was 28%.
Using the linear regression, a forecast error of only 7% could be achieved. For a product with average
sales of 1000 units per month, this error ttanslates into ±280 sales units for the current process (a range of
720-1280) and ±70 for the linear regression (a range of 930·1070). This example product represents an
extreme in the data swdied. In most cases, the differences between the two forecastir.g procedures was
much less.
SSHayes, R. H., S. C. Wheelwright, K. B. Clark, Dynamic Manufacturlns: Creating the Leaminl
OrSanization, New York: Free Press, 1988, chapter 4.
S6Source: Johnson & Johnson 1994 Annual Repon
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and Wheel\\rright structure appear to suppon product-focused manufacturing, following
EES's strategic emphasis on product development.
The remainder of this chapter takes a look at each business area -- organizational
structure and incentives, infonnation systems, and monthly planning process -- and
describes how they support the original influences from the parent business, the emphasis
on market growth, the need to have consistent product supply, and rapid product
development.
Figure 8.3. The observed influences exerted on the development of key pieces of
the business -- the monthly planning process, organizational structure, formal and
infonnal infonnation systems, and high level incentives (back order I inventory
tradeoffs).
Organizational Structure and Incentives
As already mentioned, Ethicon Endo-Surgery's organizational structure and incentives
closely match what Clark, Hayes, and Wheelwright refer to as a "representative plant
organization." A diagram of their sample organization is presented in Figure 8.4. The
authors argue that this structure works well as long as the organization does not need to
undergo significant change or improvement. When major improvements must take place,
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incentives within the structure start to conflict. For example, the materials management
group may have a requirement to reduce inventory by 50%. The group may find this goal
obtainable only by reducing inventories of parts and partially completed units (Le., WIP).
The production group, however, might be using those inventories to ensure that
production schedules are met. Without the inventories of parts and partially completed
units, production schedules may not meet the schedule consistently. The objectives of the
two groups, therefore, are in direct conflict.
plant manage
I
I I I I I
purchasing materielsmanagemenU production quality maintenance,
production engineering
scheduling
~.
maintenance
costs
inventory
levels/cost
stockouts
customer
service
level
materials
cost
availability
meeting reject machine
delivery levels downtime
schedules rework costs
cost variances QA costs
labor efficiency
maching
utilization
Figure 8.4. A representative plant organization as presented in Chapter 4 of
Dynamic Manufacturirl& by Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark.
Typical
Performance
Measures
The parent business of Ethicon Endo-Surgery, sutures (produced by Ethicon, Inc.),
is a relatively stable business, particularly when compared to the young, expanding
markets of endoscopic surgery. Sutures have been a staple product in the medical industry
for the past 100 years. Ethicon Inc. has also held a dominant market share for many years
and consequently has reached a mature state in its business lifetime. This helps explain
how the Clark, Hayes, and Wheelwright structure fits in with the past business, Ethicon,
Inc., suggesting that much of EES's structure has potentially been adopted from Ethicon,
Inc.
Some imponant distinctions exist between the organizational structure presented
in Figure 8.4 and EES's structure (see Figure 8.5). The product development emphasis is
panicularly prevalent. EES's structure, for example, breaks production down by product
line, or business unit. In looking at EES's structure when compared to Clark, Hayes, and
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Wheelwright's "representative plant organization.. " the product orientation becomes
immediately evident. The business unit structures undoubtedly help to bring products
from development into manufacturing. In addition, the planning and customer service
department reporting directly to the vice president of operations acts as a connection to
customers and to marketing -- areas critical to EES's rapid growth.
V.P Operation
aterials
management
purchasing
planning
&CS
plant manager
plant manage plant manage
business unit business unit
quality
business unit
malntenancel
engineering
maintenance/
engineers
buyer/planner mfg. team leaders ops. coordinator
Figure 8.5. Ethicon Endo-Surgery operations organization showing alterations
from Figure 8.4 that support product development focus.
Infonnation Systems
The D.A. sheets played the major communications role in connecting market demands
and production. As discussed earlier, no other infonnation systems readily tied together
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demand, production, and inventory. The fonnation of the D.A. sheets as a major
communications device can be seen by examining the development of the monthly
planning process. When the company was attacking unfamiliar markets with its strong
sales force, forecasting was understandably difficult The sales force was spending
considerable time converting hospitals, a~d new products were constantly being
introduced. Variability in demand was tremendous. Marketing was closest to the sales
force and to understanding the volume of product that would be required each month.
Marketing therefore had to detennine the monthly market needs and relay them to
production. Production would then have to verify whether or not it could "meet the plan. It
This monthly process of detennining market needs and turning them into
production plans evolved into the current monthly planning process. A communications
channel developed from the monthly planning process in the fonn of the current D.A.
sheet. The D.A. sheet allowed all. groups to communicate what needed to be
communicated each month. Marketing could relay market needs to production, and
production could verify its ability to meet the market needs.
In general, the other dominant infonnation systems grew out of three key areas:
customer order fulftllment, finance, and operatioils. Hardware and software platfonns
separated the three areas, giving an indication that development had occurred in each area
independently. This again seemingly reflects the lack of organizational overlap in tenns of
structure and incentives.
Monthly Planning Process
The previous discussion on information systems also outlined the developnlent of
the monthly planning process. The same factors that led to the D.A. sheets playing an
important communications role were driven by the development of the monthly planning
process. Early market demands were highly variable and required marketing to dictate
what each month's needs would be. The monthly planning process evolved to allow
marketing to communicate those needs and for production to verify that the needs could
be met.
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the question of why the organization had not fully recognized and
addressed the issues with back order reactions and inventory policy. The analysis of
costlbenefit tradeoffs thus far has hinged on the combination of three critical pieces of
infonnation -- demand, production and inventory. Without this infonnation, the fact that
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a tradeoff even exists may not be evident, let alone having enough infonnation to evaluate,
explicitly or implicitly, appropriate costs and benefits. The infonnation was not readily
available, nor was it sought after. The reason for this lies with the organizational
structure, incentives, infonnation systems, and one key business process. Organizational
structure and incentives separated the critical pans of the organization that would have
been able to combine the data. Infonnation systems inhibited anyone group from having
ready access to the infonnation. Finally, while the monthly planning process did actually
combine all necessary infonnation, it did so in a context that was not useful for
recognizing the problems.
Interestingly, many of the business structures that inhibited recognition of the
problems apparently were put in place to suppon rapid market growth and product
development. Other of these structures seemed to develop from Ethicon Endo-Surgery's
parent suture business -- a business that is well established and relatively stable compared
to endoscopic surgical instruments. In close of this chapter, these observations cannot
pass without emphasizing EES's tremendous success in both market growth and product
development.
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Chapter 9 Improving Monthly Forecasting
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that Ethicon Endo-Surgeryts monthly forecast accuracy
can be improved using a statistical method. Specifically, the improved method is a linear
regression made through past data using time as the only dependent variable. In contrast
to the current forecasting method which predominantly relies on market intelligence, the
linear regressions depend only on historical infonnation. As a result, forecasts may be
calculated automatically using a computer spreadsheet. More importantly, however, the
calculations can be perfonned as soon as the new demand infonnation becomes available
each month. This automation can significantly reduce the time required to complete the
planning process each month.
In this chapter, I detail the forecasting process used by Ethicon Endo-Surgery to
predict monthly demand. I will then describe how a linear regression can be used to
replace the current methodology. Using historical infonnation, I demonstrate the
improved accuracy attainable with the statistical technique. The chapter closes with a
brief discussion on the implications of automating the monthly forecasting process.
9.2 The Current Forecasting Method
In a general sense, the monthly forecasts on the DA sheet are derived from annual
forecasts, as detennined by the marketing and finance organizations. As the year
progresses, the annual forecasts are then adjusted month-by-month as necessary (see
Figure 9.1). The marketing and finance forecasts originate as a forecast for each product
family. Product family forecasts are then broken down into forecasts for each end-product
code. These forecasts, both by product family and by end..product units, are detennined in
the fourth quarter of each year for the following year. They are immediately entered into
the DA Sheets. The DA Sheets automatically break the annual figure down into forecasts
for each month throughout the entire year based on the number of weeks in the month
(either four or five) and taking into account any predetennined quarterly seasonality. As
the year progresses and each month's DA Sheet is detennined, the forecasts may be either
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increased or decreased as predicated by the Marketing organization and from judgment on
the pan of the responsible Master Planner. Any changes to a forecast on one month's DA
Sheet often result in a corresponding change to the product's overall annual forecast.
Number of Weeks
in each Month
~~~recaS1ing
DA Sheet
1----__.. Monthly
Forecasts
Annual
Forecast(by End-
Product C de)
Seasonality
Annual
Forecast(by Produ t
Family)
----------~ DA Sheet
Monthly
------ Forecasts
Market Trends
Figure 9.1. Annual forecasting process and monthly adjustments.
As an example of determining monthly forecasts from the annual forecast, suppose
that the annual forecast for a particular product is 100,000 units and that the June forecast
is needed. Assume that the prcxluct typically sells 30% of its annual volume in the frrst
quarter, 25% in the second, 25% in the third, and 20% in the fourth. The DA Sheet will
then calculate a first-quarter forecast of 30,000 units (30% x 100,(00), a second-quarter
forecast of 25,000 units (25% x 100,(00), a third-quarter forecast of 25,000, and a founh-
quarter forecast of 20,000. The second quaner happens to contain a total of 13 corporate
calendar weeks -- Aprila.,d May contain fOUf corporate calendar weeks and June contains
five weeks. The forecast for April then becomes 4/13 x 25,000 =7692 units, the forecast
for May then becomes 4/13 x 25,000 =7692 units, and the forecast for our desired month,
June, is 5/13 x 25,000 =9615 units.
The same calculations are completed for all twelve months of the calendar and
form the basis for the DA Sheet forecasts for the entire year. As the year progresses, the
original forecasts are adjusted, either up or down, based on infonnation from Marketing
and from any noticeable trends over the past couple of months. The actual adjustments
are subject to the impressions of the responsible Master Planner, but any changes must be
approved by the responsible marketing manager and by the Master Planning Manager.
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Overall the methodology can be thought of as utilizing an annual forecast to detennine
monthly forecasts and making periodic adjusttnents to the monthly forecasts based on
rrlarket intelligence. This technique of breaking down an annual forecast and making
adjustments as necessary contrasts sharply with the history-based forecasting technique
that will be discussed in the next section. Interestingly, it will be shown that past history
alone is almost always a bener predictor of monthly demand.
9.3 Improving Forecasting
In contrast to the annual forecast/monthly adjustment methodology just described, a
statistical technique that depends on past history can be used and, consequently, produces
forecasts of greater accuracy. More specifically, a linear regression that makes minimal
provision for market intelligence has been shown to consistently outperform the current
forecasting methodology. This finding tends to state that past history is a better predictor
of future demand than is an annual forecast adjusted monthly with market input. The
market intelligence used by the regression consists only of events that are well known in
advance and are generally quantifiable. An example of such an event is a sales promotion.
In this case, the additional anticipated order quantity is added into the linear regression
forecast.
The remainder of this section deals with why a linear regression technique works
well for forecasting, the method of analysis used to compare the two techniques, the
results of the analysis, and lastly implications for the planning process.
Low Seasonality, Gradual Demand Changes, and Single-Use
The reason why the linear regression works well requires an understanding of the basic
demand characteristics of the products involved. In particular, three main properties help
explain the success of the regression technique -- surgical instruments have low
seasonality, experience steady increases or decreases in demand, and are single-use.
Low Seasonality - Seasonality in this sense refers to the predictability of the
demand based only on the particular time of the year. Many retaii goods experience
seasonality each year in December due to the increase of demand during the holiday
season. Surgeries, however, are perfonned fairly consistently throughout the year as
needed by patients and therefore experience little seasonality. Some seasonality arguably
exists for surgical procedures that are less urgent and can be scheduled at the patients'
convenience.
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Steady growth or decline - The "steadiness" in this context refers to the
likelihood that the level of demand will suddenly increase or decrease with only minimal
warning. The less likely a sudden change, the steadier the demand. Demand for oil would
be considered relatively steady since overall demand is not likely to change quickly
(although oil cenainly experiences seasonality). Trendy fashions would be considered
highly unsteady since demand for the fashion may be high one month but non-existent for
the next.
Surgical instruments generally experience steady demand since surgical procedures
will consistently be perfonned and hospitals are not likely to quickly switch between
producers. Unlike most consumer goods where the customer can select from a variety of
products simply by visiting a local retail outlet, surgical instruments are subject to
purchasing contracts between a group purchasing organization (GPO) and the hospital or
directly between the hospital and the prcxlucer. This greatly reduces the ability and desire
for hospitals to switch between different producers. Conversely, taking market share
away from competitors is a slow process that requires, on a sr ~all scale, altering surgeons
preferences and, on a larger scale, "convening" a hospital or related organization (i.e.
convincing the hospital or organization to establish purchasing agreements for acquiring
the prcxlucer's instruments). Therefore, surgical instruments do not typically exhibit
substantial jumps or drops in demand due to customer preference. Increases or decreases
in demand tend to occur at a relatively steady rate.
Single-use - The importance of the products being single-use is that the prcxlucts
will experience a relatively flat life-cycle demand cUlVe. Customers will buy a new
instrument for each individual use rather than purchasing one instrument and using it
several times before replacing it, as is the case with durable goods. With durable goods, a
ponion of the product's life is spent getting the prcxluct into customers' hands. Once most
of the potential customers have the product, they won't need to buy another one for a
period of time. Therefore, sales stan to decline and most customers only purchase the
product occasionally and only do so to replace their old prcxlucl. Durable products
experience a life-cycle curve with high sales near the beginning of the product's life, when
customers are frrst purchasing the product, followed by a decline in demand as customers
only purchase new product to replace old. In contrast with sales of durable goods, single-
use goods sales are essentially all replacement sales since the customer purchases the
product each time to replace the last one that was used. Demand therefore does not
experience a decline once everyone has purchased the product but remains relatively flat
throughout most of the product'S lifetime.
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9.4 Producing the Statistical Forecasts
The statistical forecasting methodology is a simple linear regression using least squares
fitS7• Each month, four forecast numbers are generated -- a forecast of demand for the
current month, for one month into the future, for two months into the future, and for three
months into the future. The regression uses data from the prior twelve months of demand
to determine a best-fit line and, consequently, determine the forecasts of future demand.
The details of the regression technique are purposefully omitted here since the inlportance
of the forecasting is not the particular technique that is used, but rather the fact that a
simple history-based forecast can perfonn better than current methods. Different
forecasting methodologies also were not investigated in this research due to the fact that
the company had already purchased a software package to automatically generate the
forecasting using advanced regression, exponential smoothing, and seasonality techniques.
Determining that a simple history-based statistical model can outperfonn current
methodologies provides enough suppon to move toward using the software package for
generating forecasts.
The or:.e piece of the linear regression analysis that does need further investigation
is the method used to determine the quantities used for the regression. The unconverted
raw monthly data alone is not appropriate for perfonning the regression without some
slight modification. There are two modifications to the monthly data that needed to be
made -- nonnalizing each months data to a four-week month and accounting for some
simple market intelligence of well-known events. Since the company runs from a calendar
based on a combination of four-week and five-week months, some months experience
greater demand simply because they are longer. Therefore, all months need to be
normalized to a set length prior to perfonning the regression. The nonnalization length
was arbitrarily chosen as fOUf weeks, so all five-week months were divided by five to
detennine a weekly order rate and then multiplied by four to nonnalize to a four-week
month (Figure 9.2).
S7Por details on this regression technique, see for example: Hogg, R. V. t J. Ledolter, AllPlied Statistics
for EnKineers and Physical Scientists, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992, chapter 9.
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Raw Monthly Data Determining the Normalized Data
Four-week Month's demand: => use in the regression "as-is"
Five-week Month's demand: Weekly rate = Five-week Month Demand / 5
Normalized Month = Weekly rate x 4
=> use Normalized Month in the regression
Figure 9.2. Nonnalizing four-week and five-week monthly demands into a four-
week month.
Although it was stated earlier that the regression performs well without market
intelligence, the business does experience cenain demand increases that are known several
months in advance and therefore' need to be factored into the regression forecasts. For
determining the forecast for a month that is known to have an increase or decrease in
demand and the change is fairly well known, the increase or decrease is simply added to
the original forecast produced by the regression. This technique presents another problem
when the event month has passed and the orders from that month need to be used as part
of the regression for future forecasts. For example, if August 1994 has a known increase
in demand of 1()(X) units in addition to whatever demand August 1994 would normally
have, the August 1994 forecast is detennined by perfonning the regression through
nonnalized data of the twelve months between August 1993 and July 1994. If the
regression forecasts a value of 1500 units for August 1994, the overall forecast will be
1000 + 1500 =2500 units. When August has passed and the actual orders are known,
these actual orders are an outlier for future forecasts. In other words, if August's demand
turned out to be 2764 units and 1000 of those units are believed to be due to a special
one-time event, using 2764 for future forecasts of months that do not have the same one-
time event will artificially skew the slope of the regression line upward. To get around the
problem, future regressions use the event month's original regression forecast. In the
example above, 1500 would be used as the August 1994 data point for forecasts after
August 1994.
Figure 9.3 shows a sample ponioD of a spreadsheet used to detennine the linear
regression forecasts.
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Linear regression forecast for JuneUneer regression forecast for April/Actuat Demand uata determined In Marct\. detanntned in March
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58Although the exact number of products that make up the majority of the sales volume is considered
proprietary infonnation, it is appropriate to say that the 80-20 rule essentially applies here, where 80% of
the sales revenue is produced by approximately 20% of the products.
Normalized Demand Data One.Time Event In March and Apnl These numbers 8188 regressIOn Non·normahz9d forecasts Wilh
over the previous twelve months' data Market Intelligence added In
Figure 9.3. Sample portion of a spreadsheet used to detennine linear regression forecasts.
Determination of Test Products
Due to the number of products available for the comparison and the resources required for
retrieving past forecast infonnation from old D.A. Sheets, the analysis was limited to
carefully selected products. The selection criteria for the products involved a combination
of input from the master planners, statistics, and dollar sales volume. From visual
examination of almost one hundred plots of weekly demand data and from past experience
in the research, eight categories of demand patterns were identified -- general cases, new
product introductions, large quarterly increase, large quarterly decrease, noisy, fast
growth, and special cases. For each category, one or more specific products were
selected based on, as previously mentioned, input from master planners and statistics, with
sales dollar volume being used as a final detenninant in each category. Sales volume
became the deciding factor since the majority of sales revenue comes from a small sample
of product codess8. It was decided that forecasting accuracy was most critical for those
codes and that those codes should be concentrated on in the analysis. A summary of the
seven categories, the products that fell into each category, and the method(s) used for
selecting the products are summarized in Table 9.1.
Category # Category Category Description Product Selection Selected Products
Method
1 General Case "Typical" demand Feedback from Master l(a), l(b), I(c)
pattern Planners
2 New Product introduction of a new Feedback from Master 2(a),2(b)
Introduction product that replaces an Planners
old version of the
product59.
3 Large Quarterly Large increase in Statistical: >50% 3(a),3(b)
Increase quarterly demand above increase in demand in
average quarterly any quarter over
demand. average quarterly
demand
4 Large Quarrerly Large decrease in Statistical: >50% 3(a), 3(b) -.. same as
Decrease quarterly demand decrease in demand in Category #3
below average quarterly any quarter under I
demand. average quarterly
demand
5 Noisy Weekly data exhibits Sratistical: Ratio of 5(a),5(b)
substantial noise as standard deviation to
opposed to consistently weekly average> 50%.
following a ttend line.
6 Fast Growth Products with demand Feedback from Master 5(a) -- same as from
increasing at the fastest Planners Category #5
rate.
7 Special Cases Any products that have Feedback from Master 8(a),8(b)
special circumstances Planners
that have made them
difficult to forecasL
Table 9.1. Summary of the eight categories used to detennine test products and how
pnxiucts were selected into each category.
9.5 Comparison of Methods
The method of comparison between the two forecasting methods was to compare
forecasts of I-month and 3-months into the future -- most assembly scheduling depends
59As stated, the new product inlroductions in this case refer only to those instances where the new product
replaces an already existing product. In this case, historical data exists from the predecessor product that
can be used to detennine demand for the new product. Products mal have no predecessor consequently
have no source of historical data and therefore cannot be forecast with a linear regression. The majority of
product inlroductions, however, are of the former kind where new product replaces old.
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on the I-month forecast and a significant portion of orders for parts are based on the 3-
month forecast -- with error as a percentage ofactual demand as the measurement basis.
For each product code, forecast infonnation was obtainable from the D.A. sheets for the
pf.l.st 10-12 months, resulting in a comparison ofbetwee~.9-11 data points for the I-month
and 7-9 data points for the 3-month forecasts. Monthly forecast errors were then
averaged across the available data points and a final percent error number was generated
for the I-month and the 3-month forecasts for each methodology. This analysis vias
completed for all considered product codes. Final results are presented in Table 9.2.
I-Month Forecast Errors 3-Month Forecast Errors
Product D.A. Sheet Regression D.A. Sheet Regression
la 30% 12% 27% 10%
Ib 8% 14% 10% 6%
Ie 28% 7% 29% 7%
2a 30% 27% 43% 24%
2b 29% 35% 40% 34%
3a 23% 7% 24% 12%
3b 22% 15% 20% 14%
5a 13% 15% 41% 14%
5b 22% 19% 23% 190/0
7a 48% 26% 40% 38%
7b 37% 22% 39% 22%
AVERAGES 26% 18% 31% 18%
Table 9.2. Comparison of Average Forecast Error between the metllodology use by D.A.
Sheets and a linear regression. Numbers in parenthesis represent the standard deviation of
the monthly forecast errors. J~west forecast errors for each product are higltlighted.
Results of the Comparison
The comparison of average percent error between the two methods reveals two important
observations:
1. Substantially Improved Extended FQreca~ The linear regression not only
perfonns better than the D.A. Sheets on I-Month forecasts, but perfonns
substantially better with 3-Month forecasts.
2. ConsisteDcy with Forecastin~: The line.ar regression experiences much less
variation in its forecast accuracy resulting in a more consistent forecast. The D.ftio.
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Sheet forecast'i tended to be more hit-and-miss where the forecast would be
extremely accurate one month but be completely off the next.
9.6 Benefits of Using a Linear Regression for Forecasting
The imponance of finding that pas"t history is a better indicator of future demand and that
a simple statistical mooel can perfonn well not only lies with the improvements in
forecasting accuracy, but also with the improved speed with which the forecasts can be
made and turned into weekly proouction plans. The linear regressions can potentially be
completed for all prooucts in minutes using spreadsheet or database software. This is in
stark contrast to the current DA sheet process which may require a week or more of
meetings between planning and marketing to detennine the final forecast. And although
the approval process for the DA sheets may still require several days to complete, the
forecasts required for the weekly production plans can be made available immediately at
the beginning of each month.
9.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I demonstrated that monthly forecast accuracy could be improved using a
simple statistical technique. Of equal importance, this analysis reaffmned that demand
follows a relatively stable trend line and can be predicted with reasonable accuracy. The
next chapter will discuss an alternative proouction system, the "Pull System," that reduces
dependency on forecasting to meet incoming demand.
125
Chapter 10 An Alternative Production System •• the "Pull"
System
10.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an alternative production system that I believe could help alleviate
many of Ethicon Endo-Surgery's back order, inventory, and cycle time problems. The
system uses a simple Order Point I Order Quantity (OP/OQ) policy to initiate production
at each stage. When finished goods inventory drops below the finished goods order point,
the packaging / sterilization process receives an order for a new batch of finished product.
When bulk instrument inventory falls below the bulk instrument reorder point, assembly
receives an order for another batch of instruments. Component pans inventory is
replenished in a similar fashion. This method of scheduling production directly contrasts
with the monthly planning system and MRP-style scheduling currently in place. In this
current system, each week's assembly schedule is planned out ahead of time based on lead
times through the process and monthly market forecasts.
The OP/OQ system has appropriately been tenned the "Pull System" within the
organization, recognizing that product is "pulled" through each process step by a need to
fill depleted inventory. In contrast, the monthly planning process is predominantly a
"push" system, pusb.ing components into assembly based on monthly forecasts. One key
advantage of the pull system is that it allows each busine~s unit to have full control over
inventory and production, decreasing dependency on forecasting and simplifying the
overall scheduling process. It combines demand, production, and inventory
responsibilities within one group, minimizeing conflicting organizational incentives and
time-consuming business processes. Additionally, the new system places a strong
emphasis on inventory control, cycle time reductions, and increased flexibility.
This chapter describes the pull system and the changes that it presents to the
current manufacturing structure. Funher discussion is provided on why I believe the
system will help improved Ethicon Endo-Surgery's operations. A model has been
completed -- the same model as the Daily Planning model discussed in Chapter 5 -- to
demonstrate that the pull concept not only seems to work but works well for Ethicon
Endo-Surgery's internal supply chain.
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10.2 The" Pull" System
In contrast to a forecast-push operation, such as in the Monthly Planning and the W~ekly
Planning models presented earlier in this thesis, the Pull System does not utilize forecasts
to detennine production volumes. Instead, production batches are only scheduled as
needed to replenish inventory levels. The organization sets the size of each batch based on
the flexibility of the corresponding production process.
As stated thus far, the Pull System intiates a new batch of material through the
production process when the inventory level drops below a predetennined order point. As
soon as the inventory level reaches the order point, the replenishing process receives an
o..-Jer to produce another batch of product. I will now expand on this idea a little further.
The "inventory level," as used in this case, actually refers to more than just the amount of
inventory physically residing at the inventory location. It is composed of the actual
inventory itself, plus WIP, plus product that has been ordered but not staned by the
process. In other words, inventory refers to all product that has been produced, is being
produced, or is has an Gl:der to be produced. When the total volume of product in the
process, including inventory, WIP, and outstanding orders, drops below the order point, a
new order is initiated. This distinction will become important in understanding the
influence of lead times on inventory levels.
Pull-type scheduling is currendy used to replenish fmished goods inventory
through the packaging / sterilization operation. Finished goods inventory levels (or more
specifically, FG inventory, packaging / sterilization WIP, and outstanding packaging /
sterilization orders) are monitored on a daily basis. As soon as the inventory level for a
panicular product falls below the order point, a new batch of instruments are initiated
through packaging I sterilization. I now advocate expanding this process throughout the
internal supply chain -- scheduling assembly based on bulk instruments inventory and
scheduling component pans orders based on component pans inventory.
The principle variables used in the Pull System are the Order Points and Order
Quantities detennined for each inventory position for each product. Details for calculating
these variables are intentionally omitted here but are readily available from many
operations management texts (see for example, Nahmias, 1993). The following presents a
general discussion, detailed enough to allow the reader to fully understand the Pull
System's merits.
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The Order QuantiO' for a panicular inventory position depends on the flexibility of
the re}Jlenishing operation. The relationship is an inverse relationship -- the more flexible
the process, the lower the order quantity:
Order Quanlty - -(jlexibility)
If the Order Quantity equals one week's wonh of demand, the production operation will
receive a new order on average once per week. If the Order Quantity equals two days, the
operation will on average receive a new order every two days. The smaller the Order
Quantity, the more often the operation receives, and must respond to, a new order. The
more often the operation receives new orders, the more often it must change its
production schedule.
The calculations for the Order Point are the same calculations used in Chapter 6 to
demonstrate the appropriate inventory levels for a given service level objective. As
recently discussed, when inventory drops below the Order Point, a new batch is initiated
through the replenishing process. To ensure that inventory does not drop below zero
during the replenishment cycle, enough inventory must be in place to cover the incoming
demand while awaiting replenishment. In other words, enough inventory must be in place
such that, between the time an order for replenishment is sent and the ordered product is
received in inventory, inventory does not drop below zero. This invelltoryt or Order
Point, equals the expected. demand during the replenishment lead time plus an additional
factor to account for uncertainty. The Order Point therefore depends on the lead time for
replenishment plus a service factor:
Order Point ,..- lead time + service factor
It was stated earlier that the Pull System does not depend on forecasting to
detennine production schedules; yet, it was just stated that the expected demand during
replenishment detennines the Order Point. At first glance, since the expected demand
over the replenishment period is actually another tenn for a forecast, it would seem that
the Pull System actually does use "forecasts" of a son. The fonner statement, that
expected demand is actually a forecast, is cenainly true. However, the production
scheduling is not detennined directly from expected demand. Production scheduling,
instead, is detennined from the order point which is in turn detennined using expected
demand. This distinction is subtle but important. Using a "forecast" only to detennine the
order point results in less dependency on the accuracy of the forecast. The Pull System
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models, presented in Chapter 5 and presented later in this chapter, actually use the same
weekly "forecast" throughout the entire ItA year simulation. The "forecast," actually an
average of the entire period's demand, does not change for ItA years!
10.3 6enefits of the" Pull" System
Assuming that the Pull System and the current Monthly Planning System operate
equivalently for scheduling and managing inventory (this assumption will be challenged in
the following section), why would an organization want to dJmand-pull rather than
forecast-push? In this section, I discuss several of the organizational reasons why the Pull
System is a better choice for Ethicon Endo-Surgery, particularly considering EES's
perfonnance metries. The Pull System acts to emphasize inventory, cycle time, and
service level improvements in a complementary, rather than conflicting, way. It
additionally fits in with EES's current move to push full product responsibility down to the
level of the Business Unit Manager.
Emphasis on Cycle Times
Cycle time, or lead time, refers here to the total time required for an operation to process
materials and deliver product to the next inventory position in the supply chain. As
discussed briefly in Chapter 5, reducing cycle times can provide tremendous benefit to an
operation. The Pull System acts to emphasize cycle time reduction by (1) simplifying the
defmtion of cycle time and (2) by tying it to improvements in other metrics.
By using predetennined batch sizes, cycle time can be defmed as the amount of
time required to process one batch of material. The stan and finish of one batch can be
made clear to the people producing it. The definition is simple and unambiguous. Under a
monthly planning system where forecasts detennine production schedules based on fIXed
lead times, the definition of cycle time is not as clear. The system detennines a schedule
for each production day. This schedule may vary from day to day depending on the
forecasts and the inventory levels. The cycle time would be considered as one day divided
by the number of instruments produced in that day. If the schedule calls for 200
instruments on one dayt the cycle time is 1/200 day. If the schedule calls for 250 on the
second day, the cycle time is reduced to 1/250 day. But has the cycle time really been
reduced? If the schedule changes to 180 instruments, the cycle time increases up to 1/180
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day. The cycle time depends more on the day's schedule than on the ability of the
operation to consistently produce the product faster.
The Pull System also ties cycle time reduction with improvements in other key
operations metrics such as inventory and service level. Under an OP/OQ system,
inventory level is a direct function of cycle time, batch size, and demand variation:
Inventory - f( cycle time, batch size, demand variation)
Therefore, inventory reduction depends in pan on reducing cycle times. Alternatively, a
reduction in cycle time results directly in a reduction in inventory. As for service level, a
shaner cycle time results in quicker response to changes in demand, allowing the
operation to respond faster to unexpected demand shifts. The ability to react faster allows
the organization to restore supply of product quicker and improve selVice level:
Fast Cycle Time ~ Ability to React Quickly => Improved Service Level
Emphasis on Inventory Reduction
As stated, inventory levels depend only on cycle time, batch size, and demand variation.
While the production area has no control over demand variation, it can control cycle time
and batch size; and only by changing cycle times and batch sizes can the area change
inventory levels. This makes the detennination of inventory levels an objective function,
calculated based on objective data (cycle time, batch size, and demand variation),
eliminating the potential to use inventory as a buffer against underlying problems. The
message is again simple and clear -- in order to decrease inventoryt the operation must
either (1) consistently produce faster or (2) increase flexibility by decreasing batch size.
Alternatively, inventory cannot be increased without either an unlikely corresponding
increase in cycle time or batch size, or an increase in demand variation.
Emphasis on Service Level
With inventory level being a function of cycle time and batch size, increasing inventory to
buffer against problems is no longer possible. Without the ability to buffer against
unexpected problems and given that problems will occur, the only way to improve service
level is to have the ability to respond faster when a problem does occur. Protection from
falling into back order, therefore, depends critically on speed and flexibility_ The faster the
operation can respond to a sudden change in demand, the better the service level.
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The connection between reducing cycle times and improving service level has
already been discussed. A similar connection exists between reducing batch size and
improving service level:
Smaller Batch Size ~ Increased Flexibility ~ Improved Service Level
Pushing Full Responsibility Down to Business Unit Managers
With the creation of a system that does not depend critically on forecast accuracy; that
automatically produces its own production schedules; that clearly emphasizes the critical
metrics for improvement (cycle time and batch size); and that sets inventory levels based
only on the critical metrics, the process of managing the system is greatly simplified. The
management responsibility, therefore, can reside almost entirely within each business unit
As a result, all non-business unit functions then take on roles of support. For example,
consider the role of the central planning group to detenne monthly forecasts and inventory
policies. Forecast accuracy is no longer critical to the successful operation of the system,
and inventory management becomes a calculation based on lead times and batch sizes.
The responsibilities of the central group therefore shift from the perfomance-critical duties
of forecasting and inventory to the suppon responsibility for individual business units.
How could the current organization be changed to suppon the new
responsibilities? Table 10.1 displays how the various roles might change in moving from
the Monthly Planning System to the Pull System. The role of Master Planning could be
transfonned into identifying trends in demand that the business units should prepare for.
In other words, the Master Planners no longer directly plan production but, instead,
analyze demand patterns. A more appropriate new title for Master Planners might be
"Demand Analysts60." Examples of how the role shift occur with such market events as
sales promotions, adoption of new surgical procedures, and market interactions between
products. In these cases, the responsibility of the Master Planner (or Demand Arlalyst) is
to warn the business units about the anticipated demand changes and to advise on what
actions might be taken to prevent a stockout.
The role of inventory specialists also could be transfonned. The inventory
specialist could be responsible for providing analytical knowledge and for recommending
potential areas for improvement. For example, not all business units will readily
60Credil for the title "Demand Analyst" belongs to acolleague at Ethicon Endo-Surgery responsible for
helping redefine the current monthly planning process.
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understand how to detennine inventory and batch sizes. Those that do will likely come
across special cases that require special solutions. In any case, the inventory specialist
would know how to detennine inventory and batch sizes in accordance with the each
particular situation. This knowledge would not have to reside specifically in each business
unit.
Role Responsibilities Metrics
Business Unit Manager Delivery of bulk Pans Inventory
(Products) instruments to bulk Bulk Inventoryinstrument inventory
Batch Size
Lead/Cycle Time
SelVice Level (Bulk
instruments & FG)
Quality
Business IJnit Manager Delivery of finished goods FG Inventory
(Packaging I Sterilization) into FO inventory Batch Size
Lead/Cycle Time
Service Level (FG)
Quality
Master Planning Analyzing trends in the Overall Inventory
market and detennining Service Level
what the business units
need to do in preparation
Inventory Specialists Suppon of business units in Overall Inventory
detennining order points Service Level
and order quantities.
Table 10.1. New organizational responsibilities associated with the Pull System.
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10.4 Modeling
The model developed for the Pull System has already been described and demonstrated as
the Daily Planning System in Chapter 5. The details presented in that chapter will not be
repeated here, but I will resurface four imponant points concerning the modeling effon:
1. The model assumes constant lead times;
2. Actual weekly demand data is used for input;
3. The model considers an instrument composed of several pans where all
pans but one are available 100% of the time;
4. The model was completed using a computer spreadsheet software.
The first and third point demonstrate the key assumptions that the model is based on. To
account for the constant lead time assumption, the model uses a greater lead time than
actual. The third point, assuming all pans but one are available 100% of the time, was
necessary to keep the model within a reasonable scope. The assumption is meritable
considering that component parts are available for assembly most of the time.
Additionally, it is likely that all of the parts experience shortages at approximately the
same time since a shonage will typically result from a sudden jump in demand.
The results of the modeling are presented in Chapter 5. The charts on assembly
rates (Figures 5.3a,c) demonstrate the Pull System's resilience to unexpectedly high
demand. The large production swings as a result of unexpected demand give way to a
smooth response. Additionally, the inventory levels dernonstrated with the Pull System
model remain relatively stable, particularly when compared to the Monthly Planning
Model (Figures 5.4a,c). The steadiness shows that the finished goods inventory level can
be dropped considerably before worrying about frequent dips below zero.
This same model was used to simulate the Pull System on dozens of different
demand patterns. AU patterns, based on actual weekly data, produced a similar result --
production swings were reduced and inventory levels remained remarkably stable. This
would seem to indicate that the Pull System has merits beyond the organizational
enhancements discussed in the previous section. Using the simple OP/OQ method to
schedule production would greatly dampen production swings and reduce inventory.
Although the complete explanation for this was not an objective of the research, a
plausible explanation is that the Pull System provides a simple way to move from monthly
planning to daily planning.
133
The previous discussion also indicated that, in moving from a monthly planning
period to a weekly planning period, a system would be produced that is unnecessarily
reactive to small, week-to-week changes in demand. In moving to a daily planning period
(i.e., to a Pull System) the small variations in demand were effectively dampened. Why
was this so? The Pull System has another "control knob" that alleviates the reactivity
problem. By altering the batch size, sensitivity to small variations in demand found can be
controlled. Therefore, the problem of over-sensitivity that could be expected of a daily
planning system can be alleviated. Figures lO.la-c immediately following this chapter
demonstrate the effect on assembly rates of increasing the assembly batch size to two
weeks of demand (from the prior value of one week) and then decreasing the batch size to
two days. In general, the larger the batch size, the smoother the production. It should be
noted, however, that inventory levels (not shown) tend to flatten out as the batch size
decreases.
10.5 Conclusion
By using two key variables (order point and batch size) to detennine production
schedules, the Pull System provides a way to place full product responsibility down to the
business unit manager level. Dependency on forecast accuracy is greatly reduced and the
detennination of inventory levels becomes an objective calculation. The major operations
metries of inventory and service level depend critically on cycle time and batch size
(flexibility). The relationships are simple and unambiguous. Modeling results demonstrate
the feasibility of the Pull System and should warrant, at a minimum, further investigation.
In the context of the previous chapters, the Pull System allows one part of the
organization to combine all critical elements of the production picture -- demand,
production, and inventory. The part of the organization that combines demand,
production, and inventory happens to also be responsible for the actual production of the
product. I believe that this simplifying change could better equip the organization to
detennine creative and effective ways to improve delivery service in the future.
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Chapter 11 Conclusion
11.1 Introduction
In this fmal chapter, I review the major themes presented in the preceeding eleven
chapters. I then go on to provide some additional areas of interest that have not been
covered by the thesis, but are well wonh mentioning. The time I spent at t"te company
and the research that was perfomled raised many further questions that I either could not
or did not have time to address. These questions will be raised as area.s of interest
warranting further investigation. Lastly, I provide three actions that, in my opinion, will
help improve Ethicon Endo-Surgery's overall operations. I presented ulese actions as final
recommendations to Ethicon Endo-Surgery prior to my depanure from the internship site.
11.2 Thesis Summary
Reflecting back to the beginning of this thesis, the original problem posed was one of
understanding what happens when finished product leaves the company. New product
introducti:>ns, critical to Ethicon Endo-Surgery's aggressive business strategy, would often
result in extended supply shonages. Initial meetin6s with EES representatives hinted
largely at developing a market forecasting tool for new products, By having the ability to
predict incoming demand more accurately, Ethicon Endo-Surgery could prepare more
appropriately for the inttoductionc
Initial research effons were devoted entirely to understanding dealer, international
afflliate, and hospital ordering behavior. These efforts uncovered it consisterlt pattern of
demand found with new products. Dealers and afftliates would order product in large
quantities during the first few weeks of the introduction, driving demand to an initial
"spike:' This spilce was quickly followed by a relatively stable level of demand. In
comparing domestic dealer monthly orders widl hospital monthly orders, the hospital
orders did not exhibit a corresponding initial demand surge. The source of the spike could
Llterefore be attributed to dealers building inventory. By taking the difference in the area
between the domestic dealers' demand and the hospitals' demand, we detennined the
amount of inventory that dealers were stocking. The amount turned out to be consistent
with dealer and affiljate inventory policies.
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The second and third part of the thesis examined ""hat occurs within Ethicon
Endo-Surgery in response to the new product introduction demand spike. The initial
spike, typically having been under-forecast, would push the company into back order.
After a delay, production would ramp up to restore depleted inventories. At its peak, the
level of production would often exceed the peak level of demand. Further investigation
revealed a shwnilar reaction with any product that fell into back order -- an unexpected
surge in demand would be followed by an equally, if not more, dramatic surge in
production. This was interesting because the prcxluction systern was developed largely to
isolate the assembly operation from demand fluctuations. It also raised the question of
whether or not EES's quick reactions were approriate from a cost/benefit standpoint.
Among other costs in the internal supply chain, inventory levels were found to be in excess
of corporate objectives. Current policy stated in terms of weeks of inventory translated
into a service level substantially higher than the objective service level. This seemed to
indicate that EES's perceived cost of back order exceeded the cost of holding inventory in
excess of objective levels.
The historical reason.; for the high cost of back order were examined. Original
emphases on prcxluct development, market growth, and prcxluct delivery -- all necessary
for Ethicon Endo-Surgery to build market share -- helped create the current organizational
and incentive structure. The organizational and inc;entive structure, which includes
information systems, made putting together all of the key pieces to the puzzle difficult.
Lastly, the two final chapters demonstrated "flXes" to the current system. The
second-to-Iast chapter presented a new statistical forecasting technique th~t was shown to
be more accurate than the current, market intelligence-driven methodolgy. The final
chapter demonstrated a simplifying change to the overall prcxluction system. The "Pull
System" helps align organizational incentives in movirlg prcxluct effieci~ntly through the
chain. Modeling of the system demonstrated its feasibility and substantial beneifts
operationally.
11.3 Areas for Futher Investigation
In reflecting back on the thesis, I found a few areas that would provide funher
opponunities for interesting research. These areas include understanding how supplier
relations influenced the production system and analyzing funher why the demand-pull
models perfonned so much better than the monthly planni~g models.
In a few instances, problems with component parts wreaked havoc on the internal
supply chain, slewing production and causing shonages of finished product supply. As a
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result, unexpected surges in demand were not the only causes of back order. Due to the
project's scope and timing, potentially important supplier management issues were not
investigated.
As another point of interest, the supply chain improvements demonstrated by the
demand-pull models were not thoroughly researched. Previous chapters have suggested
that the ability to plan on a daily basis allows the system to react immediately to shifts in
demand. The reaction time, therefore, detennines t.he "steadiness" of production and
inventory levels. This assumption has not been challenged analytically. Modeling proof
alone is inconclusive as assumptions vary from situation to situation. From discussions
with representatives from several other organizations, the question of planning regularly,
using demand-pull scheduling, or using some hybrid system remains unanswered. I believe
many companies such as Ethicon Endo-Surgery would benefit from the results of a more
rigorous analysis.
11.4 Final Recommendations to Ethicon Endo-Surgery
The following three recommendations were presented to Ethicon Endo-Surgery
management prior to my internship depanure. At least one of the three, revising key
operations metrics, overlapped with existing company initiatives. In this case, I was able
to provide some of the analytic31 suppan to further justify the effon. Having an
"outsider" walk in, take a different approach to understanding the problem, and come up
with the same general conclusion also helped. The other two recommendations were new,
altltough not completely surprising, to the audience managers. Once again, analytics
helped justify turning initatives that many had only felt would be beneficial into pursuable
actions.
Explanations of how the recommendations were detennined will be left to the
reader. It is my hope that anyone having read this thesis should have a general
understanding of each recommendation's source. Without further discussion, the three
recommendations were as follows:
1. Revise Key Operations Metrics -- evaluate Business Unit Managers on the
inventory under their control. Measure back order length (i.e., average time to
delivery) in addition to back order dollar value.
2. Educate the OrKanizatioo on Product Demand Patterns -- show the consistent
dealer stocking trend associated with new product introductions and
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demonstrate the relatively stable demands patterns (predictable with a linear
trend line).
3. Consider moving to a pure "Demand-Pull" System -- use order point / order
quanitities to schedule production and manage inventory.
In several meetings with EES operations mCL'lagement, the recommendations were met
with positive support and acceptance. The most significant recommendation, consider
moving to a demand-pull production system, is being pursued by a special project
manager. By the time I left the internship site, many details remained to be worked out for
the system. Issues were raised concerning infonnation systems and finding a sponsoring
Business Unit Manager. Although initial enthusiasm was high, it remains to be seen
whether or not the new scheduling system will actually proceed forward.
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Appendix A Details of the Monthly, Weekly, and Daily Planning
Models
A.I Introduction
The models presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 10 of this thesis simulate Ethicon Endo-
Surgery's production system under different planning assumptions. The first model, which
most closely resembles EES's current system, simulates planning completed on a monthly
basis. Weekly and daily production schedules are detennined near the beginning of each
month based on monthly forecasts. The second model simulates weekly planning where
production schedules are updated each week based on forecasts. The final model
simulates daily planning where production is scheduled based only on the need to replenish
depleted inventories. No forecasts are used, resulting in a demand-pull type of system.
This appendix discusses the details of the variables used in the models and the
equations used to derive them. For model results, the reader should refer to Chapters 5
and 10.
A.2 Model Variables
SlAte variables versus Event Variables,' There are two basic kinds of variables in the
model -- state variables and event variables. State variables track levels of parts,
instruments, and finshed product at each point in the system, These variables include Parts
Inventory, Outstanding Parts Orders, Outstanding Assembly Orders, Assembly \VIP, Bulk
Inventory, Outstanding Pack/Ster Orders, Pack/Ster WIP, and Finished Goods Inventory.
Event variables represent the orders throughout the system that cause state variables to
change. Event variables include Parts Order, Assembley Order, Pack/Ster Order, and
Distributor Order. All quantities for the variables are nonnalized to represent one sales
unit where one sales unit may consist of several instruments of a given product code 1\Ild
one instrument may be compose.d of several different parts.
State Varlabks:
Parts Ioyentoxy - units of parts available for assembly into instruments. This assumes that
one sales unit of parts is required to build one sales unit of instruments and that each unit
of parts is ordered and stored as a single unit.
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outstandinK Parts Orders - units of pans that have been ordered but not yet delivered into
pans inventory.
OutStandin~ Assembly Orders - units of instruments that have been ordered for assembly
but cannot yet be assembled due to a shonage of parts.
Assembly WIP - units of instruments that have been ordered for assembly, have drawn
pans from Parts Inventory, but have not yet been fully assembled and delivered into Bulk
Inventory.
Bulk Inventoty - units of completely assembled instruments that have not yet been
packaged and sterilized.
outsumdina Pack/SteT Orders - units of instruments that have been ordered for
packaging/sterilization but cannot yet be packaged and sterilized due to a shortage of bulk
instruments.
Pack/Ster WIP - units of instruments that have been ordered for packaging/sterilization,
have drawn instruments from Bulk Inventory, but have not yet been fully
packaged/sterilized and delivered into Finished Goods Inventory.
Finished Goods Inyentory - units of instruments immediately available for shipment to
customers.
Event Variables:
Pans Order - orders for pans in sales units. Orders are only submitted on Mondays as
detennined MRP-style by offsetting forecasted weekly demand by pans order lead times
and accounting for inventories inbetween.
The equations used vary slightly between the monthly planning and the weekly
planning models since pans are ordered weekly in both cases, but the monthly planning
model only plans once per month and must detennine when to order pans at that time
throughout the month. The basic equation fOT a weekly pans order is:
_ {partsorderQty, if ExpectedPartslnventoryp."LT S partssafetyStoCk}
PartsOrder - 0 th ·
,0 erwlse
where ExpectedPartslnventory is the expected level of pans inventory plus
outstanding pans orders one parts lead time period into the future. PartsOrderQry is the
standard ordering quantity for suppliers, and PartsSajetyStock is the quantity of inventory
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in parts maintained for safety purposes. Put in other words, if the total parts inventory
level is expected to drop below the safety stock level within one lead time period, a new
order is submitted for parts. Exactly one lead time period into the future, the order will
arrive into Parts Inventory and may then be used by the assembly process. PartsOrderQty
and PartsSa!etyStock are parameters set for the entire model and are discussed below.
For the monthly planning model, parts orders are planned for an entire month but
are still placed in weekly increments. The MRP requirements calculated at the beginning
of the month detennine each weeks' parts orders. The equation now becomes:
{
partsOrderQty, if ExpectedParts!nventoryp.IJLT + i-I S partssa/etyStoCk}
PartsOrderi =
0, otherwise
{
4' for 4 - week monthS}i =1,2, ... n where n =
5, for 5 - week months
where i repesents the number of the week in the planning month. A parts order for
the second week of the month is detennined by calculating the ExpecredParts!nventory
one lead time period plus one week into the future. A pans order for the third week is
detennined from the ExpectedPartlnventory one lead time plus two weeks into the future,
and so on.
Assembly Order - orders for the assembly process in sales units. Once again, orders are
only submitted on Mondays as detennined MRP-style by offsetting forecasted weekly
demand by parts order lead times and accounting for inventories inbetween.
The equations used vary slightly between the monthly planning and the weekly
planning models since parts are ordered weekly in both cases, but the monthly planning
model only plans once per month and must detennine weekly assembly quantities
throughout the month. In general, the assembly order is detennined by taking the
expected quantity of finished goods that will be needed and subtracting what will be
available for filling the finished goods needs. The equation takes into account current
levels of bulk inventory, finished goods inventory, assembly WIP, packaging/sterilization
WIP, assembly outstanding orders, and pack/ster outstanding orders, The basic equation
for a weekly assembly order is:
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AssemblyOrder ={(What will be needed) - (What will be available)}
={(Forecast + Desired Safety Stock) - (Expected Inventory Level)}
(ForecastAss.mbl,LT + PClCkSlDLT + FGSa!etyStock + Bu/kSa[eryStock)
= _(ExpectedFG!nVenrOryN.rlmblyL.T + PadS,.,LT )
+ ExpectedBulklnventoryAss.mblyLT + PacU,.,LT
where ExpectedBulklnventory is the expected level of bulk inventory, assembly
WIP, and outstanding assembly orders one lead time period into the future, and
ExpectedFGInventory is the expected level of FG inventory, packaging/sterilization WIP,
and outstanding packaging/sterilization orders one lead time period into the future. A lead
time in this case represents the total time to transfonn pans into finished goods -- i.e.,
assembly lead time plus packaging/sterilization lead time. FGSaferyStock and
BulkSafetyStock are the quantities of inventory in finished goods and bulk instruments,
respectively, maintained for safety purposes. Put in other words, enough product is
ordered into assembly each week to meet demand and cover safety stock levels.
Delivery of assembled instruments into bulk inventory differs from deliveries of
pans into pans inventory. Unlike pans ordering where an entire order is delivered all at
once, bulk instruments are delivered daily at a steady rate into Bulk Inventory. The rate of
delivery is simple the size of the assembly order divided by the number of days in the
assembly lead time. Once a lead time period has passed, an entire assembly order will
have been delivered into Bulk Inventory.
For the monthly planning model, assembly orders are planned for an entire month
but are still scheduled in weekly increments. The MRP requirements calculated at the
beginning of the month detennine each weeks' assembly orders. The equation now for
assembly scheduling now becomes:
AssemblyOrderi =
(ForecastAuMtbIyLT + Pot:UurLT +; -1 + FGSa!etyStock + BulkSa!etyStock)
(
ExpectedFGlnventOryAuatbIyLT + P«ts,..LT +; -I )
+ ExpecredBulklnventoryAuMthlyLT + P«tS.LT +; - I
{
4' for 4 - week months}i =1,2, ...n where n = 5, for 5- week months
where i repesents the nUinber of the week in the planning month. An assembly
order for L~e second week of the month is detennined by calculating the
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ExpectedFGlnventory and the ExpectedBulklnventory one lead time period plus one week
into the future. An assembly order for the third week is detennined from the
ExpectedFGlnventory and the ExpectedBulklnventory one lead time plus two weeks into
the future, and so on.
PacklSter Order - orders for finished goods in sales units. Orders can be submitted as
often as every day depending on the finished goods inventory levels.
As discussed previously, packaging/sterilization operates using a pure "demand-
pull" methc.xl which does not utilize the monthly forecasts. Instead, finished goods
inventory levels are monitored on a daily basis, and when the level for a particular prc.xluct
drops below the predefined order point, a new batch of the prc.xluct is initiated through the
packaging/sterilization process. The equation for Pack/Ster Order is similar to Parts
Order except that expected inventory is replaced with actual inventory and the safety
stock becomes the order point:
{
packSterOrderQty , if FGlnventory ~ FGOrderpoint}
PackSterOrder =
0, otherwise
The equation states that when FGInventory falls below FGOrderpoint, a batch of
size PackSterOrderQty is initiated through packaging/sterilization and will arrive in its
entirety into finished goods exactly one lead time peric.xllater.
Distributor Order - orders for fmished product from dealers or international affl1iates.
Actual weekly order data is broken evenly down into daily order data by dividing by the
number of days in a week.
A.3 Setting Model Parameters
In addition to variables, several parameters may be set in the model which also influence
the results of the simulations. These parameters include Parts Safety Stock, Bulk Safety
Stock, Finished Goods Safety Stock, Parts Order Quantity, Pack/Ster Order Quantity, and
Pack/Ster Lead Time. All of these parameters remain constant between the monthly
planning and the weekly planning models and, therefore, discussion of how they are set is
unimponant to the comparison of the mc.xlels. In general, the parameters are set as closely
as possible to values used in the actual supply chain.
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